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ABSTRACT 
The Donovan Report (1965-1968) is often seen as one of the great failures in the 
overall attempt to deal with the thorny problem of the contentious nature of industrial 
relations in post-war Britain. This thesis re-examines that report and subsequent 
governmental responses, using numerous sources, many of which have barely been 
used by previous authors, in order to establish where it all went wrong. Such an 
examination is important to inform future governments on some of the problems of 
trying to legislate on industrial relations matters.  
This thesis addresses the central question addressed by the Report – the validity of 
employing legislation to deal with the problems within industrial relations, asking 
what contribution had legislation made to the ordering of industrial relations in the 
past, and what lessons future governments could take from that? Why did both the 
Labour Governments under Harold Wilson and the Conservative Government under 
Edward Heath choose to go beyond Donovan in their attempts to alter the role of the 
state in industrial relations? Finally, could the Industrial Relations Act 1971, had it 
survived, have been to the benefit of trade unions in time?  
This thesis suggests that legislation had an important role to play in the ordering of 
industrial relations, and that collective bargaining alone, although effective in many 
areas, was unable to address issues which had wider implications, such as those 
relating to health and safety or the reconciliation of differences due to the laws’ 
interference with trade unions’ rights to defend their members and their own 
collective rights. Both the Labour and Conservative Governments chose to go 
beyond the measures proposed by Donovan because economic and political 
necessity demanded a greater measure of control over strike action. However, the 
inquiry had undoubtedly focused the debate on whether or not legislation could ever 
be the most appropriate tool for controlling industrial relations, and therefore acted 
as a catalyst for the reforms that followed. 
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 failed to bring about the hoped-for industrial peace. 
Its repeal in 1974, however, did nothing to prevent further rises in strikes after 1974. 
Piecemeal legislation in the 1980s and 1990s did bring about a greater level of 
industrial peace, but this suggests that it was not legislation per se that was the 
wrong strategy for controlling industrial relations, but rather the method and pace of 
6 
 
implementation. Other means of maintaining industrial peace were experimented 
with and could have been successful if the political will had been there and the 
unions and employers had engaged more fully, but the seeds had been sown for 
legislative control and it was impossible to hold back the tide of restrictive legislation 
which followed these early forays into the concept of law as a means of controlling 
industrial relations. The Donovan Report did indeed represent the thin end of the 
legal wedge and opened the floodgates to the many enactments designed to control 
and emasculate the trade union movement which the Conservative governments of 
the 1980s and early 1990s were able to introduce. 
The collective failures of the Donovan Report, In Place of Strife and the Industrial 
Relations Act to bring about industrial peace were, however, only indicative that 
legislation was not the most appropriate means of achieving this goal at this 
particular point in time. Alternative attempts to reduce strikes and engage trade 
unions in closer working relationships with employers and their associations, and 
with the government, did meet with some success in the 1970s and may be usefully 
attempted again in the future. This will, however, depend on whether government is 
able to keep an open mind on the utility, or perhaps futility, of legislative controls 
such as those attempted in the years between 1965 and 1975. 
  
7 
 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACAS  Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
AESD  Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen 
AEF  Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers 
AEU  Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union 
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
ASLEF Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
ASTMS  Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
BJIR  British Journal of Industrial Relations 
CAC  Central Arbitration Committee 
CAS  Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
CBI  Confederation of British Industry 
CIR   Commission for Industrial Relations 
CSCA  Civil Service Clerical Association 
DATA  Draughtsmen’s and Allied Technicians’ Association 
DEP  Department of Employment and Productivity 
EEF  Engineering Employers Federation 
EPA  Employment Protection Act 
8 
 
ETU  Electrical Trades Union 
GMW  General and Municipal Workers Union 
HSWA Health and Safety at Work Act 
ICR  Industrial Cases Reports 
ILJ  Industrial Law Journal 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
ILP  Independent Labour Party 
IRA  Industrial Relations Act 
IRLR  Industrial Relations Law Reports 
IRJ  Industrial Relations Journal 
ISTC  Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
IPOS  In Place of Strife 
LRC  Labour Representation Committee 
MFGB  Mining Federation of Great Britain 
MLR  Modern Law Review 
MPS  Manpower and Productivity Service 
MSC  Manpower Services Commission 
NALGO National Association of Local Government Officers 
NBPI  National Board for Prices and Incomes 
9 
 
NEC  National Executive Committee 
NEDC  National Economic Development Council 
NIRC  National Industrial Relations Court 
NUGMW National Union of General and Municipal Workers 
NUM   National Union of Mineworkers 
NUPE  National Union of Public Employees 
NUR  National Union of Railwaymen 
OUP  Oxford University Press 
SI  Statutory Instrument 
TDA  Trade Disputes Act 
TGWU Transport and General Workers’ Union 
TUC  Trades Union Congress 
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians 
UKAPE United Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
 
  
10 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The 1960s was a period of economic difficulties in Britain, a time when there was a 
popular view that trade unions were partly, or even largely, to blame for rising 
inflation and Britain’s declining industrial competitiveness due to frequent damaging 
strikes. By 1964, the Conservatives, already in government for thirteen years, were 
aware of a growing public disquiet around trade union power and influence. In 
response, the Government announced that a Royal Commission would be 
established after the General Election, with a remit to examine all aspects of trade 
union law. Although the Conservatives subsequently lost the General Election in 
October 1964, the new Labour Government appeared also to perceive some benefits 
in this policy, and it announced the appointment of a Royal Commission in February 
1965 under the chairmanship of Lord Donovan. The Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers’ Associations was tasked with a thorough consideration of the 
relations between management and employees, and the role of trade unions and 
employers’ associations in promoting the interests of their members and in 
accelerating the social and economic advance of the nation, with particular reference 
to the law.1 The resultant Report, the ensuing White Paper2 proposals which were to 
some extent based on its recommendations, and the legislation which implemented 
some of them, but added others,3 would collectively prove to be a watershed event in 
the evolution of industrial relations and of the law relating to trade unions, although 
                                                
1 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, 1965‐1968, Chairman: The Right Honourable 
Lord Donovan, Cmnd. 3623, 1968. 
2 In Place of Strife, Cmnd. 3888. 
3 See Chapter 5 below on the Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
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not all historians and contemporaries would necessarily agree on the extent of the 
impact which this engendered.4  
i. Historiography 
This thesis considers the role of legislation from an historical perspective, focusing 
on the Donovan Report, the subsequent White Paper, In Place of Strife, and the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971. These three documents collectively provide a unique 
and rigorous focus on the role of the law in industrial relations, which can give a 
valuable insight into the extent that legislation can be an instrument for achieving 
and maintaining industrial harmony. The research seeks to address the debate about 
the value of legislation in industrial relations, and to examine whether or not the 
events of the 1960s and early 1970s suggest that legislation in industrial relations 
could ever be more than just a means of providing a floor of rights for workers. The 
effect and value of industrial relations legislation from an historical viewpoint, with the 
focus on these three documents, offers an opportunity to examine just how effective 
legislation in industrial relations was in the context of the contentious climate of the 
1960s and early 1970s. 
An additional factor which adds to the overall interest in these three documents is 
that they were the product of both Labour and Conservative governments, which 
thereby contributes a political element to the focus and the outcomes of the 
documents. The relationship between politics, legislation and trade unions has been 
widely considered by politicians, industrial relations experts, and labour historians 
whose findings are reviewed here. In addition, the diaries and biographies of 
politicians and trade unionists are able to provide personal, and often opposing, 
                                                
4 For a comprehensive account of trade unions and their relationship with the law up to 1958, see D. N. Pritt 
and R. Freeman, The Law Versus the Trade Unions, (London, 1958). 
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views of the role of legislation in industrial relations.5  Political commentators and 
historians such as Keith Middlemas, Peter Dorey, Lewis Minkin, Denis Barnes and 
H. M. Drucker have written extensively on the relationship between trade unions and 
the two main political parties.6 Dorey noted a shift in attitude in the Conservative 
Party away from collective laissez-faire7 as the accepted norm, particularly among 
the younger members and especially so after the 1964 General Election.8 Minkin 
wrote extensively on what he termed the ‘contentious alliance’ between the Labour 
Party and the unions, suggesting that each operated in separate spheres, neither 
intruding on the work of the other.9 Barnes noted the weakened partnership between 
Labour and the unions in the 1960s,10 while Drucker observed that critics ‘of both left 
and right objected that the unions had too much influence over the [Labour] party.’11 
More specifically, the link between labour legislation and trade unions in the late 
1960s and early 1970s has received extensive attention from labour historians and 
industrial relations experts, indicating the areas where such government legislation 
                                                
5 B. Castle, Fighting all the Way, (London, 1993); B. Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964‐1976, (London, 1990); R. 
Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume Three, Secretary of State for Social Services, 1968‐70, 
(London, 1977); G. Goodman, The Awkward Warrior, Frank Cousins His Life and Times, (London, 1979); J. 
Jones, Union Man: An Autobiography, (London, 1986); H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964‐1970: A 
Personal Record, (London, 1971); C. Wrigley, British Trade Unions 1945‐1995, (Manchester, 1997). 
6 V.L. Allen, Trade Unions and the Government (London, 1960); P. Bell, The Labour Party in Opposition 1970‐74, 
(London, 2004); P. Dorey, The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions, (London, 1995); J. McIlroy, N. Fishman, 
A. Campbell, (eds), The High Tide of British Trade Unions: Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, 1964‐79, 
(Monmouth, 2007); K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911, 
(London, 1979); M. Moran, Politics of Industrial Relations: The Origins, Life and Death of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971, (London, 1977); B. Pimlott, C.  Cook, (eds), Trade Unions in British Politics: The First 250 
Years, (London, 1991); B. Pimlott,  V. Cook, (eds), Trade Unions in British Politics, (London, 1982); A. Seldon, 
Churchill’s Indian Summer: the Conservative government, 1951‐55, (London, 1981); J. Sheldrake,  Industrial 
Relations & Politics in Britain, 1880‐1989, (London, 1991); R. Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British 
Politics: Government and Unions since 1945, (Oxford, 1993); S. Webb, B. Webb, Industrial Democracy, (London, 
1897). 
7 A reference to government policy to leave trade unions to bargain freely, with limited government 
intervention. 
8 P. Dorey, British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945 – 1964, (Farnham, 2009). 
9 L. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, (Edinburgh, 1991). 
10 D. Barnes, E. Reid, Governments and Trade Unions; The British Experience 1964‐79, (London, 1980). 
11 H.M. Drucker, ‘The Influence of the trade unions on the ethos of the Labour Party’, in B. Pimlott,  V. Cook, 
(eds), Trade Unions in British Politics, (London, 1982), p. 243. 
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has been actively sought and welcomed by the trade unions, and where it has been 
vehemently opposed.12  Industrial relations and the associated problems and 
potential solutions have also been the subject of much literary attention from 
industrial relations experts, both in Britain and as a subject for comparative study 
from further afield. Collectively, these publications present a wide variety of 
interpretations of the nature of industrial relations of the 1960s and early 1970s 
which aims to shed considerable light on the wider debate about the reasons for and 
effectiveness of legislation in dealing with industrial relations.13  However, very little 
attention has been paid to the role of legislation from the perspective of those who 
administer and interpret it – the lawyers. This thesis therefore aims to provide a new 
point of view, examining the law with the focus on the three key documents and 
related literature, and in particular how the legislation and proposals for new laws 
were received by those who were most affected by it, that is the trade unions. 
The Donovan inquiry was the last attempt to comprehensively address the problems 
of industrial relations in the twentieth century, and historians have assessed the 
                                                
12 P. Davies, M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, (Oxford, 1993); S. Deakin, G. Morris, Labour 
Law, (Oxford, 2012); B. Hepple,  ‘Great Britain’ in International Encyclopaedia of Labour Law & Industrial 
Relations, (Dordrecht, 1977); O. Kahn‐Freund,  Labour and the Law, (London, 1977; R.  Lewis, J.  Clark,  (eds), 
Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic: Selected German Writings of Otto Kahn‐Freund, (Oxford, 
1981); O. Kahn‐Freund, ‘Industrial Relations and the Law – Retrospect and Prospect’, BJIR, Vol. 7, Issue 3; W. 
McCarthy,  (ed.), Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations, Gains and Losses, (Oxford, 1992); D. N.  Pritt , R. 
Freeman, The Law Versus the Trade Unions, (London, 1958); R. Undy, P. Fosh,  H. Morris,  O. Smith,  R. Martin,  
Managing the Unions: The Impact of Legislation on Trade Unions’ Behaviour, (Oxford, 1996); K.W. 
Wedderburn,  R. Lewis,  J. Clark, (eds), Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn‐Freund., (Oxford, 
1983); Lord Wedderburn,  The Worker and the Law, (Harmondsworth, 1986); K.W. Wedderburn, Labour Law 
and Freedom: Further Essays in Labour Law, (London, 1995); K.W. Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour 
Relations in Britain’, BJIR, Vol. X, Issue 2, (1972); R. Lewis, ‘The Historical Development of Labour Law’, BJIR, 
Vol. XIV, Issue 1, (1976); G. H. Sorrell. ‘The Role of the Law in an Industrial Relations System’, The Journal of 
Industrial Relations, March 1969; J. Wood, ‘Whither Labour Law Now?’ BJIR, 1 November 1970. 
13 H. Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, (Oxford, 1979); H. Clegg,  The System 
of Industrial Relations in Britain, (Oxford, 1970); A. Flanders, H. Clegg, (eds), ‘The System of Industrial Relations 
in Great Britain, (Oxford, 1954); A. Flanders, Collective Bargaining: Prescription for Change, (London, 1967); A. 
Flanders, Industrial Relations: What is Wrong with the System? (London, 1965); A. Flanders, ‘The Tradition of 
Voluntarism’, BJIR, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1974; E. Heffer, The Class Struggle in Parliament: A Socialist View of 
Industrial Relations, (London, 1973); O. Kahn‐Freund, Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment, (Oxford, 
1979); W.E.J. McCarthy, ‘The Nature of the Strike Problem’, BJIR, July 1970, Vol. 8, Issue 2; J.W. Garbarino, 
‘Managing Conflict in Industrial Relations: U.S. Experience and Current Issue in Britain’, BJIR, November 1969. 
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value of the Report in its endeavours to find solutions to the problems in the 1960s in 
different ways. Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged from the 
historiography on industrial relations in relationship to the Donovan Report, In Place 
of Strife and the Industrial Relations Act 1971. Some commentators have approved 
of the avoidance of any rush to legislation and the relatively modest 
recommendations of the Donovan Report, while others were critical that both the 
Report and In Place of Strife were missed opportunities. 
 
Keith Middlemas, for instance, argued that the Donovan Commission was aware of 
the perils inherent in legislative interference in industrial relations. He reflected that 
the Donovan Commission understood only too well the danger of ‘governments 
using the law for fundamentally incompatible political ends’.14 He believed that, in the 
wake of the Donovan Report and In Place of Strife, there was in fact a real, 
constitutional danger,15 suggesting that the use of legislation to circumscribe trade 
unions’ political power gave rise to a ‘dissociation between legally-prescribed activity 
and activity legitimised by a form of mass popular democracy.’16 Since trade unions 
are essentially private, democratic organisations, any legislative attempt to 
circumscribe their activities would necessarily have to be approached with the 
utmost caution to ensure acceptance and compliance by the unions. To try and 
impose the will of Parliament on a reluctant union movement would also need strong 
justification in a country subject to both European Convention human rights laws and 
rules of the International Labour Organisation. 
                                                
14 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911, (London, 1979), 
p. 433.   
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.  
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Stephen Dunn, writing 25 years after the publication of the Donovan Report, was 
aware of the accusations heaped upon it which had condemned the Report as an 
irrelevance, but nevertheless considered that ‘it had weathered rather well’.17 He 
pointed out that the desire of the Donovan Commission for a ‘decentralized, 
management-driven collective bargaining system, stuffed with formal rule-making 
procedures’ was a prominent feature of the UK private sector.18 Peter Ingram went 
so far as to suggest that the 1980s were when the Donovan reforms ‘came of age’.19 
These writers appear to suggest that proposals for reform, particularly in the form of 
legislation, must be suited to the particular period in which they are introduced. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented in this thesis also suggests that proposals for 
new legislation should not be based on historical successes, nor be designed to 
address future problems which have not yet manifested themselves. New legislation, 
it is suggested, should be appropriate for the prevailing circumstances. 
Dunn also defended the purpose of a Royal Commission, proposing that Donovan 
had been able to get the government ‘off the hook’ by suggesting that it could 
actually do something about the disorder without offending the unions, and that it 
was not Donovan’s fault if the government ‘promptly got itself back on the hook by 
proposing legal penalties against unofficial strikers’20 which were included in both In 
Place of Strife and the Industrial Relations Act. He went on to suggest that the 
‘juggernaut’ Industrial Relations Act was not the only way to proceed, citing 
Crossley’s alternative of developing the law experimentally, ‘taking account of the 
initially limited capacity and motivation of the parties to move forward in the direction 
                                                
17 S. Dunn, ‘From Donovan to ... Wherever’, BJIR, 31:2, June 1993, 169‐187 at 170. 
18 Ibid. 
19 P.N. Ingram, ‘Changes in working practices in British manufacturing industry in the 1980s: a study of 
employee concessions made during wage negotiations’, BJIR, 29(1), 12. 
20 Dunn, ‘From Donovan to ... Wherever’, 171. 
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proposed.’21 The Conservatives in the 1980s had greater success in this regard by 
introducing industrial legal reforms only incrementally.22 Despite this, Dunn argues 
that ‘Donovan’s pragmatic judgements on legal intervention were sound’ and even 
suggests that ‘the drama of the 1970s had to be played out and the stage littered 
with bodies before the cleansing could begin.’23 Nevertheless, this was not the 
intention of the politicians or the unions at the time that these events played out. 
Nevertheless, while those writing on the Donovan Commission in the 1970s, such as 
Keith Middlemas, may have approved of the Commission’s antipathy towards the 
law, David Metcalf, writing in 1993 and with the benefit of hindsight, considered that 
the Royal Commission had ‘underestimated the potential of the law to influence 
industrial relations’.24 The evidence in his paper suggests that outcomes can be 
altered by legislation, noting the reduction in industrial action which resulted from a 
series of Conservative Government enactments to control union activity in the 1980s. 
He admits, however, that the Commission were right to be cautious, citing the 
disastrous experience with the Industrial Relations Act 1971 as a warning against 
assuming that the unions would meekly accept new laws which interfered with the 
freedom to bargain collectively.  
Labour historians, in particular, have noted the rise in demands for industrial 
legislation from across the political spectrum in the 1960s. Andrew Taylor observed 
that the Conservatives had seemed determined to undertake ‘legislative reform of 
                                                
21 J. Crossley, ‘The Donovan Report: a case study in the poverty of historicism’, BJIR, 6(3), 301, cited in Dunn, 
ibid., 172. 
22 W. Brown and S. Wadhwani, ‘The economic effects of industrial relations legislation since 1979’, National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research Economic Review, February 1990. 
23 Dunn, ‘From Donovan to ... Wherever’, 173. 
24 D. Metcalf, ‘Industrial Relations and Economic Performance’, BJIR, 31, 2 June 1993, 255‐283. 
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the voluntarist tradition of non-intervention in industrial relations’,25 although Andrew 
Thorpe warned that such a top-down solution as the Conservatives proposed [in the 
Industrial Relations Bill] had very little chance of being effective. Indeed, he was 
eventually proved correct.26 Chris Wrigley observed in the late 1990s that the 1960s 
had witnessed a ‘substantial politicization of industrial relations through proposals for 
legislation’.27  He was able to chart the start of the decline in voluntarism at around 
this time, and noted that there had never been a return to the status of collective 
laissez-faire as the dominant method of regulating industrial relations. These 
observations lend weight to the suggestion that the Donovan Report was the 
beginning of a watershed moment in the evolution of British industrial relations, and 
the start of a move towards greater legislative control from which there would be no 
turning back. 
The Donovan Report may have failed inasmuch as many of its solutions were not 
implemented, but it is far from being an irrelevancy. Dunn’s revisionist essay 
reconsidered Donovan’s ‘obsessive gnawing at the credibility of even the simplest 
proposal for legal reform’ and ‘the yawning gap in the explanation of why new 
voluntary regulation would work when fresh legal regulation would so dismally fail’.28 
He concluded that it was ‘a pity that a plan for legal reform did not emerge from the 
Commission to be speedily implemented’ and thought that the Industrial Relations 
Act, had it survived, would have been beneficial to the unions and would at least 
                                                
25 A. Taylor, ‘The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions’, in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman, A. Campbell (eds), The 
High Tide of British Trade Unions, p. 151. 
26 A. Thorpe, ‘The Labour Party and the Trade Unions’, in J. McIlroy, N. Fishman, A. Campbell (eds), The High 
Tide of British Trade Unions, p. 138. 
27 C. Wrigley, British Trade Unions 1945‐1995, (Manchester, 1997), p. 26. 
28 Dunn, ‘From Donovan to ... Wherever’, 182.  
18 
 
have put them on a solid legal footing and avoided them ‘attaining their present 
semi-outlaw status.’29  
The historiography surrounding the Donovan Report suggests that it provided the 
catalyst for change in industrial relations even though it came in for much criticism at 
the time of publication, with historians and other writers divided over its conclusions 
and recommendations, only a few of which were implemented. Many thought it did 
not go far enough. Dunn sums up the various views on Donovan by concluding, ‘The 
more left-wing the commentator, the more likely he/she is to see Donovan as a 
success. The more right-wing, the more likely he/she is to find failure.’30 
Nonetheless, he argued that there have been lasting benefits which are directly 
attributable to the Report, such as the recommendation for a remedy for unfair 
dismissal, and which would not have come about in the absence of government 
‘interference’, but that ‘its essence – the pluralism at the heart of Donovan 
philosophy – was an optimistic hope, and that is being discarded.’31 
Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, writing on In Place of Strife, considered the 
outcome of its proposals to be ‘a matter of central significance to the whole history of 
labour legislation’ in the post-war period.32 The Labour Government’s position was 
seriously weakened by its defeat over its proposals by the trade unions, and, ‘in 
terms of its implications for the development of labour law, it was a climactic event’, 
marking an important stage on the road away from collective laissez-faire.33 
Nevertheless, the White Paper was also seen by some as a missed opportunity, and 
that ‘agreement could have opened up a much needed debate on trade union/state 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 P. Davies, M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, (Oxford, 1993), p. 273. 
33 Ibid.  
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relations, broadened the appeal of the Labour party and laid the foundations for the 
development of a planned economy in which full employment and low inflation could 
have been pursued.’34 
More recently, again Bob Hepple reviewed the law, and was still convinced that it 
had value as a body of regulatory norms which acted as a supplement to collective 
bargaining, as advocated by Kahn-Freund in 196935 and by many others on the 
Donovan Commission. He considered that the advice of Kahn-Freund for more law 
of this kind was ‘ignored by the ill-fated Industrial Relations Act’.36 Brian Weekes 
went further in his article, citing the reason for the failure of the Act as ‘the simple-
minded assumption that law directly and inevitably reduces conflict’, saying that this 
was ‘erroneous’.37 
Collectively, the three documents could have been viewed as failures or even 
irrelevancies in the 1960s and 1970s, but the historiography suggests that they each, 
collectively and individually, marked a turning point in the evolution of industrial 
relations legislation. On that view they must be worthy of further examination in the 
twenty-first century, particularly in the light of the recent trend towards further 
legislation designed to emasculate the unions and restrict their legitimate activities. 
 
 
 
                                                
34 R. J. Taylor, Victims of our History, The Labour Party and In Place of Strife, 1968 to 1969, (Unpublished 
thesis), 2004, p. 272. Also see R. Taylor, ‘What if Harold Wilson and the unions had agreed In Place of Strife?’ 
in, Prime Minister Portillo and other things that never happened, D. Brack and I. Dale (eds) (London, 2003). 
35 O. Kahn‐Freund, ‘Industrial Relations and the Law – Retrospect and Prospect’, 1969, 7 BJIR, 323. 
36 B. Hepple, ‘The Future of Labour Law’, Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 24, Issue 4, 1995, 303‐322. 
37 B. Weekes, ‘ACAS – An Alternative to Law’, Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 1979, 147‐159. 
20 
 
ii. Aims and questions 
The primary aim of this research is to conduct an analysis of the place that 
legislation held within industrial relations through an examination of the Donovan 
Report, In Place of Strife and the Industrial relations Act 1971, to analyze academic 
writings on these three documents, and to suggest reasons why they failed to 
translate into workable solutions to the various problems within industrial relations in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In the light of those findings, alternatives to legislation which 
have been considered or attempted during the same period are examined to 
determine whether greater attention should have been paid to these, and whether 
they could have provided workable, alternative solutions to the problems of strikes 
that beset Britain, offering a more effective means of gaining the cooperation of 
unions with employers and governments. Greater support for collective bargaining 
was the preferred alternative to legislation of the Donovan Commission, but other 
important mechanisms include the Social Contract, the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service, and employee participation or industrial democracy. 
These three principal documents have been selected since, collectively, they 
represent a watershed moment in labour history, marking the beginning of a slow 
decline in voluntarism in collective bargaining from which the trade unions have 
never recovered. They also represent an outstanding example of the process of 
legislation of the most important kind, beginning with a thorough review of industrial 
relations and existing law by a Royal Commission, followed by a consultative White 
Paper, and culminating in an Act of Parliament. Critically, both the White Paper and 
the statute contained restrictions on trade unions which went well beyond the 
Donovan recommendations, thereby casting some doubt on the overall purpose of a 
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Royal Commission, which is to inquire, consider and make recommendations on the 
best possible way forward for future legislation.  
The second aim is to establish whether the events of this period indicate that there is 
more of a role for the law in industrial relations than the Donovan Commission was 
prepared to admit. Indeed,  a detached appraisal of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
could, it has been suggested, have been to the benefit of trade unions in time, 
ensuring a degree of democracy among members on the decision to strike, with a 
secret ballot and a cooling-off period before strike action in vital services.38 
The third and final aim is to consider whether the Industrial Relations Act 1971 - in 
some respects a reaction to the failure of In Place of Strife – prepared the way for 
the incremental legislative approach of the Thatcher and Major Conservative 
governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Through a critical appraisal of the strategic 
and legislative errors made by both the Labour and Conservative Governments of 
this period, the thesis examines what lessons could be learned by subsequent 
governments. In particular, to demonstrate that there may be a middle way for 
industrial relations regulation – somewhere between voluntarism and highly 
restrictive legislation. That is, that historical lessons are taken into account by 
governments, that there are sound, well-defined reasons for introducing restrictive 
legislation, and that it is introduced slowly and through a process of small step-
changes in order to gain acceptance through a gradual and consultative process. 
The questions addressed here are therefore: 
1. Why did the three documents fail to translate into workable solutions to the 
problems of industrial relations? 
                                                
38 Industrial Relations Act 1971, ss. 138, 141 and 143. 
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2. Would alternative methods have been preferable? 
3. Is there more of a role for legislation than the Donovan Commission was 
prepared to admit? 
4. Did the Industrial Relations Act prepare for the incremental legislative 
approach which followed in the 1980s, and are there sound reasons for 
introducing restrictive legislation more slowly? 
5. Is there a middle way, between restrictive legislation to control trade union 
activity and complete autonomy? 
6. What lessons can be learned from this study which might inform future 
legislation? 
 
iii. Methodology  
 
iii (a) Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to establish what really happened in the industrial 
relations debate in the 1960s and 1970s, and what can be learned from the attempts 
to legislate at a time of burgeoning union strength and Conservative and Labour 
uncertainty and hesitancy about unbridled trade unionism and strike action? 
The Donovan Report was heavily criticized when it was published.  Very few of its 
recommendations were implemented, successive governments having instead 
pursued more radical polices, including extensive restrictive legislation. The Labour 
Government made several proposals for new laws in the White Paper, In Place of 
Strife, but it failed to gain agreement from the unions and these were not 
implemented. The subsequent Industrial Relations Act 1971, despite its numerous 
23 
 
provisions for the exercise of greater control over unions, also failed to realize its key 
objectives, which were to bring greater order into collective bargaining and reduce 
strikes, thereby casting substantial doubt on the efficacy of such legislation.  
In order to determine whether legislation was in fact an appropriate medium for 
regulating trade unions during this particular period of history, it has been necessary 
to pursue a number of research objectives. The first was to examine and analyze 
these three primary sources in terms of proposed changes to the law which they 
contained. The second was to make a thorough investigation and analysis of written 
opinion on them, by historians, politicians, industrial relations experts, journalists, 
trade unionists, legal experts and employers’ organizations. The final objective was 
to establish a synthesis from those resources, to establish the efficacy of legislation 
in industrial relations from an historical viewpoint, and to determine what lessons 
may be learnt from this for future legislators. Through careful examination and 
analysis of key primary and secondary sources, this thesis endeavours to advance 
theoretical explanations for the role of legislation within industrial relations of the 
1960s and early 1970s, using these key historical documents as the focus for this 
study. 
iii (b) Ethical considerations 
Ethically, such an examination posed few difficulties since the majority of those 
involved in the preparation of these primary sources, and many of the secondary 
sources, are deceased. The Thirty-Year Rule also implicitly suggests that the 
relevant government documents are no longer considered to be potentially damaging 
to governments or the Monarchy. Further scrutiny of them would therefore be 
unlikely to cause distress to their authors. Therefore, to meet the objectives set out 
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above, documentary and archival research methods were used as the primary focus 
of the investigations. 
iii (c) Initial research 
In approaching this research I was mindful of the need to painstakingly examine the 
three documents, and consider them in relation to the contemporary and secondary 
articles, books and journals that have been written on them in a form of comparative 
historical analysis. This has involved examining the views of the key protagonists. 
Since many of the authors had drawn on primary source material, the next stage was 
to investigate those sources, and related materials, including government records. 
Many of these documents had been classified as confidential, secret or ‘top secret’ 
and therefore offered an insight into what was said in private by politicians and in 
their meetings with industrialists and trade union leaders. To gain the views of trade 
unionists, the TUC archives gave access to the verbatim reports of TUC Congress 
meetings and minutes of other meetings. These archives combined to give access to 
a range of very different perspectives on the same subjects, enabling a fuller and 
more balanced understanding of events.  
These documents were studied in chronological order in order to examine the 
sequence of events, some of which were compressed into a very short space of 
time, such as the discussions between the Government and the TUC over In Place 
of Strife. The single document which received lengthy and highly detailed 
consideration was in fact the Donovan Report itself, although much of the initial 
detail had to be omitted in the final thesis. 
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iii (d) Extended research 
Following a reading of In Place of Strife and the Donovan Report, the various views 
held by politicians, trade unionists and industrialists were examined to determine 
which issues they debated, and which proved to be the most controversial. These 
were found in newspapers, books, journals, trade union publications, TUC reports 
and in the collected papers of Eric Heffer and others, but government records and 
diaries offered a more personal insight into the focus of policy objectives of the time. 
Barbara Castle’s diaries and the records of meetings which took place at the level of 
government revealed the anxiety over the parlous state of industrial relations and its 
effect on the economy. Similarly, the records of the major political parties revealed 
the often opposing views, both on trade unions themselves and on the correct 
course of action to be taken in order to reduce strikes and improve industrial 
relations. 
For further analysis of parliamentary debates, and for a more focused examination of 
important political events, newspapers such as the The Times and The Guardian 
gave insightful, although often subjective, contemporaneous accounts.  
Parliamentary debates, on the other hand, were readily accessible through the 
Hansard website and were often reported verbatim in The Times. It was instructive to 
examine these accounts in order to gain multiple perspectives on the issues. 
Biographies of key politicians and trade unionists gave yet another perspective, 
albeit a highly personalized one, on the controversy over the two documents. Jack 
Jones’s biography, Union Man, offered a personal view of the strength of trade 
unions and their bargaining position vis-a-vis the government.  In particular, the 
significance of the position held by Barbara Castle as virtually the only female 
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contributor to the debate, and certainly the only woman to have a major role in 
politics at the time, adds a further interesting dimension. Although this thesis does 
not touch on the significance of feminism in the 1960s, it is highly probable that 
Castle’s determined and ambitious nature which led to her being elevated to such a 
powerful position in government may also have caused her to have overreached 
herself and overestimated what was achievable through legislation. 
The overall research process focused on the purposes of triangulation, using 
different data sources which could support and validate each other, thereby giving a 
fuller and more rounded picture. This thesis therefore draws on a wide range of 
primary resources which have rarely been examined in relation to industrial relations, 
as well as many which are readily accessible. It uses a comparative historical 
analysis approach, comparing and contrasting a wide range of works from a number 
of authors in the fields of industrial relations, history and politics. 
iii (e) Material Selection  
The selection process had the primary sources as its main focus, including 
government records, since these provided the most reliable source of original 
information. Secondary sources were then used to give a range of views and 
perspectives from trade unions, industrialists, and both Conservative and Labour 
politicians. These came from TUC Reports, biographies and diaries, letters and 
Hansard reports. An examination of the historiography was undertaken, measuring it 
against the primary evidence, while the writings of industrial relations experts and 
journalists were used to provide analytical commentary. The contemporary writings 
could take account of the current political and economic situation and offer views on 
how legislation might be appropriate at that time, while those who wrote later 
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accounts could offer a more detached and objective commentary on the events with 
the benefit of hindsight and distance. 
iii (f) Methodology Summary 
The research is largely based on documentary evidence from a variety of sources, 
including major archives. Books and journals, pamphlets, and other material aim to 
give a rounded, holistic examination of both the polarized and the moderate views of 
the role of legislation in industrial relations, much of it in relation to the three 
documents which are central to this thesis. In work of this nature, covering almost a 
decade and examining three highly significant documents, it is impossible to include 
everything that has been written about them. Nevertheless, this thesis attempts to 
provide a broad overview from multiple perspectives with the aim of exploring the 
fundamental role of legislation in an area where, up until the 1960s, it had been 
largely absent. 
iv. Subject matter of the Donovan Inquiry and the nature of the ‘problem’. 
Both trade unions and employers’ associations (EAs) were the subjects of the 
Donovan Commission inquiry, as EAs served some of the same functions as the 
unions, and both they and the representative body for trade unions, the TUC, 
submitted evidence to the inquiry. (The subject matter of this thesis does, however, 
focus primarily on trade unions, with only minimal reference to employers’ 
associations).39 Company managers and employers also gave evidence to the 
                                                
39 At the time of the inquiry, the Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP) listed around 1,350 
employers’ associations. The biggest of these was the EEF which covered 4,600 establishments and over two 
million employees. All of these EAs were concerned directly with the negotiation of wages and working 
conditions. 
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Commission.40 The 108 employers’ associations within the membership of the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) represented companies whose employees 
amounted to more than three-quarters of all employees in the private sector of 
industry and transport, and were thus an important and powerful voice in the debate 
over the role of legislation in industrial relations. 
Trade unions had been the subject of legislative control to varying degrees for well 
over a century, giving rise to a statutory definition of trade unions. However, in the 
Report, the term ‘trade union’ is used to connote combinations of employees only.41  
By 1966, there were large numbers of trade unions, varying in size from 24 members 
of the Jewish Bakers’ Union to almost 1.5 million in the TGWU. There were 574 
different trade unions with a total of 10,111,000 members; 184 of these unions were 
affiliated to the TUC, but these unions between them had a total membership of 
nearly nine million employees.42 Thus, although not all trade unions were affiliated to 
the TUC, it is frequently referred to in this thesis as the representative body for trade 
unions, and its influence with both workers and government was considerable.43  
As to the legal status of trade unions, they were (and still are) private, non-profit 
making associations without corporate status. Agreements forged collectively 
between employers and unions do not have the force of a contractual, legally binding 
agreement, but are binding in honour only.44 In this regard, trade unions are literally 
                                                
40 In 1965 the three main central employers’ organisations ‐ the Federation of British Industries, the British 
Employers’ Confederation and the National Association of British Manufacturers ‐ formed one new 
organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). 
41 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, para. 27. 
42 Ibid., para. 28. 
43 Similarly, references to trade unions here are references to the  leadership of the unions rather than their 
members, unless otherwise stated. 
44 Currently s. 179 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. 
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a law unto themselves,45 reliant upon a system of voluntarism to regulate their 
internal affairs, and it is therefore only through overarching legislation that they can 
be collectively regulated and managed.  Prior to the comprehensive Industrial 
Relations Act 1971,46 legislation relating to trade unions had been largely piecemeal. 
Certainly, there had been no previous attempt made before the Donovan Report to 
undertake such an extensive examination of the role of trade unions and employers’ 
associations, and to consider how industrial relations legislation might be used to 
further the social and economic advance of the nation. 
The Labour Government which established the Donovan Commission could not take 
the trade unions for granted, despite the historically close ties that existed between 
them. Some commentators thought that Labour could at least claim with some 
justification that it was better fitted to deal with the unions than its Conservative 
predecessors.47  The trade union movement – key financial backers of the Labour 
Party - had often looked to Labour governments to legislate to make its life easier.48  
Nevertheless, in 1952, following the election of a Conservative Government, the 
TUC indicated that it had a ‘long-standing practice to work amicably with whatever 
government is in power ... to find practical solutions to the social and economic 
problems facing the country’.49  The problems which had led both Conservative and 
Labour Governments to call for a Royal Commission in the 1960s necessitated 
urgent governmental review. There was a growing belief among trade union 
                                                
45 Trade unions were referred to as ‘outlaws’ in the literal sense by George Woodcock when commenting on 
the Rookes v Barnard decision to the Press,  saying that unions were accustomed to operating outside the law, 
with reference to sections 3 and 4 of the 1906 Act. The Times, 11 September 1964. 
46 The need for ‘comprehensiveness’ was called for by Robert Carr, Shadow Spokesman on Labour and from 
1970 Secretary of State for Employment, in both Fair Deal at Work and on introducing the Industrial Relations 
Bill: HC Deb., 26 November 1970, Vol. 807, c. 633. 
47 C. Crouch, The Politics of Industrial Relations, (Manchester, 1979). 
48 J. Sheldrake, Industrial Relations and Politics in Britain, 1880‐1989, (London, 1981), p. 67. 
49 General Council Report to the TUC, Annual Congress Report, 1952, p. 300. 
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members that ‘the government was demanding unjustified sacrifices ... through the 
imposition of incomes policy’, a view that was beginning to be shared by trade union 
officers, the TUC and Labour backbenchers.50 Nevertheless, the high level of 
industrial unrest, particularly unofficial strikes, led Labour leaders to believe that 
these were attempts to sabotage their attempts to deal with a difficult political and 
economic situation.51 Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, ‘became increasingly 
attracted to the idea of trade union reform and the use of legislative intervention to 
discipline industrial disputes.’52 Wilson may also have harboured hopes that a Royal 
Commission would take the issue of industrial relations out of politics for two or three 
years, and that it could conceivably generate proposals which might improve 
industrial relations, satisfy public opinion and still be acceptable to trade unions.53 
Legislation to control industrial relations was not a new concept when the Royal 
Commission was established in 1965. Indeed, there had been legislation of one kind 
or another for around two hundred years, all aimed at controlling the unions. 
Industrial relations were already in a state of flux, moving from the voluntarist, non-
interventionist position that had become the accepted position from the end of World 
War Two, to an increased level of state, legislative control from the early 1960s 
onwards.54 This fundamental shift from collective laissez-faire as the appropriate 
government policy immediately after the Second World War, when there was 
relatively little government control of industrial relations, through to a realization that 
such a position was no longer tenable, had some justification. Allan Flanders, who 
was a member of the Royal Commission,  noted that the potential for conflict 
                                                
50 Sheldrake, Industrial Relations and Politics in Britain, 1880‐1989, p. 69. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 D. Barnes, E. Reid, Governments and Trade Unions: The British Experience 1964‐1979, (London, 1980). 
54 For example, the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 and the Industrial Training Act 1964. 
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between sectional (i.e. union) and national interests had become more pronounced 
in the post-war years, as full employment impacted on the conduct of collective 
bargaining, creating a wage-price spiral and bringing about a serious degree of 
under-employment of employed labour.55 Employers offered little resistance to 
demands for higher wages, while national agreements did little more than fix 
minimum rates of pay, so there was minimal restraint on economic competition 
among employers for labour.56 Without government intervention, it seemed, the 
wage-price spiral would continue to gather momentum and eventually spin out of 
control. Industrial relations were governed by collective bargaining, and employers 
and employees had the autonomy to regulate their own working relationships 
through non-legal means. However, the arrival of full employment from the late 
1940s which continued throughout the 1950s, combined with the rise in the 
incidence of unofficial strikes, made it increasingly necessary to reconsider the non-
interventionist position. The Donovan Commission would be required to provide 
guidance on how industrial society should be governed in the future, and the role 
that law should play, if indeed it should have any role at all. In particular, it would 
consider whether strict regulation was completely unacceptable, whether there was a 
place for light regulation, or whether any form of regulatory legislation could ever be 
acceptable to the unions.  
 
v. In Place of Strife 
The concerns of politicians in the 1960s, a decade of frequent strikes and an ailing 
economy, were of a more practical and urgent nature than of many of those troubling 
                                                
55 A. Flanders, Collective Bargaining: Prescription for Change, (London, 1967), p. 20. 
56 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the members of the Commission. The post-war consensus between trade unions 
and political parties began to break down in the late 1950s, and calls had begun to 
emerge - initially from the Conservative Party, but later from the Labour Government 
- for more radical policies.57 Barbara Castle, as Secretary of State for Employment 
and Productivity, may therefore have felt compelled to go beyond the Donovan 
recommendations, although the problem for her was ‘how to go further than the 
Donovan Report and give [a consultation paper] a more positive role without causing 
serious conflict with the trade unions.’58 She quickly produced the White Paper, In 
Place of Strife, ‘a coherent and strongly argued document’, which ‘proposed a 
radical, vigorous use of the state in industrial relations,’ according to Robert Taylor.59 
Yet she failed to convince the TUC and key industrial leaders that her policies were 
necessary, and the proposals in the White Paper failed to be translated into 
legislation. The reasons for this are considered in Chapter 4 below. 
vi. The Industrial Relations Act 1971 
The Conservatives wrested power from Labour in 1970. The new Government 
pushed swiftly ahead with its own proposals for reform of industrial relations through 
a series of highly restrictive measures that went considerably further than Castle’s. 
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was passed without delay and without meaningful 
negotiation or consultation with the TUC. The opposition from trade unions and from 
the TUC, both before and after the Bill passed into law, was unprecedented in 
political history, and eventually contributed to the downfall of the Government in 
                                                
57 First noted in A Giant’s Strength, Inns of Court Conservative Association, 1958. Crouch, a sociologist, noted 
that the Party was able to review its policies more radically when released from office in 1964. C. Crouch, The 
Politics of Industrial Relations, (Manchester, 1979), p. 66. 
58 D. Barnes, E. Reid, Governments and Trade Unions: The British Experience 1964‐1979, (London, 1980), p. 113.  
59 R. Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics: Government and Unions since 1945, (Oxford, 1993), 
pp. 159‐160. 
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1974. The Act was quickly repealed by the next Labour Government. Its short life 
was one of the most controversial and ultimately unsuccessful enactments in labour 
history, and served to suggest the inadvisability of using legislation to restrict the 
activities of trade unions without first having meaningful consultation with the 
employers and trade unions. The controversial parts of the Act are considered in 
Chapter 5 and reasons are posited for its failure; in particular, that such restrictive 
legislation is likely to have a better outcome for the legislature if it is introduced in 
stages rather than en bloc, as the Thatcher Government would demonstrate in the 
1980s. 
vii. Conclusion: the purpose of this thesis 
There is a substantial corpus of material on the role of law as it applies to trade 
unions, but this thesis attempts to provide  an in-depth study of the first major post-
war attempt to control strikes and regulate industrial relations in Britain. It takes an 
interdisciplinary approach, with the research sitting on the boundaries between 
Labour and Legal History. It asks whether industrial legislation can be to the benefit 
of workers and trade unions, and also whether there is a point beyond which the 
legislature would be advised not to stray in its efforts to control union activities. This 
particular period of history had already witnessed the development of large-scale 
intervention in collective bargaining through the Prices and Incomes legislation of 
1966 and the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, and would be followed by the Equal 
Pay Act in 1970. Future legislators could derive valuable lessons from events of this 
period when considering further legislation which tries to take control of industrial 
relations, thereby ignoring or sidelining the value of voluntarism and the antipathy of 
trade unions towards laws which interfere with their long-established freedoms. 
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An analysis of the political documents produced between 1965 and 1970 show initial 
agreement between Labour and Conservative thinkers on the efficacy of such 
legislation, but as the economic situation worsened in the late 1960s, both sides 
grew more determined to exercise still greater legislative control over the unions. 
Although Castle called for the Labour Government to introduce more radical legal 
solutions than the Commission had recommended,60 the Conservatives went 
considerably further in their paper, Fair Deal at Work61 and the subsequent Industrial 
Relations Act 1971, despite a clear direction to the contrary produced in 1964 by 
their own think-tank.62 The following chapters provide an analysis of the outcomes of 
these forays into new legislative territory, helping to determine the answer to the 
fundamental question – to what extent can legislation act successfully to regulate 
and control industrial relations in the light of the limited success of Donovan and the 
almost outright failure of the White Paper and the 1971 Act? 
The writings of the Commission members, both before and after the Report, provide 
compelling and credible arguments for voluntarism and self-regulation which, with 
continuing governmental support and minimal control, may well have continued 
unabated. This may have given a wholly different aspect to industrial relations in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century, although the failure of the Commission 
to give serious consideration to non-legislative methods of regulating industrial 
relations such as industrial democracy and union representation on company boards 
was clearly a critical omission.63  
                                                
60 White Paper, In Place of Strife, Cmnd. 3222, 1969. 
61 Fair Deal at Work: The Conservative Approach to Modern Industrial Relations, Conservative Political Centre 
1968. 
62 NA CAB 129/117/1, Report of the Official Committee on Trade Unions and the Law, January 1964.  See 
Chapter 3 below. 
63 Chapter XV of the Royal Commission Report, ‘Workers’ Participation in Management’ ran to just four pages. 
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Chapter 1. The Role of Legislation in Industrial Relations  
 
1.1 Introduction: the role of legislation in industrial relations 
Parliamentary legislation has been a constant companion to the trade union 
movement, initially with attempts to curtail union activity by declaring it to be 
unlawful, but later providing important immunities to enable unions to protect their 
funds. The trade unions welcomed certain instances of this state intervention. These 
include the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 which provided for the 
removal of criminal liability for conspiracy from acts done in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute, and the Trade Union Act 1906 which provided 
protection to unions following the Taff Vale64 and Quinn v Leathem65  cases in which 
the House of lords had effectively created new forms of liability for certain trade 
union activities. Other examples include: the Trade Union Act 1871, which legalized 
trade unions in Britain for the first time; the Employers and Workmen Act 1875, 
which put the contract between workers and employers on a civil footing and 
removed liability for criminal conspiracy; the Trade Union Act 1913, which gave 
unions the right to divide their subscriptions into political and social funds; and the 
Trade Boards Act 1918 which was aimed at tackling the problem of sweated labour. 
Later statutes include the Wages Councils Acts 1945 which concerned the setting of 
minimum wages and encouraged the extension of collective bargaining, while the 
Contracts of Employment Act 1963 required all employers to give written particulars 
of employment and reasonable notice of dismissal. In addition there were various 
statutes relating to health and safety. 
                                                
64 Taff Vale Railway Co. V Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426 [HL]. 
65 Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 [HL]. 
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Other statutory interferences were often reviled and resisted, however, as they were 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when trade union activities were banned 
or subjected to severe legislative controls. The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, 
which inhibited industrial action and banned all kinds of combination of workers, 
prohibited all trade union activity regardless of trade. These were put in place as 
generic pieces of legislation to avoid having to legislate for every instance of trade 
unionism or industry. 
Nevertheless, by 1906, trade unions were not only legal, but free from the liabilities 
that afflicted other institutions and individuals. Pritt and Freeman described how this 
‘long journey from complete illegality to virtually complete and normal legality is a 
story of union activity, starting at a time when a variety of legal weapons could be ... 
used to render every such activity ... not merely illegal but criminal ... and continuing 
until the present state of legality was established.’66 This was accomplished through 
these various Acts of Parliament, leading in due course to ‘irresistible demands by 
the workers for further legislation.’67 While restrictive laws were anathema to trade 
unions, they nevertheless recognized that without legislation they would be 
emasculated and powerless. 
The advent of the Labour Party in the early twentieth century had brought with it a 
noticeable reduction in governmental interference with trade union affairs. Indeed, a 
greater threat to union autonomy at this time came from the courts in the form of 
                                                
66 D. N. Pritt, R. Freeman, The Law versus the Trade Unions, (London, 1958), p. 15. 
67 Ibid. 
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highly damaging judicial decisions,68 a state of affairs which has recurred from time 
to time throughout the twentieth century. Pritt and Freeman attributed this judicial 
antipathy to judges being ‘conditioned by their surroundings to understand fully only 
those [standards] of the employers.’69  By the 1960s, the state of industrial relations 
had reached something of a crisis point, and it was clear to the governments of the 
day that they would have to address the ‘trade union problem’ – a combination of the 
fear that unions were becoming ‘over-mighty’ subjects;70 unofficial strikes becoming 
a common occurrence;71 and power ‘falling out of the hands of trade union officials 
and into those of the unofficial shop stewards’ movement.’72 Legislation was one 
possible solution to these problems, and the Royal Commission was required to 
inquire into the role that law could play in improving industrial relations in Britain. 
This chapter examines the place of the law in industrial relations. It considers 
whether or not early twentieth century industrial relations legislation was still relevant 
to the 1960s when the unions were considerably stronger than at the turn of the 
century. Furthermore, it explores how those considerations may have influenced the 
Donovan Commission. It examines the writings of those who served on the 
Commission and their contemporaries, and also of historians writing more recently 
who were able to take a view of the Donovan Report in the context of later industrial 
relations developments. The key questions for the Donovan Commission were 
                                                
68 Hornby v Close 1867 LR 2 QB; Curran v Treleaven [1891] 2 Q.B. 545; Temperton v Russell  [1893] 1 Q.B. 715; 
Trollope and Sons v London Building Trades Federation, The Times, 28 April, 1,2, and 5 May 1896; Lyons v 
Wilkins [1899] 1 ch.255. Quinn v Leathem [1901]  AC 495. Taff Vale Railway Company v Amalgamated Society 
of Railway Servants, UKHL 1 1901; Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v Osborne [1910] AC 87; Rookes v 
Barnard [1964] UKHL 1; Stratford v Lindley [1965] AC 269. 
69 Pritt, Freeman, The Law versus the Trade Unions, p. 23. 
70 The Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, A Giant’s Strength: Some Thoughts on the 
Constitutional and the Legal Position of Trade Unions in England. 
71 Bodleian, John Hare, Unofficial Strikes CPA/ACP3/10(63)103. Ninety per cent of strikes in 1960‐62 were 
unofficial, according to Ministry of Labour statistics. For an alternative view of the nature of strikes in Britain 
see H.A. Turner, Is Britain Really Strike Prone? A Review of the Incidence, Character and Costs of Industrial 
Conflict, Occasion Paper No. 20, (Cambridge, 1969). 
72 K. Laybourn, A History of British Trade Unionism, c.1770‐1990 (Stroud, 1992). 
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whether or not legislation relating to trade unions still had a useful role to play in 
ensuring the economic health of the nation, and in particular, whether this could 
reduce the number and severity of strikes which threatened Britain’s economic 
stability. To be able to answer those questions, it is first important to ask whether law 
is even necessary in industrial relations, and what its overall purpose and value are 
considered to be by various commentators. 
1.2 Was law even necessary? 
According to Hugh Clegg, a member of the Commission, the answer to the problem 
of industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s lay in the role that the state played in 
industrial relations.73 His answer was to keep to the traditional strategy in Britain of 
state support for voluntary agreements and organizations, with only minimal 
legislative interference. Nevertheless, this laissez-faire approach was coming under 
increasing pressure due to public and governmental concerns about inflation, 
restrictive practices and strikes,74 (despite the fact that, in comparison with other 
countries, Britain’s strike record was relatively low).75  Clegg worked on the premise 
that trade unions could not change, and therefore other parties - management and 
government - had to.76 His views came to play an influential role in the work of the 
Donovan Commission. 
                                                
73 H. A. Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Britain, (Oxford, 1970).  
74 Bodleian, Industrial Change: The Human Aspect, CRD 2.7.17; The Times, 9 January 1964, ‘Pitwinders strike 
costs 94,000 tons first day’; The Times, 28 January 1964, ‘Move today to break ship strike deadlock’; The Times 
27 February 1964, ‘Strikes hit two car companies’. 
75 The Times, 4 June 1964, ‘Britain gets off lightly with strikes’. Bodleian, John Hare, Unofficial Strikes 
CPA/ACP3/10(63)103. According to International Labour Office figures cited by Hare, from 1951 to 1960, less 
time was lost through strikes than in any other major industrial country in the free world apart from Western 
Germany, although the record was not as good as in other smaller countries such as Holland, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
76 P. Ackers, ‘The Changing Systems of British Industrial Relations, 1954‐1979: Hugh Clegg and the Warwick 
Sociological Turn’, BJIR, June 2011, 306‐330. 
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While Clegg may have considered that most legal regulation would be unworkable, a 
more fundamental question was whether or not it was even necessary. There 
already existed alternative instruments or methods which would be more likely to 
achieve the same aims without arousing unnecessary hostility between unions and 
government, involving as they did an element of cooperation between the parties. 
The work of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) was an example 
of how the two sides of industry could work together with the Government to achieve 
common aims. This economic planning forum of trade unionists, management and 
government, established in 1962 to address Britain’s economic decline, was 
described as ‘the most promising development in industrial relations in years.’77 Later 
examples of tri-partite quasi-governmental organisations, with governing bodies 
consisting of employee representatives nominated by the TUC and employer 
representatives nominated by the CBI, included the Arbitration Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS),78 the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) and the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), although these differed from the NEDC in that 
they had administrative and policy-making functions and were not mere places for 
discussion.79  
In 1971, in a similar spirit of cooperation, the leader of the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU), Jack Jones, called for a liaison committee bringing 
together the TUC and the Labour Party, saying that ‘there is no reason at all why a 
joint policy cannot be worked out ... let us have the closest possible liaison.’80 This 
liaison committee agreed on a Social Contract, to be effective if Labour was returned 
                                                
77 The Times, 2 March 1964. 
78 See Chapter 6 for a discussion on the role of ACAS. 
79 P. Davies, M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, (Oxford, 1993), p. 409. 
80 J. Jones, Union Man: An Autobiography, (London, 1986). See Chapter 6 below for a discussion on the Social 
Contract. 
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to power in 1974, and continued to meet on a regular basis for many years.81 This 
was an important and bold attempt to create and maintain industrial harmony without 
the need for restrictive legislation. 
A further, but untried, possibility for closer working was the concept of industrial 
democracy, as the Bullock Committee proposed,82 with trade union representatives 
as members of the board of companies.83 Such industrial democracy is common in 
other countries including Germany and Denmark,84 and was given brief 
consideration by the Donovan Commission,85 although it failed ‘to agree upon 
changes which might be expected to have the desired effect’.86  
Legislation designed to regulate relationships between trade unions, employers and 
governments was not the only mechanism for achieving harmonious industrial 
relations, although it would have been the means by which certain bodies such as 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Service or industrial democracy would have to be 
introduced. These alternative mechanisms for regulating industrial relations are 
considered in detail in Chapter 6 below, demonstrating that legislation, while an 
immediate and powerful method of reforming industrial relations, is not an absolute 
necessity, but only one possible tool among an array of possible devices. 
  
                                                
81 Labour Party Manifesto, October 1974, Britain will win with Labour, ˂http://www.labour‐
party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/oct/1974‐oct‐labour‐manifesto.shtml.>Accessed 10 December 2014.  
82 Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (1977) Cmnd. 6706; P. Davies, Lord 
Wedderburn, ‘The Land of Industrial Democracy’, ILJ, 1977, 6 (1), 197‐211. 
83 This concept contrasts with Clegg’s reductive model of industrial democracy which referred simply to 
effective collective bargaining: H. Clegg, A new Approach to Industrial Democracy, (Oxford, 1960). 
84 R. Lund, International Studies and Management and Organisation, Vol. 7, No. 2, 17‐26; B. Wilpert,  ‘Research 
on Industrial Democracy: the German case’, IRJ, Vol. 6(1), 1975,  53‐64. 
85 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, Ch. XV, ‘Workers’ Participation in Management’. 
86 Ibid., para. 997. 
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1.3 The purpose of legislation 
To be able to understand the role that law, specifically legislation, should play in 
industrial relations, it is necessary to first determine its purposes, and to consider 
why it is sometimes perceived as a necessary adjunct to such alternative ways of 
achieving industrial harmony. First, ‘law’ is not monotypic. Since the Trade Union Act 
1871, when those trade unions which had registered with the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies finally became recognized as legal bodies, capable of protecting their 
funds in courts and striking legally,87 a clearly enunciated legal framework for British 
industrial relations had begun to develop with two distinctive parts, according to Lord 
Wedderburn’s analysis.88 The first part is the floor of employment rights based on the 
individual employment contract with its gradual accretion of statutory rights, such as 
the duty to give employees written particulars of employment and minimum notice 
periods.89 Health and safety legislation,90 the right to redundancy compensation91 
and the proposed right of employees to challenge ‘unfair’ dismissal92 are all part of a 
body of labour law establishing a floor of statutory rights and duties in the 
employment relationship, whether subject to collective bargaining or not.’93 These 
rights protected all workers, including those in non-unionized industries, thereby 
having a universal reach that the trade union movement was unable to match 
through collective agreements alone, since such agreements extended only to 
workers in the represented industry. 
                                                
87 The 1871 Act was the result of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions, 1868‐69. 
88 K.W. Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, BJIR, Vol. X, Issue 2, July 1972, 270‐290. 
Lord William Wedderburn was an academic expert on industrial relations, becoming Professor of Law at LSE in 
1964. 
89 Contracts of Employment Act 1963. 
90 For example: Mines and Quarries Act 1954; Factories Act 1961; Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 
1963; Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
91 Redundancy Payments Act 1965. 
92 Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
93 Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, 271.  
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The second part concerns legislation dealing with collective labour relations which, 
until the Industrial Relations Act 1971, was mainly based on non-intervention. There 
had been rare departures from this principle such as in the Trade Disputes and 
Trade Unions Act 1927 (following the exceptional circumstances of the General 
Strike in 1926), during both World Wars, and as remedial action following judicial 
interference.94 This type of law can be further sub-divided into two parts. The first 
sub-division is the negative protection of statutes relating to trade unions and trade 
disputes.95 These statutes did not provide positive rights to organize and strike, but 
removed legal impediments to such activities. They provided exemptions from legal 
doctrines of restraint of trade and unlawful conspiracy, although it was Conservative 
lawyers who first labelled these exemptions as ‘privileges’, thereby attempting to 
undermine the rights of trade unions to enjoy such exemptions.96 
Wedderburn’s analysis of the law identified the second sub-division of collective 
labour relations as relating to compulsory conciliation of disputes. Other jurisdictions, 
such as the USA, had compulsory procedures providing for 80-day ‘cooling off’ 
injunctions against strikes in emergency situations. Wedderburn pointed out that the 
problems with this were that the definition of ‘emergency’ is essentially a political 
decision, and also that the Executive should be presented with a choice of remedies 
- including conciliation.97 Indeed, the Industrial Relations Act 1971 would come to 
                                                
94 Such legislation was enacted to deal with the very specific issues raised by labour shortages and war‐time 
necessity. WW1 legislation included the Munitions of War Act 1915, requiring unions to forgo their right to 
strike and to recognize compulsory arbitration as a means of preventing stoppages on war work; and the Trade 
Boards Act 1918 established trade boards which could fix pay rates in areas where organization was weak, but 
was primarily concerned with preventing labour unrest. In WW2, the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 
gave Ernest Bevin control over the labour force, while Order 1305 (18 July 1940) made strikes and lock‐outs 
illegal. Judicial interference with union rights had also been common, a situation which could only be 
addressed and remedied through legislation such as the Trade Disputes Act 1906. 
95 Trade Union Act 1871, especially ss. 2, 3 and 4; Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, especially ss. 
3 and 17; Trade Disputes Act 1906. 
96 A Giant’s Strength, 23: ‘we would like to see these substantial privileges ... given only to registered unions.’ 
97 Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, 274‐5. 
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define ‘emergency’ so widely that almost any major industrial conflict would be 
included, and the remedy was not an arsenal of weapons as Wedderburn had 
recommended, but ‘the rusty old flintlock of a 60-day “cooling-off” injunction’.98 This 
approach mirrored that taken by the American ‘Taft-Hartley Act’, even though it had 
already proved to be completely ineffective in the United States.99 
The Donovan Commission was set up to consider the potential for a more 
interventionist role for the law in industrial relations than had been the case hitherto. 
The aim was to address their rather chaotic nature and the prevalence of unofficial 
strikes taking place in the early and mid-1960s. The acute situation, brought about 
by the dire economic circumstances of the time, would have persuaded any 
responsible government to be seen to be addressing the problem. 
Table 1: Number of disputes between 1960 and 1970.100 
 
 
                                                
98 Ibid., 275. 
99 The Labor Management Relations Act 1947 was a United States federal law which restricted the power and 
activities of trade union; more commonly cited as the Taft‐Hartley Act after its sponsors, Senator Robert Taft 
and Representative Fred Hartley Junior. 
100 <http://visual.ons.gov.uk/the‐history‐of‐strikes‐in‐britain> Accessed 9 May 2017. 
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Table 2: Aggregate number of working days (x 000) lost between 1960 and 1970.101 
 
Legislation could be an immediate response, although to be effective the potential 
consequences of such action would need to be given serious consideration. 
Friedrich Hayek102 cautioned against the use of legislation in general: 
Legislation, the deliberate making of law, has justly been described as among all 
inventions the one fraught with the gravest consequences, more far-reaching in its 
effects even that of fire and gun-powder.103 
Hayek noted that the invention of legislation, unlike the common law which evolved 
over a long period of time, gave great power into the hands of man which needed to 
be controlled. He viewed legislation as a powerful tool that should be used with the 
utmost caution. This prudent approach would be reflected in the Donovan Report, 
which largely eschewed the use of legislation, but would go unheeded in the later 
Industrial Relations Act 1971, with fairly disastrous consequences. Nevertheless, 
although the Act was short-lived, it proved to be the first of many Parliamentary 
                                                
101 Source: Employment Gazettes. 
102 Friedrich Hayek was a twentieth‐century economist and philosopher. 
103 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political 
economy, (London, 1982), Vol. 1, p. 72. 
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enactments designed to curtail, regulate and stifle trade union activity. It therefore 
merits some considerable attention in Chapter 5 below as an important event in the 
evolution of industrial relations legislation. 
Indeed, the continuing interference of the law in industrial relations led a 1996 study 
of trade unions in Europe104 to conclude that the UK stood out as one of the few EU 
states with strict regulation of union activity enshrined in legislation.105 The 
conclusion drawn from the study was that: 
Legislative intervention is seen as stunting the autonomous development of unions, 
as inimical to the maintenance of democracy on a societal level, and as counter-
productive in that it would generate ill-afforded hostility among union members.106 
In France, unions are subject only to the same legal restraints as other non-profit 
organizations, and there is no legislative prescription for internal organization, liability 
of union officials or the relations between unions and their members. In Spain, 
unions are free to organize their own affairs. The UK today, by contrast, is one of the 
most interventionist of the EU States considered in the study. The authors explain 
the level of recent legislative control as a shift from the view of the unions as 
voluntary associations, responsible for their own internal affairs, to organizations 
which were privileged in legal terms and therefore whose conduct should be subject 
to public accountability. The study suggests two key arguments against the 
deployment of legislation to control union activity: 
The State may fear the objections of a strong union movement to the legal regulation 
of its affairs when it wishes to retain the unions’ cooperation. Alternatively, the State 
                                                
104 R. Undy, P. Fosh, H. Morris, O. Smith, R. Martin, Managing the Unions: The Impact of Legislation on Trade 
Unions’ Behaviour, (Oxford, 1996), p.72. 
105 Currently largely contained within the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, the 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, and the Employment Relations Acts 1992 and 2004. 
106 Undy et al, Managing the Unions, p. 272. 
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may be seeking to build up unions’ weak bargaining strength in order that they may 
function efficiently as social partners and accordingly feel that creating a 
comprehensive legal framework for running unions’ internal affairs would be counter-
productive.107 
Other EU countries are able to use alternative instruments to curb union power, and 
to work with unions as partners in a system of industrial democracy rather than 
against them as enemies. The question therefore arises as to why, since the 1960s, 
successive British governments have considered it necessary to employ legislative 
power to control union activity, despite the strong counter-arguments identified in the 
1996 study.108 The Donovan Commission would seek evidence for the most 
appropriate course of ensuring the future economic health of the nation. Although 
legislation would not feature prominently in their recommendations, the Report could 
now be perceived as the catalyst which sparked a tranche of restrictive legislation in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
1.4 Views on the value of Legislation in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 
Trade unions in the 1960s were concerned to preserve a system of voluntarism in 
industrial relations, with the State generally refraining from direct interference. Allan 
Flanders supported the principle of voluntarism, but he considered that the partiality 
of the bargaining parties for complete autonomy was an outmoded concept, since a 
commitment to a national productivity, prices and incomes policy inevitably places 
some restraint on the freedom to bargain collectively. To do otherwise, he thought, 
would be to leave everything to the market, which would mean advocating a return to 
                                                
107 Ibid., p. 276. 
108 E. H. Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial Relations, (London, 1959), p. 355. 
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the nineteenth century.109 He argued that there was a place for legislation in the 
modern era, and exemplified two legislative measures, neither of which undermined 
voluntary collective bargaining. These were the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 
and the Industrial Training Act 1964, both of which pointed the way to the type of 
measures that would be increasingly necessary in modern industry. One set 
minimum standards on terms and conditions of employment, and provided for fixed 
minimum notice periods, while the other set up institutions to solve urgent planning 
problems with an industrial training content.110  
Andrew Shonfield, also a Donovan Commission member, made a strong argument 
for the role of law, with its wider remit and application, to supplement or replace the 
role of the trade unions in determining the rights of workers. He cited Frederic 
Meyers, an American authority, who noted that neither the employer nor the wage-
earner had a clear idea of his rights, resulting in a lack of formal procedure for 
judging a case which made it more difficult for British employers ‘than for their 
American counterparts to establish and maintain standards of industrial discipline or 
to dismiss when good cause in fact can be shown.’111 Only centrally-imposed formal 
legislation could provide that certainty: it could not be achieved through collective 
bargaining alone, being too vague and subject to frequent changes. Shonfield also 
highlighted the transformational ability of legislation to alter deeply entrenched 
mindsets, in the form of the Industrial Training Act 1964 which provided government 
with the power to impose a compulsory levy on industry to finance training, and ‘the 
                                                
109 Ibid., pp. 34‐35. 
110 Ibid., p. 36. 
111 F. Meyers, Ownership of Jobs, Los Angeles, Calif. University, 1964, cited in Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, p. 
116. 
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introduction of official representatives of the government into the boards to be set up 
to supervise training in each industry.’112 
Thus, in the early 1960s the State was in fact already moving from a non-
interventionist, non-paternal position to a less traditional role, directly addressing the 
problems that were plaguing British industry. Shonfield’s approval of this transition 
was apparent in his Note of Reservation in the Donovan Report: ‘It seems 
inconceivable in the long run that ... trade unions will be treated as if they had the 
right to be exempt from all but the most rudimentary legal obligations.’113  
The system of industrial relations which the Commission examined in the 1960s was 
still very much based on voluntarism,114 but it would need to consider whether it was 
desirable or even necessary to incorporate the law at some level. Wedderburn 
described the two schools of thought which gave evidence to the Commission, 
based on increased legal intervention on the one hand, and improved bargaining 
procedures on the other: 
The first urged that ‘the law’ should be called in to change the pattern [of increasing 
informal bargaining at shop-steward level, wage drift and fragmentation] by 
regulation, compelling collective agreements to be legally enforceable in labour 
courts, penalizing strikers perhaps by automatic deprivation of rights to social 
security benefit.115 
The Commission, however, rejected this view, and these options have never been 
pursued by any UK government since. The Commission did, however, accept the 
second school of thought that the preferred option was reform of industry-wide 
                                                
112 Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, p. 119. 
113 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, 289. 
114 A. Flanders, ‘The Tradition of Voluntarism’, BJIR, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 1974, 352‐370. 
115 Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, (Harmondsworth, 1986), p. 48. 
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bargaining (with some legal stimuli) that kept with the tradition of existing legislation, 
and which did not regulate or undermine the ‘voluntary’ system of collective 
bargaining. The Commission also recommended a ‘floor of rights’, a move which was 
met with approval by Wedderburn as a necessary legislative adjunct to collective 
bargaining.116 These were in relation to unfair dismissal, notice periods and 
redundancy, all employment protections which were introduced through legislation of 
the 1960s and 1970s.   
The perception of legislation’s value to industrial relations differed between political 
parties, suggesting that views were based on political objectives rather than 
objectively assessed needs. Andrew Thorpe wrote on The Labour Party and the 
Trade Unions and it is instructive to compare his references to the perceived value of 
legislation with Andrew Taylor’s essay on The Conservative Party and the Trade 
Unions in order to determine differences in emphasis between the two parties.117 
Thorpe noted that the Donovan Commission’s recommendations were broadly 
accepting of the status quo, although there was a recommendation that there should 
at least be a codifying Act of Parliament which would contain and simplify the rules 
relating to collective bargaining, industrial relations, unions and employers’ 
associations.118 This did, however, open the door to new legislation and, as Thorpe 
wrote, ‘It was now up to ministers whether they simply consolidated the law, or 
whether they sought to give it a more substantial tweak.’119 Thorpe considered that 
such a top-down solution had very little chance of being effective, and the unions in 
                                                
116 Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, pp. 270‐290. He believed that Kahn‐Freund and 
Clegg had used their own influence in convincing ‘the majority of the Commission’s members that direct legal 
regulation was not the correct answer’ to the problems of unofficial strikes.  
117 Both essays are part of an edited collection: J. McIlroy, N. Fishman, A. Campbell (eds), The High tide of 
British Trade Unions: Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, 1964‐79, (Monmouth, 2007), Chapters  5 and 6. 
118 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, 1968, p. 204. 
119 A. Thorpe, ‘The Labour Party and the Trade Unions’, in McIlroy, Fishman, Campbell (eds), The High tide of 
British Trade Unions, p. 138. 
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fact firmly rejected the Labour proposals for legislation which were later incorporated 
into the White Paper, In Place of Strife120. The unions’ objections to the subsequent 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 demonstrated still further the impracticality of a top-
down solution. 
Andrew Taylor offered an alternative viewpoint, writing on the Conservative Party’s 
determination to undertake ‘legislative reform of the voluntarist tradition of non-
intervention in industrial relations.’121 While the Labour Government appeared to 
have openly accepted the idea of legislative reform only after 1968,122 the 
Conservatives had been planning radical legislation since at least 1958 when A 
Giant’s Strength was published.123 The Conservative Government of 1951-1964 had 
already successfully secured the unions’ approval for the Contracts of Employment 
Act 1963 and the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 which gave workers greater 
security, although it did expect in return that the TUC would impose greater order on 
the unions. Crucially, in the event that the TUC did not respond to this expectation, 
the Conservatives could thereby find sufficient justification for more extensive 
legislation in the future.124  
In the same year that the Donovan Commission was appointed, the Conservative 
Trade Union Law and Practice Group made its own recommendations, suggesting 
greater government intervention. Taylor considered there was a serious weakness in 
this approach, which was that there was little consideration given to the political 
objective of reform.125 He found no evidence that attempting to bring trade unions 
                                                
120 Ibid., p. 141. Also see Chapter 5 below. 
121 A. Taylor, ‘The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions’, in McIlroy, Fishman, Campbell (eds), The High tide 
of British Trade Unions, p. 151. 
122 In Place of Strife, Cmnd. 3888. 
123 A Giant’s Strength, Inns of Court Conservative Association, 1958.  
124 Taylor, ‘The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions’, p. 152. 
125 Ibid., p. 154. 
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within a greater measure of political control would have any effect on the central 
aims of government, the key one at the time being to control inflation. 
There was undoubtedly little political or academic agreement over the value of 
legislation in the 1960s. It is interesting to note, however, that Keith Laybourn 
observed a volte face within the trade union movement itself over two decades later, 
going so far as to say that ‘there is evidence that the trade unions and the TUC have 
modified their attitudes towards legislation since about 1987’.126 He described this as 
an age of ‘new realism’, with unions responding to a series of new statutes passed in 
the 1980s127 to deal with trade union issues which, among other things, devolved 
power from the trade union centre to the members by extending democratic rights 
into collective bargaining. He considered that the miners’ strike of 1984-5 was in 
many ways ‘the turning point in the attitude of trade unions and the TUC towards the 
government’s industrial legislation’.128 Arthur Scargill, leader of the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), had refused to hold a national ballot, and it could be argued 
that the workers had grown weary of union leaders taking unilateral decisions which 
affected their livelihood, a situation that could only be resolved through imposing 
restrictive legislative measures. Davies and Freedland agreed, writing that, by the 
time of the Employment Act 1990,129 ‘the lengths to which the reduction of power had 
already progressed ... can be judged from the relative absence of public controversy 
surrounding an Act whose provisions would in 1979 have seemed absolutely 
revolutionary.’130 
                                                
126 Laybourn,  A History of British Trade Unionism, p. 192. 
127 Employment Acts 1980, 1982, 1988, 1989, 1990, and the Trade Union Act 1984. 
128 Laybourn,  A History of British Trade Unionism, p. 211. 
129 The Act was ‘to make it unlawful to refuse employment ... on grounds related to trade union membership’, 
effectively abolishing pre‐entry closed‐shop practices. 
130 Davies, Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, p. 508. 
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Nevertheless, the Donovan Commission would certainly not have entertained the 
notion that such radical legislation as the 1980s produced would ever have been 
acceptable to the trade unions, nor that it would effectively address the alleged 
defects of collective bargaining. Donovan’s recommendations were for voluntary 
reform of collective bargaining and its extension into new areas of employment, 
which would be overseen by a new public agency, the Commission on Industrial 
Relations (CIR), and enforced with the aid of indirect legal sanctions. Unofficial 
militancy would be dealt with by making certain collective agreements legally 
enforceable131 and by confining the statutory immunity from inducing breach of 
contract to registered unions only.132  
Roy Lewis was able to reflect more critically on this position in 1976, noting that, 
while the Report had been largely against legal interference with industrial relations, 
its recommendation for eventual enforceability of collective agreements introduced 
an important caveat, strengthened by Shonfield’s Note of Reservation. This could 
have reinforced the political argument for greater regulatory legislation which would 
eventually appear in the White Paper, In Place of Strife, and in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971. ‘If behaviour was to be changed the law’s role was a question of 
degree and, perhaps unintentionally, the Donovan analysis represented the thin end 
of the legal wedge.’133 This observation seems now to have been prophetic in the 
light of the plethora of legislation which has since been introduced to control trade 
union rights and activities. Stephen Dunn even argued that the Industrial Relations 
Act, had it survived, would have been beneficial to the unions and would at least 
have put them on a solid legal footing and avoided them ‘attaining their present 
                                                
131 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, para. 508. 
132 Ibid., para. 801. 
133 R. Lewis, ‘The Historical Development of Labour Law’, BJIR, Vol. XIV, Issue 1, 1976, 1‐17. 
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semi-outlaw status.’134 Nevertheless, although Dunn may have been disappointed by 
the failure of the Labour Government to implement effective legislation, he was also 
giving an historical viewpoint, and had the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of 
what happened to industrial relations legislation in the 1980s and 1990s under 
Conservative governments.  
1.5 Conclusion 
When Harold Wilson led the Labour party back into power in 1964, he promised a 
‘new prosperity’ and this involved reforming out-dated institutions – including the 
British trade union movement, with its restrictive practices operating as a major 
obstacle to economic growth.135 Trade unions had evolved to be disparate bodies of 
various sizes, but the larger unions in the key major industries had achieved an 
unprecedented level of power.136 While they had little protection from the law, 
particularly if they had chosen not to register with the Registrar of Friendly Societies, 
neither were they subject to significant legal regulation. 
By 1965, therefore, it was unavoidable that legislation would be at the heart of 
discussions over what should be done about the ‘problem’ of trade unions and their 
alleged ‘over-mighty’ status, but equally clear that there were opposing views on the 
value of legislation, both within the Commission and among academics and 
politicians. The trade unions were anxious to maintain their privileged position as 
private associations with minimal statutory interference, but could not deny that 
legislation had produced a number of benefits from time to time, not just for the trade 
unions themselves, but for the wider working population. The politicians were also 
                                                
134 S. Dunn, ‘From Donovan to ... Wherever’, BJIR, Vol. 31, Issue 2, 1993, 169‐187. 
135 The Times, 19 October 1964. 
136 The TGWU had just over 1.5 million members by 1969: J. Jones, Union Man, (London, 1986). 
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concerned to be seen to be doing something about the unofficial strikes which were 
rife at the time,137 and the Royal Commission was to be the first step on the long 
road to industrial reform. 
The 1960s was a decade of major political and economic upheaval, and it was 
against this backdrop that the Donovan Commission was expected to conduct its 
inquiry and report. It was being asked to play a major part in the overhaul of 
industrial relations, and would do so by first conducting detailed research and 
analysis of the perceived problems, and then by positing reforms to deal with those 
problems. Nevertheless, the members of the Commission, many with detailed 
knowledge of the history of the role of law in industrial relations, could not help but 
be influenced and possibly discouraged by the experience of previous attempts of 
the legislature to interfere with the autonomy of trade unions.138 
 
  
                                                
137 The Donovan Commission reported that 95 per cent of stoppages were due to unofficial strikes: Royal 
Commission Report, 1968, Cmnd. 3623, paras. 365, 368. 
138 See Chapter 2 below. 
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Chapter 2. A History of British Industrial Relations, Governments and the 
Royal Commission Report.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The history of law in industrial relations, from the late eighteenth century to the 
1960s, had evolved from one of tight legislative control through to one of support and 
consultation with the trade unions. Chris Wrigley approved of the approach of Hugh 
Clegg and Allan Flanders in highlighting this long evolution of industrial relations.139 
He cited the regard which these industrial relations experts held for the role of the 
law in this field: ‘The state supports and supplements collective bargaining in a 
number of ways, and the law of industrial relations therefore demands separate 
consideration.’140 Kahn-Freund approved of this system, noting that ‘the desire of 
both sides of industry to provide for, and to operate an effective system of collective 
bargaining is a stronger guarantee of industrial peace and of smooth functioning of 
labour-management relations than any action legislators or courts or enforcement 
officers can ever hope to undertake.’141  
Even though the courts continued to maintain a level of mistrust of the unions in the 
twentieth century,142 any fear and distrust which the legislature initially had of the 
union movement had begun to dissipate at the start of the century, when trade 
                                                
139 C. Wrigley, ‘Industrial Relations’, in N. Crafts, I. Gazeley, A. Newell, Work and Pay in 20th Century Britain, 
(Oxford, 2009), p. 203. 
140 A. Flanders, H. Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain: Its History, Law and 
Institutions, (Oxford, 1954), p. v. 
141 O. Kahn‐Freund, Chapter on Legal Framework,  in A. Flanders, H. Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain, pp. 43‐44. 
142 Case law tended to militate against the acknowledged freedoms and immunities of the trade unions, for 
example: Taff Vale Railway v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] UKHL 1; Rookes v Barnard 
[1964] AC 1129 (HL).  
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unions began to be represented in Parliament.143 The legislature was both willing 
and able to support union aims by passing laws to protect the unions from civil and 
criminal liability and thereby protect their funds.144 Legislation was also used to 
protect vulnerable workers where unions were weak or non-existent,145 to improve 
equality and maintain the health and safety of workers,146 and eventually to provide 
protection from unfair dismissals.147 Legislation and relations between workers and 
employers became progressively more integrated, while trade unions and the 
legislature enjoyed an increasingly symbiotic relationship. 
As trade unions became more powerful in terms of size and influence in the 
twentieth century, the notion of using legislation to control their power became 
increasingly political. In 1957, the Minister of Labour, Iain Macleod, ‘faced with the 
worst year of industrial unrest since 1926, announced that he was to draw up a list of 
the best industrial employment practices in the hope that they would become more 
widely adopted’,148 but the Conservative Government was unsatisfied with the 
response, deciding on legislative intervention by 1962.149 The Contracts of 
Employment Act 1963, while giving redundant workers the security of guaranteed 
notice periods, threatened to take away that right if the worker had broken his 
                                                
143 The Labour Representation Committee (LRC) had its founding conference in 1900, hosted by the TUC with 
the purpose of examining labour representation in Parliament. Two LRC MPs were elected in 1900, including 
Keir Hardie. 
144 The Trade Disputes Act 1906 provided immunity for liability for damages arising from strike action. 
145 For example, the Trade Boards Act 1918 regulated wages in industries where there was no effective 
representation.  
146The first general statute on safety at work was the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, although there were 
earlier examples of industry‐specific Acts such as the Factories Act 1937, the Baking Industry (Hours of Work) 
Act 1938, the Shops Act 1950, and the Mines and Quarries Act 1954. Hours of work were regulated for women 
and children in the Employment of Women, Young Persons, and Children Act 1920, Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933, Hours of Employment (Conventions) Act 1936, Employment of Women and Young Persons Act 1936 
and the Young Persons (Employment) Act 1938 
147 Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
148 Nation Union, 77th Annual Conference Report (1957), p. 92, cited in Moran, The Politics of Industrial 
Relations: The origins, life and death of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, (London, 1977). 
149 Moran, The Politics of Industrial Relations, p. 18. 
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continuity of employment by participating in unofficial industrial action. This 
legislative measure was designed to dissuade workers from participating in unofficial 
strikes, and the Government thereby hoped to cut the number of strikes by taking 
this threatening stance. 
Industrial relations was fast becoming something of a political football, a potential 
vote-winner for whichever party could be seen by the electorate to be doing 
something about the escalating ‘problem’ of strikes which impacted on the ordinary 
citizen.150 Lewis Minkin argued that Labour governments have rarely truly favoured 
the trade union movement, but worked for the good of the nation, while Conservative 
governments have been much more focused upon their own vested interests.151 
Nevertheless, by the 1960s it was becoming evident that both Labour and 
Conservative parties were equally concerned about the growing number of strikes, 
particularly the unofficial strikes, which were threatening the economic security of the 
nation. They each began to give serious consideration to legislative measures as a 
means of exercising greater control over the unions. 
The union problem was beginning to gain a higher profile, and becoming the focus of 
attention for both politicians and labour correspondents. A review of trade unions by 
Eric Wigham, Labour Editor for The Times, had made a number of recommendations 
to resolve the inefficiencies and problems within the union movement, some of which 
involved legislation. He noted that ‘in those countries where collective agreements 
are binding in law, unofficial strikes are much fewer than in Britain.’152 John Hare, 
Minister of Labour, considered that unofficial strikes were ‘a breakdown of loyalty 
                                                
150 The number of days lost to industrial disputes rose sharply from 1965, reaching a peak in 1971. 
<http://www.unionancestors.co.uk/Images/Strikes%201901‐2000.pdf> Accessed 16 October 2015. 
151 L. Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, (Edinburgh, 1992). 
152 E. Wigham, What’s Wrong with the Unions? (Harmondsworth, 1961), p. 220. 
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and discipline,’153 and that ‘there was a need for responsible trade union leaders to 
control militant members.’154  It was becoming evident that nothing short of a full, 
official review was needed to address the multiple problems within trade union 
organization and in industrial relations in general. Both Conservative and Labour 
parties considered that another - the fifth - Royal Commission on Industrial Relations 
would be the best way forward to review and propose amendments to the law. The 
Royal Commission, headed by Lord Donovan, was established in 1965 and reported 
in June 1968.155  
2.2 History of law in industrial relations up to the 1960s. 
The Commission, with its remit which required that it should make ‘particular 
reference to the Law’, would have to consider the type of legislation which could 
provide greater support for workers in terms of job protection, while at the same time 
bringing order and stability into industrial relations. Trade union legislation had 
certainly come far since the days of the early, interventionist laws156 which attempted 
to impose restrictions on trade unions. This had been a manifestation of the fear of 
government towards any kind of combination of people; this had been exacerbated 
by the French Revolution (and William Pitt the Younger’s fear of Jacobin157 activity). 
By the 1960s, the fear that trade unions were again engendering among politicians 
threatened a potential return to such restrictive legislation. 
                                                
153 National Union, 79th Annual Conference Report (1960), p. 74, cited in Moran, The Politics of Industrial 
Relations. 
154 Moran, The Politics of Industrial Relations, p. 19. 
155 The remit of the Royal Commission was to ‘consider relations between managements and employees and 
the role of trade unions and employers’ associations in promoting the interests of their members and in 
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156 E.g. the Combination Acts 1799 and 1800 
157 Jacobin refers to a style of left‐wing revolutionary politics and is named after a famous political club in the 
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In the nineteenth century, Friendly Societies158 began to spring up all over Britain, 
members contributing small amounts of money which could be used to insure 
against hardship when workers lost their jobs, or where the main breadwinner died 
or was too ill to work. However, they were not legal bodies and therefore could not 
protect their funds, or members, in court. The Friendly Societies Act 1855 
established the Registrar of Friendly Societies. Those organizations which opted to 
register had their funds protected, but the case of Hornby v Close 1867159  revealed 
the inability of friendly societies to use their own funds to support striking workers. 
The funds used in this way were taken as ‘evidence’ that these societies had similar 
objects to trade unions, and were thus held by the court to be operating illegally in 
restraint of trade.160 This was one of the early examples of the courts demonstrating 
their distrust of trade unions, and would not be the last. 
The effect of this case was considered by the Royal Commission on Trade Unions of 
1868-69.161 Its recommendations led to the Trade Union Act 1871 which legalized 
trade unions in Britain for the first time, providing they registered with the Registrar of 
Friendly Societies, thereby protecting their funds. However, the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1871, passed at the same time, criminalized picketing, and this law 
was not amended until the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875. The later 
Act permitted peaceful picketing and also provided that acts committed in 
furtherance of a trade dispute should not be regarded as a criminal conspiracy 
unless the actions were themselves criminal. This Act, passed by Disraeli’s 
                                                
158 Regulated by the Registrar of Friendly Societies until 2001 before the role was taken over by the Financial 
Services Authority and subsequently by the Financial Conduct Authority. 
159 (1867) LR 2 QB 153. 
160 Hornby v Close 1867 LR 2 QB was one of the key reasons for the formation of the Trades Union Congress in 
1868: TUC Annual Congress Report, 1894, p. 73. 
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government which was ‘acutely aware of a growing working class vote’, was the 
‘golden formula’162 which attempted to ‘settle the conditions under which industrial 
conflict could take place.’163 Together with the Employers and Workmen Act 1875, 
the legislation fully decriminalized the work of trade unions, an outcome which was 
largely due to the success of union leaders who were able to present their unions to 
the Royal Commission as bastions of respectability.164 ‘The fledgling TUC which had 
campaigned for the change in the law ‘was so ecstatic that a telegram of 
congratulation was sent to the Minister’.165 Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
George Howell, the retiring TUC Secretary, cast doubt on any further need for the 
TUC,166 so complete were its objectives, the organization continued to campaign for 
workers’ and trade union rights. Almost a century later, the trade unions and the TUC 
would yet again present arguments to the Donovan Commission that they were still 
to be trusted to manage their own affairs effectively without legislative 
interference.167 Nevertheless, new laws are best designed to deal with the prevailing 
circumstances, and the industrial relations landscape would be very different in the 
1960s, thus making it necessary to provide different arguments if the unions were to 
retain their semi-outlaw status. 
The Disraeli Government’s legislation marked a major turning point in the attitude of 
politicians towards trade unions, acknowledging them as a positive aspect of the 
industrial scene, rather than part of the criminal underworld. The new laws provided 
social benefits to trade unions and their members, and were therefore naturally 
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welcomed by them, engendering a complementary alteration in the attitude of trade 
unions and socialists towards the law. Indeed, John Sheldrake observed that, ‘State 
intervention, collectivism and socialism were depicted [by Sidney Webb, writing for 
the Fabian Society] as part of an irreversible process destined to provide a more 
efficient and equal society.’168 The views of the Society169 were also paralleled by the 
Idealist philosophy of T.H. Green as a central and positive element in social life. 
Green’s work ‘underpinned the New Liberalism which abandoned the nostrums of 
laissez faire and looked to piecemeal state intervention as the means to ameliorate 
social injustice.’170 Almost a hundred years later, the Donovan Commission would 
likewise be required to consider how state intervention could yet again be used to 
reduce actual or perceived injustices in the workplace.171 
2.2.1 The State Intervenes  
The industrial relations landscape of the nineteenth century was one where the State 
was beginning to introduce a number of reforms designed to underpin the aims of 
trade unionism and combat judicial hostility. Collectively, the views of trade unions, 
philosophers and socialist reformers also reflected ‘an increased willingness to use 
the state’s legislative and administrative power’.172 A major example of the 
legislature using its influence to correct an abuse of power by the state, specifically 
the judiciary, came in the Trade Disputes Act 1906. The apparent immunities created 
by the legislation of the 1870s, following the outcome of Hornby v Close, had been 
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169 A political think‐tank which emerged in 1884 and had Beatrice and Sydney Webb as founder members. 
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undermined by the House of Lords’ decision in the Taff Vale case in 1901.173 This 
was the latest in a decade of anti-trade union judicial decisions, beginning with 
Curran v Treleaven 1891.174 In the Taff Vale case, the House of Lords held that a 
trade union could be sued in its corporate capacity for tortious acts committed on its 
behalf, thereby putting union funds at great risk. The House of Lords later decided in 
Quinn v Leathem175 that a strike or boycott, or the threat of it, could be a conspiracy 
to injure, and that damages could be paid out of union funds. 
These examples of judicial creativity, seemingly designed to undermine the strength 
and capabilities of trade unions, highlighted the insecurity of the legal foundations of 
trade union action, and raised new concerns, since the judgments determined that 
trade unions could be sued for damage inflicted by their officials. It seemed that the 
right to strike which Parliament had granted to unions in the Trade Union Act 1871 
and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, the judiciary had in effect 
taken away, once more leaving the unions vulnerable to the potential loss of funds. 
Faced with such hostility from the judiciary, the unions were left with no choice but to 
once again call on the supreme law-maker - Parliament - to restore the immunities 
they had relied on for so long. The question would be whether doing so would be of 
any benefit to the Government. This had been a major factor behind the Disraeli 
Government’s decision to pass the previous legislation, and one which would 
underpin the attempts to legislate in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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2.2.2 Organized labour finds a political voice. 
This period was a time of major change to the traditional two-party system in 
Parliament. In 1893, Keir Hardie helped to set up the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP), a socialist political party. In 1900 some trade unions within the TUC, along with 
the ILP, formed the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). ‘The formation of the 
LRC (which became the Labour Party in 1906) had come about, primarily, as a result 
of trade unions’ anxieties about their legal status.’176 The LRC immediately grew in 
strength as a direct response to increased judicial interference in trade union affairs, 
more than doubling its number of affiliates by 1903. In this way the short-term results 
of the anti-union case law were both a strengthening of the LRC and increased 
independent labour representation at the 1906 General Election. These changes 
grew from a desire to change the law which was threatening the right of unions to 
strike, by creating a force capable of persuading the next Liberal government to 
address and overturn the effect of the Taff Vale case.177 A tacit electoral alliance with 
the Liberals178 led to a landslide victory for the Liberals in 1906, with 29 new LRC 
members, many of whom were trade union leaders.179 
Following a further Royal Commission Report in 1906,180 the new Government 
introduced the Trade Disputes Bill which was intended to reverse the effects of Taff 
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Vale. This Bill was a highly significant one in terms of the shifting of influence and 
power from central government towards the trade union movement. Rather than 
proposing a simple return to the pre-Taff Vale position, where unions would be 
immune from actions in tort, the Government took the opportunity to try to impose 
greater order on union activity, proposing that unions should have executive 
committees for the conduct of disputes, and that they should take legal responsibility 
for the actions of those committees.181 This was not acceptable to the unions, 
however, and they introduced a Private Member’s Bill which would give them 
complete immunity from actions in tort, a move which prompted objections from the 
Spectator: 
It seems to us highly dangerous to confer upon any body of men a power which it is 
so easy to misuse ... As citizens, we object to any class being accorded legal 
privileges which are denied to the rest of the community. Hard cases notoriously 
make bad law, and if the Trade-Unions get their will, the law made to reform their 
grievances will be bad indeed.182 
Nevertheless, as radical as this new Bill was, it passed unopposed through both 
Houses of Parliament, becoming the Trade Disputes Act 1906. The 1875 Act had 
given immunity from criminal conspiracy in respect of strike action while the 1906 Act 
confirmed that such action would also be immune from civil conspiracy, but both had 
attributed to unions a form of protection that was not available to citizens in any other 
kind of collective organization. Unions were in effect outside the law, and it was even 
argued that this protection could be used as a political weapon against the 
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government.183 Nevertheless, for the first time in history, the unions had an effective 
voice in Parliament and were beginning not just to influence, but actually to dictate 
the law which would apply to them. 
This Act remained in force when Donovan reported,184 and had by now become one 
of the major causes of disquiet among employers, since it gave to trade unions an 
unparalleled immunity from criminal prosecution and from suit in tort, allowing them 
to take industrial action with impunity.185 The Commission would need to consider 
whether it was appropriate in the 1960s to maintain such immunity for a trade union 
movement that had moved from a position of relative weakness to one of immense 
strength.186 Indeed, it would seem sensible to consider whether the law should be 
used to re-adjust the balance of power between unions, employers and workers, 
since there was little doubt that unions and their members were beginning to dictate 
the terms of their contracts, and the employers were all but powerless to object.  
Nevertheless, these events demonstrated how law could be used to protect the 
collective rights of trade unions to self-determination. At the same time, it could be 
used to give a floor of rights to individual workers, something that Lord Wedderburn 
approved of and considered an ideal role for legislation.187 It is also important to bear 
in mind that not all businesses were unionized, and many workers suffered harsh 
working conditions, providing ‘sweated labour’.  When the Trade Boards Act was 
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passed in 1909, it represented a significant departure for the Government from the 
conventions of voluntarism which had dominated industrial relations,188 and 
demonstrated the social value of legislation for working people. Rather than working 
against the unions, legislation was for the first time being used to address the gaps 
that unions alone could not fill, such as ensuring minimum wages in non-unionized 
industries. 
However, while the Government was acting in this somewhat limited manner to 
protect vulnerable workers through legislation, the courts once again interfered with 
trade unions’ right to self-governance, specifically the right to include a political levy 
in membership fees. The House of Lords’ ‘Osborne Judgment’ in 1909189 ruled that 
union members would have to ‘contract in’ if they wished for a portion of their 
subscriptions to go to support the emerging Labour Party, rather than the previous 
system whereby members would have to ‘contract out’.  It overturned a practice 
which had existed legitimately for forty years, and declared all union political funding 
to be unlawful. This decision resulted in severe financial difficulties for the Labour 
Party, but was eventually remedied by the Trade Union Act 1913, which effectively 
restored the legitimacy of union political funding and reaffirmed the supremacy of 
Parliament to legislate on union matters. The case was a reminder of the 
vulnerability of trade unions to judicial interference with their right to self-govern, but 
highlighted the very type of situation where legislation could be deployed to 
strengthen the trade union position rather than seek to undermine it, as later 
legislation would attempt to do.190 The Donovan Commission would in due course 
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have to consider the benefits of this type of legislation which maintained the rights of 
trade unions when determining the overall role of legislation in industrial relations.  
This was a key turning point in the developing relationship between trade unions, the 
new Labour party and the legislature, when trade unionists had the confidence, the 
influence and the power to make themselves heard on the political stage. Indeed, 
they would later play a crucial role in the examination of and proposals for reform of 
industrial relations which would be central to the Donovan Commission’s remit in the 
1960s. This would be in spite of the relationship between the Labour Party and the 
unions remaining a ‘contentious alliance’,191 a factor which would undermine the 
ability of the Party to force through legislation of which the TUC did not approve. 
2.2.3. The General Strike and a return to War  
The relationship between unions and the Government reached a crisis point in 1926. 
Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister, put the blame firmly on the Trade Disputes Act 
1906 and the burgeoning strength of the union movement. He condemned the fact 
that the Act ensured that, ‘when once a strike was declared, anything that a man did 
on strike was legal’, warning, ‘whereas previously the trade union forces have moved 
in regiments and brigades, in recent years they have moved in armies.’192 The 
previous year, Baldwin had supported the coal-owners’ insistence that miners should 
take a 13 per cent pay cut by arguing that, ‘All the workers in this country have got to 
take reductions in wages to help put industry back on its feet.’193 When the pay cut 
was imposed in 1926, the TUC backed the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain 
(MFGB) and a national sympathetic strike in support of the miners was called. This 
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‘General Strike’ confirmed what many politicians now believed – that the unions had 
become too powerful, thereby putting at risk the economic safety of the nation. In the 
debate in the House of Commons on 3 May 1926, Sir Robert Horne MP warned that, 
‘... the whole instincts of the British people will revolt against any attempt to take 
them from their freedom and plant tyranny in place of constitutional government’.194 
Baldwin therefore bowed to the demands of his party, and the highly restrictive Trade 
Disputes and Trade Union Act 1927 was passed. This was a significant turning point 
in the relationship between unions and government, and the fears and motivations 
that underpinned it would be echoed by the Conservative publication, A Giant’s 
Strength,195 over thirty years later. The Act made secondary picketing unlawful, and 
any strike aimed at coercing the government was banned. Strikes by local 
government workers and all general strikes were henceforth illegal.196 The Attorney 
General was also empowered to sequester the funds of unions involved in such 
strikes. Additionally, in a move which had a devastating effect on Labour Party 
funding, union members were mandated to contract in to any political levy their union 
made on their behalf, rather than contract out as they could previously do. This re-
introduced the system which the Osborne decision had brought about in 1909. The 
fierce opposition to the Act from the unions brought the Labour Party into a closer 
alliance with them.197 Of great concern at this juncture was that the Labour Party was 
pandering to union demands in order to safeguard its own funding and therefore its 
future. Just as Disraeli had done previously, politicians were making promises to the 
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unions to manipulate the legislation for their own political aims rather than for the 
good of the economy or the country as a whole. 
During the Second World War the unions regained much of their former respect and 
kudos for their help in mobilizing the economy for the war and its aftermath.198 
Industry was largely left to manage its own affairs and to operate autonomously. The 
Ministry of Labour showed a preference for the regulation of industrial relations 
through voluntary bargaining, stating in its own Industrial Relations Handbook that ‘it 
is important to recognize that the main responsibility for the regulation of wages and 
conditions of employment rests with the joint voluntary machinery established by 
employers’ organizations and trade unions.’199 This theme would be picked up later 
by the Donovan Commission, which considered that strengthening this voluntary 
machinery was the best way forward for stable and effective industrial relations.200  
This policy of state non-intervention under Conservative governments continued 
throughout the 1950s as conditions of almost full employment continued to be the 
norm.201  
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Table 3: UK Unemployment figures 1938-1980.
 
 
‘Thus the pattern of very limited legislative activity and, in its place, of broad reliance 
upon collective bargaining, so brilliantly analyzed by Kahn-Freund, was well and truly 
established in the 1950s.’202 
This period also witnessed a fundamental shift in the way that trade unions 
perceived the value of legislation. It was no longer simply about protecting union 
rights - there was a growing recognition that it could have a positive effect on 
individual employment rights which would benefit all workers. Throughout World War 
II, and during its immediate aftermath, the TUC had demonstrated a willingness, not 
just to accept, but to actively demand legislation in certain areas. For example, the 
                                                
202 Davies, Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, p. 104. 
                  
71 
 
TUC saw that there could be a wider role for legislation when it called for the 
Government to implement a forty-hour week and provide for two weeks’ paid holiday 
for all workers.203 Additionally, the Crombie Code204 for long-term compensation to 
workers who were made redundant because of nationalization of certain industries 
came about largely due to pressure from the TUC. This indicated a potential 
acceptance of future legislation by the trade unions and the TUC, leading Davis and 
Freedland to observe that, ‘should government wish to expand general individual 
employment rights in this way [as it did in the 1960s], it would not meet with any 
strong opposition from the trade unions, even if collective laissez-faire were thereby 
and to that extent qualified.’205   
2.2.4. Post-war consensus and legislation 
Following the end of the Second World War, trade unions were hailed as war heroes. 
Winston Churchill declared in the House of Commons: ‘We own an immense debt to 
the trade unions and never can this country forget how they have stood by and 
helped.’206 So began a pivotal moment in the evolution of trade unionism, since this 
formal recognition that the unions had an important part to play in maintaining the 
economic strength of the nation gave them immense bargaining power. J.V. 
Radcliffe, The Times labour correspondent, told the delegates at the 1945 TUC 
Congress, ‘You do not go to 10 Downing Street but 10 Downing Street comes to you 
... You have no longer any need to thunder; you have only to whisper and Ministers 
tremble and Field-Marshals bend their knees.’207  
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This may well have been an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that trade unions 
were enjoying a new-found confidence, and were assured of a place at the political 
bargaining table. This was a pivotal moment in the evolution of trade unionism and 
the part that unions played in the economic strength of the nation. Robert Taylor 
wrote that, ‘A strong harmony of interest and outlook existed between the political 
and industrial wings of the Labour Movement in 1945. The “contentious alliance” had 
never seemed more at ease with itself.’208 He added that there was ‘recognition that 
on the broad range of economic and social policy no genuine division of opinion 
existed between the Attlee Cabinet and the TUC Establishment.’209 Indeed, Prime 
Minister Attlee assured the TUC Congress in 1945 of continued close collaboration 
and consensus.210 His Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who had played a crucial 
role as Minister for Labour during the war in controlling the workforce and allocating 
manpower, was determined to strengthen the bargaining position of unions after the 
war. He continued to act as go-between between senior trade union leaders.  
Legislation which had restricted the growth and bargaining power of unions was 
rapidly repealed. Kahn-Freund noted, rather poetically, that ‘war-time controls of the 
labour market ... vanished in the sun of peace like snow in the spring, and “freedom 
of contract” emerged triumphant.’211 There was a return to a system of voluntarism, 
and unions were free to negotiate their own terms and conditions.  To the delight of 
trade union leaders,212 the viciously anti-trade union Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act 1927, which had outlawed sympathetic strikes, banned the closed shop 
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in the public sector, introduced contracting-in to payment of the political levy and 
made secondary picketing illegal, was also finally repealed in 1946.213  
The Wages Councils Acts of 1945 and 1948 were passed to ensure minimum wages 
in industries where wages were low and where there was little or no collective 
organization. The 1945 Act ‘was based on the premise that the state should use its 
powers not simply to ameliorate the effects of ‘sweating’ [extreme low pay and 
casualization of employment], but to keep collective bargaining going when 
economic circumstances tended to destroy it.’214 215 Nevertheless, some trade 
unions leaders came under attack for the way in which they cooperated in the later 
wage freeze in 1948, thereby reducing the wage setting role of the unions: ‘Their job 
is to look after wages and hours and conditions, not to play politics and ignore the 
troubles of their own men and women.’216 
Labour market controls were relaxed after the end of the war, although Essential 
Work Orders in relation to agriculture and mining were maintained in the face of 
continuing unofficial strikes in these industries. In 1948, the Government passed the 
Employment and Training Act, but this had little effect on vocational training in 
industry and commerce.217 However, in 1951, the newly-elected Conservative 
Government explicitly promised to maintain the status quo and avoid further 
legislation. ‘The seal was set by Churchill’s appointment of Walter Monckton as 
Minister of Labour in 1951. Monckton was chosen because he had no clear party 
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affiliation and was given the brief of ensuring good relations with the unions.’218 It 
was nevertheless becoming very clear that industrial relations, despite concerns that 
trade unionists were working too closely with politicians, could not work effectively in 
isolation from the legislature. Parliament could strengthen the bargaining position of 
trade unions through legislation and ensure that certain groups of workers were 
protected through health and safety laws and restrictions on working hours. These 
were ‘interferences’ that would have been welcomed by the unions, but Parliament 
had also acted in the past to curtail the financial strength of the unions and to restrict 
industrial action, as in the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act 1927. If a future 
government had designs on legislating for improved industrial relations, it would 
have to keep in mind the lessons of the past and attempt to balance any restrictions 
on trade union freedom with improved working conditions and further strengthening 
of trade unions. The Donovan Commission would have been acutely aware of the 
balancing exercise it was being asked to perform, and criticism of the subsequent 
Report would reflect the very difficult task of trying to satisfying all three protagonists 
- trade unions, employers and the Government.  
2.3 ‘A Giant’s Strength’ and judicial interference 
By the late 1950s the tide of political and public opinion had once again begun to 
turn against trade unions as they gained in power and size. In 1958, the Inns of 
Court Conservative and Unionist Society published A Giant’s Strength,219 a 
devastating critique of the union movement, in which the view was expressed that 
the trade union movement had become ‘over-mighty subjects’ and should be put 
under  greater legislative control. The suggestions for future policy were laid down in 
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the document and, although it had no immediate impact, it nevertheless came to 
form the foundation of far-reaching legislative proposals for reform of industrial 
relations. These would be considered with increasing seriousness through the 
1960s, eventually finding legislative approval in the Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
This attitude represented a determined U-turn within the Conservative Party. The 
Industrial Charter of 1947 had stated that the official policy of the Party was in favour 
of trade unions, and that it attached the ‘highest importance to the part to be played 
by the unions in guiding the national economy.’220 Yet there was an emerging 
political determination to once again bring the trade unions within the remit of formal 
legislative control, a change of attitude which was very much in evidence in the 
proposals contained within A Giant’s Strength. Statutory protection from suit in 
common law torts for those acting in the course of unofficial strikes would be lost 
under the proposals, while trade unions and those taking part in official strikes would 
only remain protected under certain conditions, including formal registration with the 
Registrar of Friendly Societies. There would also have to be an inquiry into the 
issues in dispute, and a ‘cooling off period’ before strike action. These were all 
proposals that would require legislation for their implementation. 
However, shortly before the Royal Commission was set up to investigate the role for 
legislation, matters reached a crisis point for trade unions when the judiciary 
renewed its determination to intervene in the rights of unions in two cases: Rookes v 
Barnard221 and Stratford v Lindley.222 Rookes involved an employee who was 
dismissed under pressure from his former trade union, the AESD, and who 
successfully brought an action against his former employer. The decision to award 
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damages against the trade union was upheld by the House of Lords, a decision 
which left unions financially liable, despite the apparent protection of the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906. Stratford was another House of Lords ruling in which the 
injunction to prevent the ‘tortious’ act of causing loss by unlawful means through 
inducing breach of commercial contracts was upheld, again denying to the trade 
union immunity from liability under the 1906 Act. This was later described by O.H. 
Parsons as a judicial act ‘even more splenic in its anti-trade union attitude than in 
Rookes.’223 Wedderburn attributed this change in the former judicial attitude of ‘non-
intervention’ to the growing strength of trade unions and a popular view that they 
were over-powerful.224 The unions were now under attack from the judiciary, the 
politicians and the public, and the pressure to deal with the problem was becoming 
ever more urgent. 
The TUC appealed to the Labour Government to address the anti-trade union 
decisions of the courts. While the Government could have acted straight away to 
legislate to ameliorate or nullify the effect of the decisions, it took the opportunity to 
use the situation to gain agreement from the TUC to a full inquiry into the current 
state of industrial relations. The careful response from the Minister of Labour, John 
Godber, was that an examination of Rookes v Barnard could ‘appropriately be made 
only within the framework of the general inquiry into trade union law.’225 In fact, the 
Government was able to obtain the agreement of the TUC to an inquiry by making 
reversal of the effects of the Rookes v Barnard judgment through further legislation 
conditional on their acceptance of the inquiry. As Robert Kilroy-Silk observed: 
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There can be little doubt that the Rookes v Barnard case was a godsend for the 
Labour Government ... [providing] the excuse for the Commission, and the 
Commission provided the excuse for procrastination. The Government could claim to 
be doing something when, in fact, it was doing nothing. Or rather it had managed to 
pass what, to it, was a politically dangerous issue on to other shoulders.226 
Nevertheless, whether the Donovan Commission was simply a ruse used by a 
government playing for time, as Kilroy-Silk maintains, or in fact a serious attempt to 
inquire into all aspects of activity of trade unions, the inquiry proved to be a pivotal 
event in the history of industrial relations.   
2.4 The Political and Economic Situation 1945-1965.  
It is important to set the legal changes within the context of the political and 
economic climate of this period, in order to better understand the calls for a full Royal 
Commission review of industrial relations. The Commission reported over twenty 
years after the end of the Second World War, a period which had witnessed major 
changes in the social and economic situation in Britain. In addition, there had been 
significant legislative gains for the trade union movement and for workers in general. 
These included the Wages Council Act 1945, ensuring minimum wages in certain 
industries and the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act 1946, restoring the 
restrictions on strikes and trade union membership removed by the 1927 Act.227 
There had been a raft of Acts aimed at protecting the health of workers in specific 
industries, while the Contracts of Employment Act 1963228 required employees to be 
                                                
226 R. Kilroy‐Silk, ‘The Donovan Royal Commission on Trade Unions’, in R. A. Chapman (ed.), The Role of 
Commissions in Policy Making, (London, 1973), p. 44. 
227 Repealed by s. 1 Trade Unions and Trade Dispute Act 1946. The 1927 Act was described as ‘one of the most 
spiteful measures that was ever placed on the statute book’: H.A. Mills, The British Trade Disputes and Trade 
Union Act, The Journal of Political Economy, 36(3), 1928. 
228 Widely recognised as ‘the first modern employment protection statute’. S. Deakin, G. Morris, Labour Law, 
(Oxford, 2012). 
78 
 
given reasonable notice before dismissal and a written statement of particulars at the 
commencement of employment. The Second World War had brought the TUC into 
direct consultation with government on a wide variety of issues, and, since the TUC 
was now established as the centre of trade union representation, it could justifiably 
be said that the trade-union movement ‘had arrived’.229 
The first post-war government, under Clement Attlee,230 made significant attempts to 
gain union consent to overall social and political policies. The Labour Government 
brought with it financial gains for the union movement, as well as policies that 
resulted in full employment.231 This latter would prove to be highly significant, since it 
resulted in a shift in the balance of power between workers and employers: 
There has been a decisive movement of power within industry itself from 
management to labour ... The change from a buyer’s to a seller’s market for labour, 
however, by transposing at once the interests, and therefore the attitudes, of the two 
sides, has dramatically altered the balance of power at every level of labour 
relations.232 
However, as this balance of power shifted between workers and employers, so also 
did it move away from union leaders and towards the shop-stewards’ movement.233 
This led to a gradual move away from national bargaining and towards plant-based 
bargaining systems, shifting control of pay away from central authority and towards a 
system of individualized awards which often bore little resemblance to pay levels 
                                                
229 K. Coates, ‘The Vagaries of Participation, 1945‐1960’, in Trade Unions in British Politics, B. Pimlott, V. Cook 
(eds), (London, 1982), p. 171. 
230 Attlee served as Prime Minister from 1945 to 1951. 
231 Figures for years 1948‐1965 in Table 1  above. 
232 C.A.R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, (London, 1956), pp.  30‐31. 
233 It was noted in the Donovan Report that the shop steward is less likely to be applying industry‐wide 
agreements than obtaining a concession in excess of that agreement. Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, 
para. 101. 
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agreed through national bargaining.234 This led to rising prices and a worrying 
degree of inflation which the Government was anxious to bring under control.235 
The 1950s was a time of economic decline in Great Britain in comparison with other 
competitor countries. There was a ‘stop-go’ cycle of economic management in 
Britain,236 which appeared to be the cause of the relatively slow growth rate, since it 
deprived the industrialists of the necessary confidence to make large-scale and long-
term investments.  
Laybourn examined the political situation which prevailed between 1940 and 1969, 
observing that trade unions in this period were becoming increasingly conscious of 
their power and authority, ‘seeking involvement in the economic decisions of 
governments, agreeing to wage freezes for the good of the economy and even 
contemplating the need for new productivity arrangements.’237 Historians 
acknowledged that ‘... wartime and post-war consensus created the opportunity for 
trade union development.’238 However, this consensus between union leaders, 
business leaders and politicians led to dissatisfaction among union members, who 
perceived that officials were ignoring the best interests of the ordinary members who 
began to take industrial action without the official approval of their leaders. Laybourn 
considered that, ‘The emergence of such undisciplined industrial relations paved the 
way for both Labour and Conservative politicians to examine ways of making trade 
                                                
234 The Commission referred to this state of affairs as ‘the two systems of collective bargaining’: Royal 
Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, paras. 143‐154. 
235 UK Inflation since 1948, 
<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Asiju4DoCDhScFhNRlEzZTRhRlkxMW9Ra1RfN0ZoWmc#gid=
0> The rate of inflation was beginning to rise in 1960, moving from ‐0.5 to 1.8 per cent between January and 
December; in 1965 the annual inflation rate was running at around 5 per cent. 
236  Defining stop‐go policy, Dow wrote: ‘Policy appear[ed] both to cause deviations from trend and (later) to 
reverse them ... [such] that growth would have been closer to a sustainable trend had it done neither.’  J.C.R. 
Dow, The Management of the British Economy, 1945‐60, (Cambridge, 1964), p. 284. 
237 K. Laybourn, A History of British Trade Unionism, p. 157. 
238 Ibid., p. 158. 
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union leaders both more powerful within their unions and more accountable to the 
public.’239 
In response, the country began to take on a more active, less complacent role in 
economic management. The Conservative Government under the leadership of 
Harold Macmillan decided to modernize the economy during 1961. The idea of 
controlling wages through an incomes policy was a more acceptable option from the 
Government’s perspective, but employers, desperate for workers in a period of full 
employment, were driven to undermining government-imposed wage freezes240 by 
alternative means such as bonuses and systematic overtime. These were negotiated 
directly with shop stewards, thereby accelerating the shift of bargaining power away 
from union leaders to the shop floor.241 The powerful grip which the unions appeared 
to exercise over the country’s economy had to be loosened if Britain was to thrive 
and prosper, and the Conservatives now determined that this could only be achieved 
through legislation, other strategies such as wage polices having failed.242 
Neither the Conservative nor the Labour parties were significantly eager to take on 
the unions at this time, even though rising wages fuelled the soaring inflation 
rates.243 The favour of the trade unions was courted by both sides of the political 
divide, but this became a time of careful analysis of the whole relationship between 
government and trade unions, when both political parties were forced to examine the 
                                                
239 Ibid. 
240 A number of incomes policies had been tried since 1948, but it was found that restricting rates of wage 
increases was not enough. The Prices and Incomes Act 1966 was an anti‐inflationary measure which allowed 
governments to scrutinize rising levels of wages, and ‘showed a great willingness on Parliament’s part to 
intervene in the system of industrial relations where it judged voluntary action had failed’: Royal Commission 
Report, Cmnd. 3623, para. 160. 
241 K. Coates, ‘The Vagaries of Participation 1945‐1960’ in B. Pimlott and C. Cook (eds), Trade Unions in British 
Politics, p. 177. 
242 The National Incomes Commission established in 1962 was ineffectual, largely due to the TUC boycotting it, 
and Macmillan’s Incomes Policy of 1962 also failed in its objectives. 
<http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab‐129‐109‐c‐99.pdf> Accessed 13 March 2015. 
243 H/C Research Paper 99/20 Inflation: the Value of the Pound 1750‐1998, Price Index, Table 1. 
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issue of intervention through legislation in what had been areas of concern 
traditionally left wholly in the hands of trade unions.  
2.5 The decline of laissez-faire industrial relations 
Thus the hitherto laissez-faire period of labour relations, with little interference from 
government, began its slow and possibly inevitable decline in the early 1960s.244 
Harold Wilson’s administration oversaw the birth of the Royal Commission in 1965. 
Wilson and his First Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, Barbara 
Castle, were concerned to pitch their response to the Royal Commission Report in 
such a way that they could be sure of another term of office. The Conservatives, also 
concerned with regaining power, had their own plans. But who would win the battle 
for Downing Street and become the party that restored good sense and order to the 
trade union movement?245 A radical solution had to be found, and therefore the 
Royal Commission was called upon to examine the whole system of industrial 
relations and propose suitable solutions to the trade union ‘problem’. 
One way to achieve this would be through legislation, provided that the right balance 
of control of union power and support for workers could be formulated. Reducing the 
political and industrial power of the unions was viewed as popular with the electorate 
and could help either Labour or the Conservatives win a general election if only they 
could find the correct formula.246 The plan would have to seek a re-balancing of the 
power between union leaders and members, while continuing to involve unions with 
                                                
244 Davies, Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, pp. 137‐139. 
245 P.  Jenkins, The Battle of Downing Street, (London, 1970). 
246 R. Undy, P. Fosh, H. Morris, P. Smith, R. Martin, Managing the Unions: The Impact of Legislation on Trade 
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decisions affecting the economy, but at the same time trying to curb the growing 
influence of the union movement.  
The growth in calls for restraining union action took legislation in an entirely new 
direction, and away from the voluntarist position that had characterized industrial 
relations for many decades. Although Wedderburn had asserted that ‘most workers 
want nothing more of the law than that it should leave them alone,’247 this was a 
desire that no British political leader, Labour or Conservative, was willing to 
contemplate by the late 1960s. The role of the law would prove to be the most 
controversial aspect of tackling growing concerns over trade union activities. 
The first formal evidence of the change in Conservative attitude from one of laissez-
faire to calls for greater state control had appeared in A Giant’s Strength, demanding 
a new legal framework for industrial relations, including the loss of all legal 
‘privileges’  if a union went on strike in defiance of union rules. This pamphlet would 
influence Conservative policy in the 1960s and lead to insistence on greater legal 
control over union activities, even though many Tory MPs still remained wary of 
legislation, 248 These even included the Minister for Labour, John Hare, who warned 
that: 
Legislation would cut across the present policy of trying to bring about a general 
improvement in industrial relations on a voluntary basis in cooperation with 
employers and unions. It would end the prospect of further progress on these lines in 
                                                
247 Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law, p. 1. 
248 Many of the ideas contained in A Giant’s Strength were contained in Fair Deal at Work: the Conservative 
Approach to Modern Industrial Relations, published by the Conservative Political Centre, CPC No. 400, April 
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the immediate future. It would cause a head-on collision with the trade union 
movement generally.249 
Wilson too had little appetite for a confrontation with the unions, but the majority of 
Conservatives had far fewer reservations on the issue, recognizing that, ‘One way to 
avoid disaster might be for the government to take on, and beat, the unions,’ 
something ‘on which the Conservative opposition under Edward Heath was now 
making the running.’250 The Trade Union Law and Practice Group appointed by 
Heath reported in 1965 recommended a decisive break with the voluntarist approach 
of post-war Conservatism.  Heath’s new style of Conservatism was set out in the 
1965 policy document Putting Britain Right Ahead,251 while specific proposals for 
legislation were contained in the 1966 manifesto, Action Not Words.252 This latter 
document called for ‘legally enforceable collective agreements, a Registrar for union 
rules, an Industrial Court, action on restrictive labour practices and action to prevent 
intimidation.’253 
This represented a seismic shift in the Conservative political ideology since the 
Churchill Government of 1951-55, when the Minister of Labour, William Monckton 
had been an arch-appeaser of the trade unions.254 This period also saw the coining 
of the term ‘Butskellism’ in The Economist, a term which implied that Conservative 
and Labour policies were almost indistinguishable, and that both sides were agreed 
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250 Ibid., 139. 
251Putting Britain Right Ahead: A Statement of Conservative Aims, Westminster: Conservative and Unionist 
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on the importance of consultation with the unions.255 By the 1960s, the very notion of 
appeasement by any political leader had subsided to such a degree that legislation 
to control the unions now appeared to be inevitable, whichever political party was in 
charge. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The period of history examined here, through the nineteenth century and up to the 
1960s, had witnessed an ebb and flow of legislative and judicial interference with 
industrial relations and with the rights of trade unions to manage their own affairs 
autonomously.256 The extent to which legislation should or should not be employed 
to act as a brake on union autonomy and for managing industrial relations and 
regulating the rights of trade unions and workers was once again attracting 
increasing political attention. The value of legislative interference in industrial 
relations was once more under the microscope, even though some Conservatives, 
led by Richard (RAB) Butler, continued to maintain that legislation would be 
unworkable.257 
Any Royal Commission investigating legislative interference in industrial relations 
would need to consider what role, if any, the law had to play.258 Wedderburn’s 
description of the dual role of industrial legislation259 noted how new laws had been 
welcomed when used to support workers where unions were weak or non-existent, 
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industrial relations and concluded that legislation to limit the right to strike would be inappropriate and 
unenforceable: Bodleian, CRD 2/7/17 IRC, Industrial Change, The Human Aspect, 1962, 7. 
258 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623. Written Evidence of the Ministry of Labour, London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office. 
259 Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law. 
85 
 
and where they were used to strengthen and protect the unions’ freedom to strike 
and manage their own financial affairs.260 However, where legislation was deployed 
as a means of governmental control over those unions whose very strength was 
perceived as a threat to the economic health of the nation, it was viewed as a threat 
by trade union leaders and accordingly resisted.261 Yet, it was positively demanded 
by the whole trade union movement when used to act as a counterbalance to the 
very real threat to union autonomy coming from the courts.262  
The Donovan Commission, which would include several lawyers and industrial 
relations academics, would have been acutely aware of the history of state 
interference with trade union autonomy from both courts and legislature. While 
legislation had been shown to be an appropriate measure for moderating, supporting 
or even controlling industrial relations in certain circumstances, governments had 
learned to use it with some caution, particularly when it operated as a threat to union 
autonomy. The absolute disregard paid to this sense of caution by both Conservative 
and Labour Governments between 1968 and 1974 may have contributed to their 
subsequent fall from grace, a factor which will be examined below. Nevertheless, 
neither the Labour Government, which tried to introduce penal sanctions against the 
unions in 1969,263 nor the Conservative Government, which brought in the Industrial 
                                                
260 Examples include: Trade Union Act 1871, Protection of Property Act 1875, Employers and Workmen Act 
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Relations Act 1971 that severely limited union activity, survived the subsequent 
General Elections.264 
According to contemporary writers, including Wigham, Roberts and Flanders, the 
Donovan Commission Report was the first major step on the long and tortuous road 
to the reform of industrial relations, but the parlous state of those relations and of the 
economy generally were the catalysts for the call for a Royal Commission in 1965 to 
examine the whole area of voluntarism which characterized British industrial 
relations at the time.265 
When the Donovan Commission was established, the most pressing problem for the 
Government was the number of unofficial strikes, often called by shop-stewards and 
without leadership approval.266 There were also many strikes in the coal industry 
where there were no shop stewards. This was, however, merely a symptom of the 
way in which the trade union movement and industrial relations had evolved and 
developed. Rules governing their behaviour had developed through custom and 
practice, but many unions had by now become too large for effective self-regulation, 
a view held even by one of the most powerful and influential union leaders, Jack 
Jones of the TGWU.267 
The questions that the Commission would have to consider were: whether a general 
code of practice would ensure a more effective system of regulation; whether there 
was a place for light regulation;268 whether collective agreements should maintain 
                                                
264 See Chapter 5  below. 
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266 95 per cent of all strikes were unofficial in the years 1964‐66, and approximately half concerned wages. See 
Ministry of Labour Statistics, Royal Commission Report 1968, Cmnd. 3623, 101. 
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their non-legal status; and whether legislation could set minimum standards which 
the unions would have to observe. Ultimately, the solutions that the Donovan 
Commission was required to find would be an exercise in compromise and 
diplomacy. It would be up to the Commission to ensure that its proposals would be 
acceptable to the government, to the unions and to business leaders if they were to 
achieve any level of success. Legislation of some kind would need to be considered, 
but there was a sufficiently diverse body of opinion within the Commission to ensure 
that a positive recommendation for legislative control was far from a foregone 
conclusion. The Donovan Commission would have been acutely aware of the past 
attempts of the legislature to interfere in industrial relations, those which had met 
with success and those which had not. This awareness would form the bedrock of its 
future inquiries and recommendations, but there was little doubt that the emerging 
patterns of post-war industrial relations would give a renewed urgency to consider 
some of the recurrent problems of British industrial relations, and to propose 
remedies to resolve them. 
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Chapter 3. The Royal Commission on Industrial Relations Report  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Royal Commission on Industrial Relations was set up for a number of economic, 
legal and political reasons. The Conservative governments in the 1950s and early 
1960s had endeavoured to remain on good terms with the unions, thereby avoiding 
the possible exploitation of popular fears that they were a threat to industrial stability. 
Such reticence was absent from the more right-wing Conservatives and ‘it was the 
lawyers who were to the fore in giving expression to these shades of opinion’ such 
as in the booklet, A Giant’s Strength.269 The consideration of changes to the law 
would be central to the deliberations of the Commission, which would have to decide 
to what extent - if at all - legislation would be a suitable means of bringing greater 
order into industrial relations. 
The economic situation which prevailed in the mid-1960s would need to be 
addressed through both long-term and short-term strategies, and while a Royal 
Commission could consider longer term goals, the Government also had to consider 
the immediate state of Britain’s public finances. Harold Wilson took office as Prime 
Minister in 1964, inheriting a huge £800 million balance of payments deficit. He was 
therefore anxious to see a reduction in unofficial strikes and an improvement in 
productivity, but in the short term it would also be imperative to impose further wage 
restraints, with a cap of 3-3.5 per cent, in order to satisfy the international money 
markets. Nevertheless, as Taylor pointed out, ‘the trouble was that the fragile British 
economy required a prolonged period of wage restraint to ensure international 
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confidence, and this was hard to achieve with a collective bargaining system that 
was fragmented and based on voluntaristic principles, not legal regulations.’270 
Taylor warned, however, that ‘the crucial question was whether the TUC’s affiliated 
unions were really ready and willing to cooperate in a policy that would require them 
to compromise with their traditional commitment to “free” collective bargaining’, 
particularly in relation to wage determination.271 
Some form of industrial relations legislation as part of that revisionist strategy 
seemed unavoidable, and that would form the basis of the Royal Commission’s 
remit. While some aspects of the law required urgent attention, such as the 
restoration of trade union immunity which had been undermined by the decision in 
Rookes v Barnard,272 other legislative amendments which could address such 
problems as unofficial strikes could be carefully considered over a longer period of 
time by a Royal Commission.  
There had also been more recent calls from the Conservative Party for extended 
industrial relations legislation, and although the Labour Government may not have 
been aware of the details, it would have been anxious to have its own proposals, 
particularly in the light of the growing problems of high inflation, low productivity and 
unofficial strikes.  The Conservative Governments of the 1950s and early 1960s had 
been equally anxious to avoid exploiting popular fears of trade unions as a potential 
threat to industrial stability. Nevertheless, the tide was turning against the unions 
movement, and the more right-wing Conservatives, particularly the lawyers, had 
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recently argued in A Giant’s Strength273 that the nation could no longer sustain the 
freedom of collective action prevalent at the time, and were dedicated to making 
radical changes to industrial relations through legislation.   
The Conservative Policy Group therefore worked over the next few years to produce 
its own analysis based on some of the recommendations in this pamphlet, and 
eventually reported shortly before the Donovan Report was published.274 Crucially, 
as Flanders had argued, a system of absolute voluntarism was no longer an 
acceptable option for either side of the political divide: 
The time has come when not humanity alone but our very existence demands justice 
in industry. Justice between master and man, between employer and union, between 
a union and its members and, perhaps above all, justice to the public. To obtain 
these things, it may be necessary to question the validity of certain assumptions that 
have come to be very nearly articles of faith to trade unionists.275 
Those assumptions were the freedom to engage in big, economically damaging 
strikes and in restrictive practices; to have damaging inter-union rivalries; and the 
freedom to run closed shops and thereby victimize individual workers.276 A Giant’s 
Strength reflected the political outlook upon industrial society of many lawyers, 
judges, employers and their associations, as well as senior Conservatives, who 
perceived the power of the unions as a challenge to the political and constitutional 
ordering of society. This may help to explain the stance taken by the House of Lords 
in 1964 in the case of Rookes, when the court ‘encroached upon the assumption, 
crucial to the whole structure of collective laissez faire, that the Trade Disputes Act 
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1906 had been intended to exclude economic tort law from the whole field of 
industrial disputes and should be construed accordingly.’277 The Law Lords had 
indicated that the policy embodied in section 3 of the Act278 was unduly protective of 
all kinds of trade union action, and they were willing to develop the common law and 
to use statutory construction to achieve radical new policy outcomes. They decided 
that the law ‘did not protect inducement of breach of contract where that is brought 
about by intimidation or other illegal means.’279 Public, judicial and political 
perception of trade unions was militating against the ever-increasing power of the 
unions, and the time was ripe for radical reform. 
This judicial decision gave further momentum to the pressure on the Government to 
respond to the perceived crisis in industrial relations.280 The TUC had pressed the 
Conservative Government to legislate to reverse the decision, but the Government 
wanted a full inquiry to take place before legislating.281 At the TUC Congress that 
year, one NUR delegate concluded the debate on the Rookes crisis by reminding 
Congress of the value of union freedom from legal restraints: 
I believe we have to strain every nerve to secure at the earliest possible moment 
amending legislation which will fully restore that kind of protection [under the 1906 
Act]. I believe that if we fail to do that, we shall betray our trust to those old pioneers 
who fought so hard to ... try to ensure that trade unions and trade union officials 
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should be able to be able to exercise their legitimate and proper functions without ... 
legal fetters.282 
Action to remedy the effects of Rookes was a priority for the union movement. 
Wilson was willing to agree to legislation which would restore the trade dispute 
immunities, having earlier declared an intention to consider major law reforms ahead 
of the Election.283 He charged Ray Gunter, his Minister of Labour, with reversing the 
effect of Rookes. The appointment of the Royal Commission in 1965, tasked with a 
full review of the system of industrial relations, was directly followed by the 
publication of the Trade Disputes Bill which acted to undo the immediate effect of 
Rookes. This came as something of a relief to the trade unions, which had for over 
half a century been safe in the knowledge that, as non-corporate organisations, they 
could not be held legally responsible for economic torts. Legislation had protected 
that position, and it was evident that new legislation was the only way to ‘correct’ the 
position which the House of Lords had seen fit to disrupt. Evidently, trade unions 
were not entirely averse to legislation – if it suited their own purposes.  
There was undoubtedly a crisis which had been sharpened, but not caused by the 
intervention of the House of Lords in Rookes. The Royal Commission was being 
asked to ‘do nothing less than discover by rational inquiry the right normative order 
for industrial society for the future’, and to consider whether law had a part to play in 
that order.284 The new Labour Government showed little appetite for confrontation 
with the unions. Wilson may have complained that a Royal Commission would take 
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years,285 but he may also have seen a benefit in such a delay, relying on that fact to 
keep him in government for as long as possible while something was at least seen to 
being done about the ‘trade union problem’. The timescale was set at two years, but 
in fact it would take three years to complete the report. The magnitude of the task 
was huge, with 640 trade unions and 1,500 employers’ associations all potentially 
wishing to have some input into the inquiry.286 
Meanwhile, the Conservatives would have ample time to reconsider their policies 
and formulate a plan that would not only restore them to government, but which 
would enable them to rein in the trade unions and their unbridled excesses of power 
once and for all.287 (It would indeed be a Conservative Government that succeeded 
in this aim, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, but that would be in a 
different decade and involve considerable conflict.)  
When the Donovan Commission Report was finally published in June 1968 it 
contained only tentative and minor recommendations, with no major role for the law. 
It was a disappointment to many, including Barbara Castle and Jack Jones, TGWU 
leader.288  Meanwhile, the Conservative party succeeded in publishing its own 
recommendations in Fair Deal At Work, two months ahead of the Donovan 
Report.289 The problem of unofficial strikes was clearly seen as a key election issue, 
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and it was likely that the party with the most effective proposals would have a distinct 
advantage in the next General Election. 
3.2 The Royal Commission 
The House of Lords ruling in Rookes had delivered a severe blow to the concept of 
trade union immunity. The ruling made it clear that trade unions did not enjoy the 
blanket protection from liability, and against loss of their funds, which they believed 
they had possessed ever since the Trade Disputes Act was passed in 1906. The 
TUC, seemingly not averse to legislation which directly benefited workers and trade 
unions, had persuaded the Labour Government to intervene to reverse the effect of 
the decision. In return, it offered to accept the appointment of a Royal Commission to 
consider other aspects of industrial relations, with the proviso that trade union 
representatives were included among its members.290 There was a long-standing 
and unshakeable assumption that trade unions had an important role to play in the 
post-war consensus, and the notion that the operations of unions should be central 
to a thorough examination of economic problems and suggested solutions did not 
question this assumption. 
The Royal Commission had its terms of reference set out in the Royal Warrant by 
which the twelve members were formally appointed on 8 April 1965.291 With such 
terms of reference, it was to be expected that there would be a number of lawyers on 
the Commission, but also trade unionists and experts on industrial relations. Since a 
Royal Commission has free rein in how it approaches its task, unconstrained beyond 
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its vague terms of reference,292 it is instructive to first establish the background of the 
twelve Commission members. It is in the nature of group studies that individual 
personalities, with their prejudices and experiences, will influence the outcome of the 
group’s enquiries and findings. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the 
members of the so-called Oxford School who were included on the Commission, 
played an unduly influential role in the outcome. The Commission constituted a 
group of people who collectively held a wide variety of strong opinions which may 
have played some part in the shortage of agreed solutions in the final report.  
Lord Donovan was chosen to chair the Commission, and the other eleven members 
were selected over the next few weeks.293 The Times reported on the choice of 
members, noting the importance of the legal experts: 
The membership has been chosen to reflect relevant interests, including experience 
of labour relations, management, and trade unionism from the academic, practical, 
legal and independent viewpoints. The inclusion of legal experts is particularly 
important, since some of the demand for an inquiry into trade unions was stimulated 
by apparent anomalies in the law brought to light by the cases of Rookes v Barnard 
and Stratford v Lindley.294 
Gosnell, in his study on Royal Commissions, noted that it was common to appoint a 
judge to chair a Commission, but suggested that the obvious qualities of an 
experienced judge may be counterbalanced by other tendencies such as a 
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willingness to accept compromise.295 Indeed, with so many members, each from 
very diverse backgrounds, it was perhaps predictable that many compromises would 
have to be made in order to progress to a conclusion and final Report. 
With a background in both law and politics, Lord Donovan had been elected as a 
Labour MP in 1945, but resigned shortly after the 1950 election to take up the post of 
High Court judge. He rose through the judicial ranks to become a Law Lord in 1964. 
Since the inquiry would focus on the role of the law, it was perhaps natural that a 
judge would be appointed to chair the Commission. Gosnell may have been correct 
in his analysis, however, since the final report was very much based on compromise, 
with clear disagreements within the membership and a lengthy Note of Reservation 
from one member, Andrew Shonfield. 
The chairmanship of the Royal Commission was Donovan’s only major appointment 
before his retirement in 1971. His influence as a judge and former Labour MP gave 
him the dual advantages of knowing the law and having the experience of dealing 
with trade unionists and working men in his capacity as an MP. Although he had 
limited experience of labour law, he would have found favour with the trade unions, 
since he was one of the Court of Appeal judges who had reversed the High Court 
decision in the Rookes case, in favour of the unions.296 The TUC had always 
stressed the need for a wide-ranging inquiry which covered more than the law, but 
nevertheless accepted Donovan as a legal chairman. His relative ignorance of the 
subject matter, however, led to his relying heavily on the academic experts on the 
Commission who were eventually to produce the essential parts of the Report. 
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The Prime Minister was challenged in Parliament on the choice of the remaining 
members. Mr Lubbock MP and Mr Godber MP asked whether the membership of the 
Commission should have included people with recent experience of negotiations at 
factory level, such as shop stewards and works’ managers, or even wholly 
independent people who could be more objective. Nevertheless, Wilson professed 
himself satisfied with the make-up of the Commission.297 The Economist also 
expressed doubts about the membership, querying before the full list was 
announced, ‘whether it will also include some people who have in the past been 
critical of [the trade union movement].’298 The full scepticism of The Economist was 
apparent in a later article when it described the Royal Commission as ‘too large’, 
having ‘a nineteenth century air’ and being ‘unusual among British royal 
commissions in that it contains representatives of the two groups involved in the 
investigation’.299 This reflected the opinions of the two MPs who seemed to be 
otherwise lone voices in Parliament concerned at the make-up of the Commission.  
The members could be categorized loosely as academic and non-academic experts, 
representative and lay members, who were able to assist each other in providing the 
diverse range of experience and opinion that is fundamental to the production of a 
balanced report. Certain members of the Commission were known to be opposed to 
the use of legislation, and in favour of voluntarism. Others were inclined to take a 
more pragmatic stance, arguing that the economic situation and the transition of 
trade unions from weak organizations in the early twentieth century to monolithic, all-
powerful and autonomous bodies in the 1960s necessitated greater regulation. 
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3.2.1 The Academic Experts 
It was essential to include industrial relations specialists on the Commission, given 
its remit. Otto Kahn-Freund, Allan Flanders and Hugh Clegg, together with and Eric 
Wigham, were major contributors to the debate on the role of legislation. Their 
previous experience and opinions inevitably came to heavily influence the Report of 
the Commission. 
Oxford University had by this time established itself as a pre-eminent place for the 
study of industrial relations, and several members of the Commission had an ‘Oxford 
School’ connection. The Oxford School was important for its role in creating a new 
academic social science field of industrial relations. It ‘addressed a crucial policy 
moment in the development of social democratic corporatism with reference to the 
role of trade union’.300 They group’s members were academics who ‘analysed 
industrial relations primarily by relying on empirical research and who were 
interested in applying their research to practical problems.’301 In Hugh Clegg’s words, 
‘we tended to be practical-minded – looking where possible for ways of improving 
things, and we tended to rely on empirical research – particularly in the 
workplace.’302 The five key founder members were Hugh Clegg, Allan Flanders, Alan 
Fox, Bill McCarthy, and Arthur Marsh.303 So influential were they, that it was written: 
Dialling 0092, the Oxford prefix is a performance you can predict of an editor who 
wants an article on the role of the shop steward, of an employer’s association which 
needs specialist advice, of a trade union seeking guidance. It is too a necessary ritual 
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for a government department in need of an academic for a committee of inquiry into a 
strike.304 
It came as little surprise, therefore, that Flanders and Clegg were appointed as 
Commission members. Clegg was appointed as a Commission member, while 
Flanders was asked to submit evidence to the Commission. 
Although the members of the Oxford school were generally opposed to legislative 
interference with industrial relations, Flanders was the one who was most in favour 
of legislation, which he admitted was increasingly necessary in modern industry.305 
Nevertheless, he also advocated retaining the long-standing of collective 
agreements as permitting flexibility and encouraging responsibility, which together 
‘induced a greater readiness to compromise and to stand by whatever compromise 
was reached.’306  
The fact that industrial activity changes day by day, that technology and markets are 
constantly in flux, means that it cannot be directed with a sensitive regard for the 
manifold and diverse interest of those involved by a regime of strict external law and 
outside regulation. Fixed codes of rights and obligations, rigid notions of justice and 
equity, are not applicable to industrial relations.307 
Flanders also advocated limited legislative measures to positively strengthen 
collective bargaining. Rather than general legal enforcement of procedural collective 
agreements, he could see a place for selective use of legal support for substantive 
agreements relating to wages.308 He recommended retaining the flexibility of 
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voluntarism and considered that ‘the legal enforcement of procedural agreements 
would completely change the character of collective bargaining and force the actual 
conduct of negotiations and the process of dispute settlement into a restrictive legal 
form.’309 Nevertheless, Flanders suggested that legislation could act as ‘an important 
means of stimulating the negotiation of agreements’ and ‘a spur to their 
observance.’310 The method which he advocated, therefore, was ‘to use state 
regulation to set minimum conditions, while allowing the parties to opt out of legal 
enforcement when and where they negotiate agreements with not less favourable 
terms.’311 
Hugh Clegg, also a member of the influential Oxford School, had been a Fellow of 
Nuffield College, Oxford since 1949, taking up the position of the first Professor of 
Industrial Relations at Warwick University between 1967 and 1979. He had written 
extensively on trade unions and industrial relations, having been a pre-war trade 
union activist. He published the first of three volumes of A History of British Trade 
Unions in 1964.312 Together with Flanders, he had previously published the System 
of Industrial Relations in Great Britain.313  
Clegg was a traditionalist who advocated state support for voluntary agreements and 
minimal legislative interference.314 His preferred approach to industrial relations lay 
somewhere between voluntarism and legislation. He considered that the use of the 
law to restore industry bargaining, to make collective agreements legally binding, to 
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regulate strike action or to reform trade union structures were all unworkable 
options.315 
Although described more as an Oxford ‘outsider’,316 one of the Report’s main 
authors, Otto Kahn-Freund, was a distinguished academic lawyer and professor of 
Comparative Law at Oxford. He had studied History and Law at the Universities of 
Frankfurt, Heidelberg and Leipzig, a period of study which had ‘helped him to realise 
that an understanding of the development of a law, and of the social context in which 
it was required to work, was an essential basis for the discussion of present day 
issues.’317 He was strongly influenced by the teachings of Professor Hugo 
Sinzheimer who was widely regarded as the creator of German labour law. Kahn-
Freund wanted to understand how the law worked in society at large and was highly 
critical of the German Federal Labour Court, comparing its attitude to that of the 
fascist Italian government which had attempted to restrict the collective action of 
workers while enhancing the benefits of individual labour law.318 He was intensely 
interested in the scientific study of British collective labour law because of the 
apparent ‘abstention’ of the law, of which he was very much in favour, and the 
absence of any intention to create legal relations which would normally form part of 
any commercial agreement.319 
With his background in the highly regulated German legal system, Kahn-Freund was 
one of the greatest proponents of the voluntary, laissez-faire nature of industrial 
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relations, which he thought was considerably better than the German system.320 He 
had regarded statutory interventions as ‘second best’ so that ‘all British legislation is, 
in a sense, a gloss or footnote to collective bargaining’.321 Interestingly, his attitude 
towards the role of legislation would soften with his membership of the Donovan 
Commission, and he came to admit that there were benefits to legislative control 
over some areas of industrial relations.322 
Kahn-Freund adopted a sociological approach to the law, but also wrote frequently of 
law in the political context and was able to compare English law with that in other 
jurisdictions. It is these qualities of insight into the purpose of law and the inherent 
dangers of a fascist-style regime, together with his ability to critique and analyze the 
law in its sociological, comparative and political contexts which gave Kahn-Freund 
the advantage of being able to view the problems and potential solutions from 
multiple perspectives. Kahn-Freund thought that ‘the part played by the law in the 
regulation of relations between employers and their organizations on the one hand 
and trade unions on the other is problematical everywhere.’323 He considered that 
the solutions to that problem in one country could be of interest to other countries 
and should not be dismissed as purely theoretical.324  
In Britain, collective regulation was traditionally a matter of autonomy for the unions, 
taking place outside the law, and Kahn-Freund put this down to the fact that, while in 
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Germany and France the political labour movement preceded the trade union-
movement, in Britain the reverse was true by at least half a century. The disruption 
caused by industrialization in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
combined with the severe economic effects of the Napoleonic Wars, led to a surge in 
workplace combinations and trade organisation. This was despite the Combination 
Acts of 1799 and 1800 which made combinations of all trades illegal, replacing the 
need for individual pieces of legislation aimed at particular trades. Nevertheless, 
trade unions were well and truly established long before politicians considered it 
necessary to regulate them - rather than simply ban them - through legislation, and 
their organizational rules and procedures had already been developed internally 
through consensus and a process of custom and practice – a concept that Kahn-
Freund admitted was hard for lawyers to grasp.325 He explained that British laws, 
unlike those of Germany, ‘do not have a systematic, codifying character, but are 
intended to deal with abuses.’326 There has never been an attempt to provide a code 
of practice in Britain that would regulate industrial relations and union activities; 
instead, successive governments have identified a problem or ‘abuse’ when it arose 
and passed legislation to deal with it.327  
Kahn-Freund wrote on the role of law in industrial relations, both in retrospect and 
prospect, following publication of the Donovan Report, posing the questions:  
What possible contribution can the law make to the ordering of industrial relations, 
what contributions has it made in this country in the past, and what are we expecting 
it to make in the future?328  
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He considered that law had three possible roles. He believed that law could support 
the autonomous system of collective bargaining; provide a code of substantive rules 
governing terms and conditions of employment; and it could ‘provide the rules of the 
game’, what is allowed and what is forbidden in the conduct of ‘industrial hostilities’. 
He argued that the greatest defect in the law was ‘the absence of any attempt to 
create a body of regulatory norms to provide the parties with a clear ruling where 
collective bargaining fails to provide it.’329 There was no willingness on the part of 
either labour or management to ask for direct sanctions such as injunctions, the 
imposition of damages, or of criminal penalties, nor to recognize collective 
agreements as legally binding contracts.330 However, the use of ‘indirect sanctions 
provided by law’ was one of the formative elements of British industrial relations.331 
Kahn-Freund considered that they provided a statutory framework for what he 
termed ‘organized persuasion.’ Direct sanctions, such as those used in wartime, 
were ineffective and usually withdrawn when peace was re-established.  
Kahn-Freund wrote: 
The trade unions have never in this country demanded the legal enforcement of an 
obligation to recognize them, just as they have preferred to rely on their own strength 
rather than on the law for the enforcement of the concluded agreement. This is an 
attitude which is deeply rooted in their history ... trade unions [have] achieved 
through industrial action a high degree of bargaining strength long before their 
members had achieved the political franchise and the unions had achieved the 
political pressure power that goes with the franchise of members.332 
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Yet Kahn-Freund could see the benefits of limited legislative control over selected 
areas of industrial relations, and in fact authored Chapter 9 of the Royal Commission 
Report on ‘Safeguards for Employees against Unfair Dismissal’, and Chapter 10 
which proposed the establishment of labour tribunals to deal with this and other 
employment-related issues. Kahn-Freund was demonstrably in favour of legislation 
to ensure that dismissals were done fairly, a protective measure that went beyond 
union members and which has protected all employees since 1971.333 However, 
right up until shortly before his death, he maintained the belief in the importance of 
the strike as the ‘necessary ultimate sanction, without which collective bargaining 
cannot exist’, and that law could make no contribution to the solution of the 
problem.334 He nevertheless admitted that the freedom to strike could be in danger of 
being lost if the unions did not do something about the problem themselves, a 
change of heart that may have been prompted by the shift in the pattern of strikes in 
Britain, and with the growth in large-scale strikes by public sector workers.335 His 
‘ideal’ of collective laissez-faire was certainly no longer sustainable at the time of his 
death in 1979, and was possibly already a concept that was no longer tenable in the 
mid-1960s, as the turmoil that characterized industrial relations for the next two 
decades was to suggest. 
Kahn-Freund compared the voluntary system of industrial relations in Britain with the 
highly-regulated German system and found that almost every fault that he had seen 
in the industrial relations of the Weimar Republic could be matched by a virtue in the 
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British system.336 He considered that the obligations and liabilities of the British 
method ‘do not lend themselves to enforcement by state-created legal machinery.’337 
Kahn-Freund had a preference for the system of voluntarism in Britain and thought 
that ‘legal norms and sanctions are blunt instruments for the shaping of intergroup 
relations which have developed into a higher community.’338 His concept of collective 
laissez-faire was both a descriptive model of British industrial relations and a 
normative model of how they should be, and it was heavily influential in the study of 
industrial relations. His attitudes were doubtless shaped by his earlier experiences in 
Germany as a judge, and his arguments against the use of the law to control workers 
were distinctly political. Nevertheless, this antipathy towards legal regulation altered 
significantly with his membership of the Donovan Commission, and Hugh Clegg, a 
fellow member, attributes this to the evidence of key witnesses to the 
Commission,339 one of whom was including Allan Flanders.340 
Together, Flanders, Clegg and Kahn-Freund offered outstanding intellectual insight 
into the theoretical side of industrial relations and were heavily influential in the final 
Report. 
3.2.2 Non-academic experts 
An expert and author on trade unions, Eric Wigham worked as Labour Editor for The 
Times. In his book, What’s Wrong with the Unions? he demonstrated a sympathetic, 
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but constructively critical view of trade unions.341 He advocated legislation to control 
and modernize the trade unions, restricting legal privileges of trade unions to those 
which registered with the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, who would have 
responsibility for ensuring that the rules were observed. Wigham noted that ‘laws 
have been passed specially to make it legal for them [the trade unions] to do things 
that would otherwise have been illegal’, but argued that ‘they were given their special 
status because they were weak ... [and] now they are much stronger.’342 He 
recognized that while the prevailing social, economic and political circumstances had 
significantly altered since the 1906 Act, so had the status of trade unions, and that 
these changes should be recognized by amendments to the law. He did not restrict 
his recommendations to legislation alone, however, suggesting other reforms which 
could be undertaken by the unions, by the TUC and by employers.343  
From his perspective, legislation was desirable as means of controlling and 
modernizing the trade unions rather than for the improvement of the workers’ lot. He 
was concerned that there was much about trade unions that needed urgent 
improvement. Indeed, some of Wigham’s calls for state control would be included in 
the Donovan Report and would eventually find statutory footing in the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971. 
Andrew Shonfield, an economist, also disagreed with absolute voluntarism, and in 
the Report would call for greater formal control of industrial relations, which he 
claimed was necessary in an advanced industrial society; he authored the Note of 
Reservation which was almost a Minority Report.344 Before becoming a Commission 
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member, he had published his views on the British system of industrial relations, 
noting the lack of any legal framework in Britain which he dubbed an ‘unpaternal 
State’.345 He opposed the ideas of the majority on the Commission for continuing 
with a system of voluntarism while strengthening workplace bargaining, and led the 
‘hawks’ on the Commission. His philosophy of industrial relations was a legal-
sanction-based one. He made a strong argument for the role of the law to protect 
workers where there was little or no collective organization, and agreed with Frederic 
Meyers in decrying the lack of formal procedures for maintaining industrial discipline 
or dismissing with good cause.346 Shonfield had worked as economics editor on the 
Observer newspaper, and his expertise on economics and preference for legal 
sanctions formed the basis of his Note of Reservation attached to the Donovan 
Report. While the Oxford scholars drew on past experience of industrial relations, 
attempting to fit their recommendations into the voluntarist tradition, Shonfield took a 
significantly more pragmatic and forward-thinking approach to the problems, drawing 
on his experience as an economist. 
Shonfield had also written in favour of industrial relations legislation in some form. 
He considered that ‘the most striking illustration of the persistence of the traditional 
British attitudes is to be found in the legal framework of the rights of labour in relation 
to their jobs.’347 What he was referring to was the general lack of any legal 
framework and the extreme lengths to which the government took this principle. As 
an example of governmental antipathy towards industrial legislation, when the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) had agreed that all countries should move 
towards a forty-hour week in 1963, Britain was the sole dissenter, believing that such 
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matters should be left to independent collective bargaining, even though the TUC 
had pressed for the change to be enshrined in legislation.348  
Yet the British Government was in fact already beginning to move away from the 
principle of non-intervention and becoming in a sense increasingly ‘paternal’. For 
example, the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 had provided for fixed periods of 
notice based on length of service.349 This legislation was brought in as a result of the 
unions’ own intransigence, holding ‘rigidly to the principles of permanent 
employment, the traditional notion that the only form of protection for a wage-earner 
is to insist that he keeps on working in the particular job which he happens to 
occupy.’350 Shonfield blamed the unions for clinging to an older ideology based on a 
scarcity of jobs, and a failure to demand the right to financial compensation for the 
inconvenience associated with the loss of paid employment. Nonetheless, along with 
legal protection for individual workers, he also advocated tighter regulation of the 
unions, a point on which he disagreed with the majority of the Commission 
members.351 
3.2.3 Lay members 
Lord Robens had many qualifications for his presence on the Commission. He had 
served in the Attlee Labour Government as Minister of Labour in 1951, following the 
resignation of Nye Bevan, prior to which he had held posts as junior minister at the 
Ministries of Transport and Labour. He was appointed as Chairman of the National 
Coal Board in 1961,352 a role which gave him invaluable experience of politics, 
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business and industrial relations, making his appointment to the Commission a 
natural and obvious one. 
The sole female member of the Commission, Mary Green, was a successful 
headmistress of London’s first purpose-built comprehensive school, Kidbrooke. She 
was described by Roy Hattersley MP as a ‘public servant who kept properly 
detached from party politics.’353 This could be one reason for her appointment, since 
she could offer objective views, untainted by political bias. She took on her new role 
with great fervour and her record of attendance at public hearings held by the 
Commission was second only to Donovan himself.354 She was given a Damehood in 
1968, and served on other public bodies, including as a governor of the BBC 
between 1968 and 1973. 
The other lay member, John Thomson (later Sir John Thomson), was chairman of 
Barclays Bank between 1963 and 1973, and brought to the table his expertise in the 
service industries, rather than any particular knowledge of trade unions, although he 
would have been able to represent the views of commercial management. He was 
chairman of the Morlands brewery, and served in the army during the war. Educated 
at Magdalen College, Oxford, he had gone on to hold public office as High Sheriff of 
Oxfordshire and, later, as its Lord Lieutenant.355 
3.2.4 Representative Members 
Representative members are always likely to create dissension and disagreement 
and will occasionally be responsible for the minority reports which lie outside the 
majority report but which nevertheless present an enduring record of alternative 
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viewpoints and solutions. The interests of both employers and trade unions were 
represented on the Commission. 
There were two trade union members of the Commission who were both at the very 
heart of union matters – the General Secretary of the TUC, George Woodcock, and 
his TUC colleague, Lord Collison, national leader of the agricultural workers and a 
member of both the Council on Tribunals and the National Insurance Advisory 
Committee. Woodcock, a graduate of Oxford University, had a keen interest in the 
future of trade unions, but in fact rarely attended the meetings of the Commission 
and in reality achieved very little, missing out on this rather unique opportunity to 
make a significant contribution to the eventual recommendations in the Report. 
The employers’ representative was Sir George Pollock; he was a successful former 
barrister,356 becoming Director of the British Employers’ Confederation in 1954.357 
Finally, although not strictly speaking a direct representative of employers, Lord 
Tangley was a businessman with several directorships, and a keen mountaineer and 
author of several books on business, mountaineering and the law. He too had been 
a lawyer, and at one time had been appointed as President of the Law Society. 
3.2.5 The Composition of the Commission 
Thus, the Commission was an informed body of professional people, but did include 
four lawyers – Lord Tangley, Sir George Pollock, Otto Kahn-Freund and Lord 
Donovan himself. Hugh Clegg and Allan Flanders were experts in the study of 
industrial relations, an emerging branch of the law. The management interests of 
industry and commerce were represented by Pollock and Tangley, but also to some 
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extent by Thomson and Robens, while the views of workers and trade unions were 
represented by Woodcock and Lord Collison. A more critical and arguably less 
partisan view would be provided by Shonfield and Wigham, while Mary Green’s 
inclusion on the Commission could debatably have been the result either of tokenism 
or the sheer paucity of women in politics, in journalism, in commerce or indeed in the 
law. 
There was undoubtedly an imbalance of experience and opinion among the 
members of the Commission, which could have led to the suspicion that the group 
had been selected with a particular governmental view in mind. Women were clearly 
under-represented, which carried the danger of their particular problems in the 
workplace, such as unequal pay, going unrecognized. It could also be argued that 
there was insufficient representation of the trade union perspective, and an over-
emphasis on the representation of lawyers on the Commission, (even though it was 
true that Lord Tangley and Sir George Pollock had ‘travelled far since the days when 
they had practised law, and they had become very much, both in their knowledge 
and attitudes, men of business.’358) It would therefore be difficult to predict the 
emphasis that each member would give to the importance of the law when 
considering their remit with its overarching reference to law, although there would 
undeniably be divergent opinion on the extent to which legislation should be allowed 
to interfere. 
There were further significant weaknesses in the membership, which may have 
contributed to the ultimate failure to create a comprehensive set of rules which could 
effectively govern and control trade union behaviour. By having representative 
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members in Woodcock and Collison (for the TUC) and Pollock (for the employers’ 
organizations), Ray Gunter - the Minister responsible for appointments to the 
Commission -  had turned it into a representative body, and had thereby lost much of 
the element of objectivity. However, it was also fair to say that Gunter had an 
obligation to have a representative body with a range of interests, and that true 
objectivity is hard to come by in people of experience in any field. Lord Donovan may 
also have been a miscalculation, as he was relatively ignorant on the subject of 
industrial relations. Also, by choosing Kahn-Freund, Clegg and Flanders, Gunter 
should have been aware of ‘the weight of a particular approach which he was 
unconsciously building into the Commission’ ... and that ‘the overall composition was 
... one quite likely to polarize views within the Commission.’359 The Royal 
Commission Report, published in 1968, bore out this view since it was largely a 
vindication of voluntarism, with very few recommendations for legislation. 
3.3 The Nature of Trade Unionism in the early 1960s 
To understand the views and opinions of the Commissioners, which heavily 
influenced their recommendations, it is necessary to have some insight into the 
prevailing nature of trade unionism in the 1960s. Peter Dorey suggested that the 
‘problems’ as the politicians saw it were threefold: there were too many unofficial 
strikes in Britain; unions were an obstacle to increased productivity by virtue of 
‘restrictive practices’; and wage increases sought by unions were a major cause of 
rising inflation.360 The unions blamed the Tories for their policy of induced 
unemployment and failed economic policies, forcing the unions to employ unpopular 
weapons such as strikes and working-to-rule, but it was evident that many of the 
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problems lay with the unions themselves. In 1962, Bill McCarthy wrote that ‘the 
outlook facing the leaders of the British trade union movement is uncertain, 
impossible to predict, and potentially disastrous.’361 This gloomy viewpoint was 
based on some hard facts, with a slow growth in membership and a falling proportion 
of workers in trade unions.362 Media reporting on union tactics also cast them in a 
poor light with the public. At the 1959 Trades Union Congress, Bob Edwards of the 
Chemical Workers hit out at the Press, saying that it had built up the unions as the 
‘bogymen’ to distract attention from the real culprits – the big industrialists - who had 
‘…forced trade unions into the last six strikes because they refused to negotiate and 
because they were carrying out the business of the present Government.’ He 
continued: 
Those are the people who conspire to disrupt the economy of this country in order to 
destroy the British Trade Union Movement … It is time the British people knew the 
facts. This is the most constructive, responsible Trade Union Movement in the 
world.363  
He went on to cite ILO figures which demonstrated that Britain’s strike record was in 
fact one of the best in the Western world, and called for these facts to be made 
known.  
Nevertheless, many of the trade union movement’s ills were not simply down to a 
conspiracy between Press and Tories, since there was much that the movement 
could do to help itself. McCarthy identified four basic problems within the trade union 
movement:  membership growth, communications and control, bargaining priorities 
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and relations with Government and the public.364 The role of the TUC, as chief 
negotiator on industrial relations and union rights, would be vital in any endeavour to 
reform the trade union movement and address these problems, and the inclusion on 
the Donovan Commission of both George Woodcock and Lord Collison as 
representatives of the TUC was highly significant. Indeed, there was a wealth of 
experience and viewpoints on the Commission, but they were also operating in the 
context of an emerging debate in which the Conservative Party was making its own 
stand on industrial relations. 
3.4 The Findings and Recommendations of the (Conservative) Official Committee on 
Trade Unions and the Law 
Although the Report of the Donovan Commission is the best known and most widely 
discussed in-depth analysis of trade unions in the 1960s, it was not the first body 
established around this time to inquire into trade unions and the law, and it is 
instructive to first consider the recommendations of the secret Conservative 
Government committee. This was set up in 1963 to consider the role of the law in 
industrial relations and ‘to obtain better information about the points on which reform 
might be considered and about the implications about particular proposals for 
reform’.365 There was no attempt to involve the trade unions in this inquiry, and 
therefore any conclusions reached by the committee would be necessarily biased 
and not altogether practicable, since any major changes to the law on industrial 
changes would require at least the acceptance, if not the full agreement, of the 
unions. 
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The committee members comprised representatives from the Ministry of Labour, 
including Sir James Dunnett (chairman) and Denis Barnes; Charles Cunningham 
from the Home Office; representatives from the Lord Chancellor’s Office and the Law 
Officers’ Department; and S. Musson from the Registry of Friendly Societies. The 
terms of reference of the committee were to ‘consider the law relating to trade unions 
and employers’ associations, and to report what changes, if any, were desirable.’366 
The Final Report was eventually produced on 19 February 1964.367 This Report paid 
particular attention to the possibility of using legislation to control union activity, but 
its conclusions were almost entirely against this, despite the absence of any trade 
union representation on the committee which might have been expected to oppose 
them. The Report concluded that it would be unacceptable to make unofficial strikes 
illegal,368 impracticable to impose criminal sanctions for striking in breach of 
contract,369 and undesirable either to impose criminal penalties for inducing strikes in 
breach of contract370 or to try to strengthen trade union rules so as to deal with 
unofficial strike leaders.371 The Report likewise rejected altering the law to permit civil 
actions against individuals or trade unions for inducing employees to break their 
contracts of employment in pursuance of a trade dispute,372 and the Committee 
concluded that legislation to make collective agreements enforceable at law could on 
balance not be recommended.373  
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As to the conduct of union affairs, the Report rejected the idea of legislation to ban 
the closed shop,374 and, while it was considered desirable for a person whose 
employment prospects were affected by exclusion from a union to have a right of 
appeal, legislation to enforce this was again considered to be unwarranted, although 
could be considered at a later date.375 Legislation providing for appeals against 
irregularities in trade union elections was felt not to be justified, but again could be 
considered later; both of these latter considerations were to be left to the TUC to 
take effective action.376 
As to other possible changes in the law, legislation was considered to be of no 
advantage in providing for a ‘cooling off’ period before a strike,377 or in forcing unions 
to hold a secret ballot before calling a strike.378 Nothing was to be gained in making 
all trade unions register, the Report concluded.379 The Committee also rejected the 
proposal to amend section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 to limit the immunity of 
trade unions from actions in tort to acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a 
dispute.380 Legislation was considered desirable, however, in the area of the 
dismissal of workers, the Report recommending that employers should have to justify 
a dismissal, and that an employee would have a right of appeal to an independent 
tribunal.381 
In short, the Report effectively amounted to an almost wholesale rejection of 
legislation as an appropriate vehicle for reform of industrial relations. Many of these 
findings would be reflected and confirmed in the Donovan Report, even though it 
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was unlikely that the Commission would have had any awareness of this alternative 
Report, since it was designated as ‘Secret’ and therefore not intended to inform 
others who were undertaking a similar investigation. Nevertheless, the level of 
concurrence between the two studies is quite astonishing, and the report appears to 
show a quiet regard by the Conservative committee for the system of voluntarism 
that underpinned industrial relations, with no desire or sense of compulsion to alter 
the status quo. 
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission would be required to consider many of the 
same aspects of the law and come to its own conclusions on whether the law should 
be extended or limited in its scope. The Conservatives would also revisit these 
issues, and proposals from their findings would appear in 1968 in Fair Deal at Work, 
and later in the Industrial Relations Act 1971. Yet while the Donovan Commission 
would largely reject legislation as a means of regulating industrial relations, the 
Conservative Government would make a dramatic departure from the traditions of 
voluntarism and bring in a raft of new legislative provisions. This manoeuvre would 
represent a sharp U-turn in Conservative thinking on the role of legislation in 
industrial relations, and disregards all the earlier recommendations from the earlier 
Report of the Official Committee. 
3.5 The Royal Commission’s Task and Methodology 
The Donovan Commission began its mammoth task of inquiry into trade unions and 
employers’ associations in 1965, publishing the long-awaited report in 1968.382 This 
was the culmination of possibly one of the most thorough investigations into 
industrial relations and the role of the law ever undertaken. Shortly before the report 
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was published, The Times commented with a wish-list of what the Commission ought 
to have achieved.383 The writer anticipated ‘a major programme of legislative reform’ 
which would ‘make unions more responsible’; ‘strengthen the rights of the individual 
union member vis-a-vis his trade union’; ‘establish more order in the field of 
collective bargaining’; have comprehensive, negotiated contracts of employment with 
‘impartial machinery for examining disputes’ arising out of such contracts; and 
establish a system of Labour Courts.384 This particular writer was to be sorely 
disappointed. 
The Commission had a slow start to its investigations, as it had to begin by gathering 
evidence from all the various stake-holders. It first issued a highly detailed and 
comprehensive questionnaire to all trade unions and employers’ associations and to 
some Government departments and individuals who had specialist knowledge of 
industrial relations. Members of the public were also invited to submit their own 
observations. This resulted in a considerable amount of written evidence from over 
four hundred organisations or persons, including the CBI and the TUC, as well as 
many trade unions. The Commission then took oral evidence from several of those 
who had submitted written evidence. 
In order to obtain information about industrial relations at the workshop level, the 
Government Social Survey Department was asked to carry out interviews on the 
basis of a series of questionnaires with shop stewards, trade union officers, 
members and non-members, and many others. In addition, members of the 
Commission personally visited workplaces to speak with management and workers. 
Seven members of the Commission visited Sweden and Germany to gain first-hand 
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knowledge of the structure of industrial relations in those countries, including the 
system of industrial democracy practised in Germany, which is discussed in Chapter 
6 below. They professed to find the experience very valuable.385 
The methodology came in for some criticism from at least one commentator, while 
others were critical of the disregard that the Commission appeared to have towards 
the economic implications. J.R. Crossley, an economist, considered that the 
methodological approach was fundamentally flawed, predicting that this Royal 
Commission Report ‘will not be the last’ since the Commission had failed in one of its 
central tasks, but generously conceded that it was at least ‘an excellent first draft’.386 
Crossley considered that the answer lay in the way that industrial relations is studied 
and taught in this country, separate from other social sciences, and especially 
economics. He also felt that there had been no sense of urgency, despite the 
prevailing economic difficulties of the time and the pressing need for reform, which 
were largely blamed on the disorder of industrial relations. There was a chapter in 
the Royal Commission Report on the efficient use of manpower but the research 
team did nothing to add to the prima facie evidence already available and which was 
in any case disputed: this aspect of the methodology seemed remarkable to 
economists.387 Wage drift was given only scant attention while the section on 
incomes policy was ‘perfunctory’. Despite the Commission’s remit to consider the 
social and economic advance of the nation, these areas received minimal 
consideration. 
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The study was also criticized for its use of the historical method, while ignoring the 
more critical and scientific methods used in other social sciences. Karl Popper 
described ‘historicism’ as ‘an approach to the social sciences which assumes that 
historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is 
attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that 
underlie the evolution of history.’388 Yet, to look back is not necessarily the best way 
to predict the future, and other, economic, predictors may have been a preferable 
benchmark. For example, Chapter III of the Royal Commission Report described the 
way in which an informal, fragmented and autonomous process of bargaining at the 
work-place grew up alongside the formally recognized machinery of industry-wide 
bargaining, yet there was no analysis or explanation of the growth of workplace 
bargaining other than to suggest that it was due to full employment. It was explained 
merely as a trend, and as such ‘contains its own justification, since the historicist 
finds ends as well as means in his identification of “trends” and is relieved of the 
uncomfortable task of writing down the criteria which a good industrial relations 
system should satisfy, supposing we were free to construct or reconstruct one.’389 
Robert Kilroy-Silk390 also questioned the approach to research, saying that the 
‘evidence’ which the Commission received from organizations was no more than 
their opinions, and which could have been more efficiently gathered by means of a 
social survey. He expressed disappointment in the Report because it avoided the 
real issue of the role of trade unions and unofficial groups in a managed economy, 
and he concluded rather disparagingly, ‘It is, as George Woodcock is reported as 
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having said, a good handbook on industrial relations. It is no appraisal of groups in 
society.’391 
Thus, while the Royal Commission Report had much to commend it, it was also 
criticized on many fronts.392 Donovan would have done well to pay greater heed to 
the prevailing conditions, not only economic, but also industrial and political. As 
Davies and Freedland commented: 
 ... it was convenient for all concerned to proceed as if incomes policy and industrial 
relations, with their respective bodies of legislation, existed in two different spheres, 
to be kept apart on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds, so that the ephemerality 
of the intrusion upon free collective bargaining would be kept in full view.393 
Yet, despite the criticisms of the methodology, the time taken to conclude the Report, 
and the failure to take the prevailing economic conditions fully into account, the 
findings of the Report were nevertheless extremely valuable, and were used to 
inform later proposals for legislation, principally in Barbara Castle’s White Paper, In 
Place of Strife.394 
 
3.6 The Problems: Two Systems of Industrial Relations, Multiple Unions, and Strikes  
One major finding of the Report was the identification of the two very distinct 
systems of industrial relations: the formal and the informal. The disconnection 
between them was held to be responsible, at least in part, for uncontrolled wage 
rises. Pay negotiation at an industry-wide level was common in the private sector. 
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National industrial negotiating councils met with consortia of trade unions to discuss 
pay and conditions, but companies were wary about giving away information about 
investments and their own finances in general, so pay negotiations were conducted 
on the basis of incomplete information. Hugh Clegg, in particular, had become 
disenchanted by the process. It was he, therefore, who distinguished between this 
formal system and the informal system of shop-floor bargaining which he considered 
was the better way forward.   
Britain has two systems of industrial relations. The one is the formal system 
embodied in the official institutions. The other is the informal system created by the 
actual behaviour of trade unions and employers’ associations, of managers, shop 
stewards and workers.395 
The latter was so informal, however, with pay being informally negotiated in 
individual areas of industry - often despite the existence of formally negotiated 
national agreements - as to be impossible to control by external means such as 
legislation, and therefore needed to be supported by other means.  
The Report concluded that the two systems were in conflict, with the informal system 
acting to undermine the formally negotiated agreements, which resulted in ‘pay drift’. 
Nonetheless, there was no suggestion that the solution was to force the informal 
system to comply with the formal – ‘reality cannot be forced to comply with 
pretences.’396 The proposed solution was to eschew legislation and instead improve 
collective bargaining systems, since full employment and the decreased authority of 
employers’ associations, which together induced pay drift, were outcomes which 
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were considered by the Commission to be effectively beyond the power of 
governmental legislation to change.  
However, there was a knock-on effect from this informal wage bargaining. The 
resultant chaotic pay structures were leading to an increase in unofficial strikes, 
indecision and anarchy at the factory level which could realistically only be tackled at 
the enterprise level.397 Nevertheless, H.A. Turner thought the Commission was 
wrong to conclude on the basis of an examination of one type of industry, positing as 
it did a ‘silver bullet’ of a remedy which would cure all ills. He doubted whether it was 
realistic for the Commission to convert what was originally a description of a specific 
industrial situation (mainly in the engineering industry) into a general description of 
British industrial relations and a corresponding general panacea for their reform.398 
Furthermore, it surely cannot be appropriate to legislate to remedy a concern that is 
industry-specific and non-generic. This is another failing of legislation in general, 
since it is a blunt instrument which cannot discriminate between areas which need 
reform and those which operate more effectively when left alone. 
Addressing the problem of unofficial strikes, the Report argued that measures to deal 
with them were urgently necessary, and considered a range of possible remedies, 
including legislation, but concluded that: 
By far the most important part in remedying the problem of unofficial strikes and other 
forms of unofficial action will however be played by reforming the institutions of 
whose defects they are a symptom. Unofficial strikes are above all the result of the 
inadequate conduct of industrial relations at company and plant level.399 
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The blame was thereby laid firmly at the door of the unions which, it was claimed, 
had ‘failed to respond adequately to the challenge inherent in the growth of 
workplace bargaining.’ Also, that ‘the multiplicity of unions operating within plants 
has hindered the development of an organic link between negotiators at plant level 
and those higher up in the hierarchies of trade unions.’400 This particular problem of 
multiple unions had been previously highlighted in The Times: 
There is a case for following the United States pattern and allowing workers to decide 
by ballot which union they want to represent them in a particular plant. This might 
work in some cases but not in others ... But is should be an essential condition of any 
switch to plant bargaining that all contracts should be negotiated simultaneously so 
as to avoid leap-frogging.  
This aspect of the Report on unofficial strikes came under fire from a number of 
commentators. Robert Kilroy-Silk produced a scathing analysis of one particular 
weakness, claiming that, while the Report recognized that the incidence of unofficial 
strikes was the main and most urgent problem, its proposals to deal with these was 
inadequate.401  Turner had a different criticism, and considered that, in terms of days 
lost at work, the economic consequences were in fact manageable, complaining that 
‘informed discussion of the effect of strikes in Britain is limited by the absence ... of 
any close and systematic examination of what these might in general actually be.’402 
There was nothing beyond the official record of ‘working days lost’ which, as he 
calculated, averaged around one hour per head of the working population and 
therefore gave little real cause for concern. He also pointed out that savings were 
                                                
400 Ibid., para. 394. 
401 R. Kilroy‐Silk, ‘Trade Unions and Society: The Donovan Report’, Political Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 95‐101. 
402 H.A Turner, Is Britain Really Strike Prone?  (Cambridge, 1969). 
126 
 
made in a strike in terms of unpaid wages and unused power, and that ‘lost’ output 
was often made up when the strike was over.403 
The Commission’s analysis of the problems failed to stand up to close scrutiny, and 
the methodology used in the investigation was subject to profound criticism from 
several quarters. Nevertheless, despite the dubious nature of some of the evidence, 
and the methods used for its collection, the Commission’s proposals for reform did 
enjoy some success and were well received by some, in particular the trade unions. 
Indeed, there were very tangible short-term benefits, with union membership rising 
by a third over the next decade, while workers enjoyed better working conditions.  
3.7 Proposals for Reform 
i. Collective Bargaining 
Having set out the results of their extensive enquiries and uncovered what the 
Commissioners saw as the root of the problem, the Commission went on to make its 
recommendations for reforming the system to bring a sense of order and logic to 
industrial relations. This began with a reconstruction of voluntary collective 
bargaining. Following recognition that ‘the central defect [of the system of industrial 
relations] is the disorder in factory and workshop relations and pay structures 
promoted by the conflict between the formal and the informal systems’ the Report, 
not unreasonably, proffered the solution of replacing disorder with order.404 The 
solution, however, was not to concentrate on industry-wide agreements, but on those 
made at factory level, which could better deal with the finer details such as 
production methods, distribution of overtime and differential pay rates. It was 
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recognized that, while national agreements dealt with minimum rates, factory 
agreements regulated actual pay, and it was this that was of greatest concern to the 
Government.405 Again, the Commission was encouraging better management of 
informal systems of collective bargaining, recognizing that industrial relationships 
work best when organized at the micro-level, whereas legislation was a macro-level 
solution which could not possibly take into account the diversity of problems, issues 
and needs which existed within the various workplaces. 
Nevertheless, such agreements do not come about automatically or operate 
successfully without central management; it was recognized, therefore, that neither 
employers’ associations nor trade unions could accomplish greater order by 
themselves, and that this could only be achieved by boards of directors.406  This 
would require the co-operation of the unions who would be required to ‘sign the 
agreements and take their share of responsibility under them.’407  It was obvious that 
the notion of unions being willing to enter into legally binding agreements with 
management, and thereby become liable under them, was unlikely to be a popular or 
viable option for trade union leaders. Such an arrangement could render them 
financially responsible for losses incurred through strike action, a journey towards full 
trade union legal liability already embarked upon by the House of Lords in Rookes v 
Barnard. Indeed, the concept of legally binding collective agreements formed part of 
the later Industrial Relations Act 1971, and roused strong objections within the union 
movement.  
The Commission recommended that boards of directors should review industrial 
relations within their organisations, with particular objectives in mind, including the 
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development of comprehensive collective bargaining machinery at factory level to 
settle terms and conditions of employment, and to develop joint procedures for the 
rapid settlement of grievances. The Commission stated that, ‘We consider action by 
companies on these lines is as much in the interests of the trade unions and their 
members as the companies themselves.’408   
Allan Flanders’s 1964 thesis on productivity at the Fawley works409 and its apparent 
success may have influenced the Commission to recommend that collective 
bargaining should be strengthened. The reform of pay bargaining which was founded 
on the Commission’s recommendations did lead to a strengthening of the informal 
system, while national negotiating councils gradually faded into obscurity, but this left 
unions vulnerable to the legislative changes brought in after 1979. Smaller 
bargaining units only encouraged managers to act unilaterally. Holding on to large 
negotiating councils would have left unions better able to resist the changes brought 
in by the Conservative Government in the 1980s. Donovan could therefore be 
criticized for having thrown the baby out with the bathwater, declining to recognize 
the very important role played by the formal collective bargaining system.410 
 
ii. New Legislation. 
Could the law do anything to help bring about an improvement in the problems 
identified by the Royal Commission, particularly in the matter of unofficial strikes, and 
what form should such legislation take? One suggestion put to the Commission for 
dealing with the ‘strike problem’ came from the Society of Conservative Lawyers: to 
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further reduce the incidence of official strikes where a national emergency was 
threatened, the Minister of Labour should be empowered, through legislation, to 
apply for an injunction compelling the continuance of work.411 This went further than 
the Society’s own earlier recommendations for dealing with strikes, made in A 
Giant’s Strength in 1958. The suggestion was in turn based on the USA’s emergency 
powers act, the Taft-Hartley Act 1947,412 which included powers to order a cooling-
off period and to hold compulsory strike ballots. The Commission, aware that this 
legislation had met with minimal success in the USA, rejected the suggestion, since 
it considered that the existing, more flexible powers available to the government 
would be more effective in resolving a dispute.413 These powers included the 
conciliation machinery of the Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP), the 
appointment of conciliators, or the potential to arrange arbitration or to order many 
different forms of inquiry.414  
Account must also be taken of the occasions when strikes have been imminent but 
have been averted through our flexible procedures. If the more rigid arrangements of 
the fixed cooling-off period had been used in their place, strikes might have taken 
place which were in fact avoided.415 
Unofficial strikes were common in a small number of important industries, although 
the breach of procedure that produced such strikes was not caused by trade unions 
but by their members. It was these individuals who stood to be sued for being in 
breach of contract under the Contracts of Employments Act 1963, and to be stripped 
of their continuity of employment. The employer could even take the strikers before a 
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magistrates’ court to obtain damages under the Employers and Workmen Act 1875. 
Therefore no new legislation was necessary to make unofficial strikes ‘illegal’ since 
they already were. Understandably, however, employers rarely chose to litigate since 
their key aim was to get employees back to work rather than to sue them for 
relatively small amounts of money with all the loss of time and the expense that this 
involved, not to mention the potential damage to the relationship with their 
employees.416 The Commission therefore had to conclude that, ‘unless and until our 
system of industrial relations itself has been reformed, no proposal to impose legal 
sanctions is practicable if it assumes that the employer takes an active part in its 
enforcement.’417 
Another possibility was to legislate to make collective agreements legally 
enforceable.  In countries where they were legally enforceable, neither the union, nor 
the employer or employers’ federation were permitted to breach the agreement, and 
would be subject to a heavy fine if they did so. The CBI and the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation (EEF) were in favour of such a measure, although neither 
was sure whether this was appropriate within the British legal system.418 Similar 
measures seemed to work satisfactorily in some countries such as Sweden, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the USA, but the Commission was wise enough to 
be wary of trying to transplant measures into a country with different social 
conditions to those in the country of origin.419 
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Collective agreements in Britain were not legally binding contracts, and neither side 
intended them to be so. This feature was deeply rooted in the British system of 
voluntary industrial relations. The agreement could be modified over time by a series 
of decisions or resolutions made by standing bodies such as joint industrial councils, 
thus making the agreement a continuous and flexible process. Furthermore, at the 
shop-floor level, agreements were often informal and fragmented, with the precise 
contracting ‘party’ being hard to identify. In legal terms, such informal agreements 
would be void for uncertainty and therefore impossible to enforce.  
Although a move to render collective agreements legally binding would mean a 
fundamental departure from deeply-rooted principles of contract law, it was argued 
that it would be worth it if such a move were to remove the cause of the ‘evil’ which 
was the high number of unofficial strikes. The Commission concluded, however, that 
making procedure agreements legally enforceable would not remove the reason for 
the strikes.420 
To overcome the difficulties outlined above, a further suggestion was to take the 
responsibility for action against strikers out of the hands of the employers and 
instead have a sanction that was imposed automatically by the removal of an 
existing statutory right. Examples included the statutory right given under the 
Contracts of Employment Act 1963 whereby employees became entitled, after 26 
weeks of continuous employment for the same employer, to a minimum notice 
period; and, under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, employees with minimum 
employment periods were entitled to compensation when laid off or made redundant. 
Under neither Act did strikes break the necessary continuity of employment, but the 
suggestion was to remove that protection where the worker was on an unofficial 
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strike and deem his employment to have commenced only on the day that he 
returned to work.421 While at first glance this appeared to be advantageous in that 
employers would not have to take action to impose the penalty, after further scrutiny 
this too proved to be unworkable for a number of reasons. It would have varied 
unfairly in the impact it would have on different members, particularly those with the 
longest periods of service who had the most to lose. The flexibility inherent in the 
current system would be lost, and therein lay one of the fundamental problems with 
using legislation to resolve complex, human problems where there is an infinite 
number of variables: its intrinsic rigidity effectively denies to the courts the 
opportunity to apply it in an equitable, fair and sensible manner. 
 
iii. Unemployment Rights 
Strikers at that time, far from being penalized for taking action could, in certain 
limited circumstances, rely on social security benefits in the event of being 
unemployed due to strike action.422 Payment for times when a workman was 
unemployed due to a trade dispute was specifically excluded, but a person who was 
thrown out of work by reason of a trade dispute would not lose his entitlement to 
unemployment benefit unless the dispute occurred at his place of employment. 
Nevertheless, the TUC considered that the conditions under which disqualification 
could be incurred were too severe, while the CBI wanted them to be broadened still 
further. The Commission referred at this stage to the observations on this matter 
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made by Lord Blanesburgh’s Committee of 1925-27, which had been set up to 
consider the working of the unemployment insurance scheme: 
This clause can never assume a form which will be entirely satisfactory. Frame it as 
you will, many will be entitled to benefit who, if the whole truth could be known, ought 
to be excluded as much as actual participants in the dispute, and some will be 
excluded from benefit who, if the whole truth could be known, ought to have it.423 
The CBI wanted the disqualification for receiving unemployment benefit to be 
extended to include situations where the dispute occurred within one company, and 
that ‘place of employment’ should not be determined simply by geography.424 The 
TUC, on the other hand, wanted the definition of place of employment to be 
narrowed. Nevertheless, the majority of the Commission believed that the present 
definition of employment should stand and thus refused to defer to the wishes of 
either the TUC or the CBI.425 Although this was by far the safest option in order to 
avoid disappointing either unions or employers, this failure to take a bolder decision 
on the issue was a wasted opportunity to address the vague nature of the provision 
and provide more detailed guidance on the qualification requirement for 
unemployment benefit. 
 
iv. Unfair Dismissal  
Although generally not in favour of major changes to the law, where a change was 
considered advantageous by the Commission was in the sphere of unfair dismissal, 
a frequent cause of unofficial strikes. At common law an employee only had 
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protection against wrongful dismissal, so an employer could still dismiss an 
employee lawfully provided he followed the correct procedure of giving due notice or 
paying wages in lieu of notice; the employer could also dismiss summarily for gross 
misconduct. This tied in with the recommendation earlier in the Report that any 
stipulation in a contract that an employee should not belong to a trade union should 
be made void in law and of no effect.  If it were left open to an employer to dismiss 
an employee for joining a trade union, simply paying him the wages he would have 
earned had he not been dismissed, then the above recommendation would be 
undermined and of little use. The Commission was strongly of the opinion that the 
state of the law was wholly unsatisfactory and in need of urgent reform.426 
Cyril Grunfeld considered that one of the most significant of the Commission’s 
recommendations was the proposed jurisdiction of labour tribunals over such unfair 
dismissals.427 This would help to ensure consistency and enable tribunals to develop 
expertise in the field of employment rights. The Commission also proposed a major 
extension of the area of remediable dismissals to include dismissals which were 
motivated by reasons that were deemed to be unfair.428 The requirement for an 
employee to bring an action for unfair dismissal within five days could help to 
underline the urgency of such cases, and the tribunals would be empowered to give 
priority to dismissal cases.  
Compensation rather than reinstatement was to be the primary remedy. This again 
recognized that an often irremediable rift would have formed between the employer 
and the dismissed worker. Since both parties would be required to agree to 
reinstatement, a preferable solution may have been for reinstatement to be the 
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primary remedy, with compensation available to the employee if it were impossible to 
perform, or if he preferred to take compensation. Compensation was to be limited to 
two years’ earnings (with a limit of £40 per week) so that employers could insure 
against this possibility. Grunfeld considered that the introduction of the above 
reforms in procedural and substantive law could have a revolutionary effect in British 
industrial relations.429 
v.  Strike Ballots 
Compulsory strike ballots were also mooted, on the basis that members were likely 
to be less militant than their leaders and would take the opportunity of a ballot to vote 
against strike action. The Commission considered this an unlikely scenario, and 
indicated that it would not prevent smaller, unofficial strikes.430 Nevertheless, these 
suggestions would later find favour in the Government’s White Paper, In Place of 
Strife,431 which took an altogether tougher line with the trade unions than the 
Commission deemed advisable.432 Compulsory strike ballots could have prevented 
the greater part of unofficial strikes at a stroke, if combined with further measures to 
ensure compliance by the unions, but the Commission appeared to dismiss the 
suggestion as inappropriate and unworkable. Once again, this appears to be a 
missed opportunity to recommend legislative changes which could potentially have 
had a positive impact in reducing the number of unofficial strikes. It is suggested 
that, had the Commission taken a more flexible approach to the deployment of 
legislative measures to tackle particular issues, the Report may have had a more 
enthusiastic reception. 
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vi. Making Unofficial strikes Official. 
While the problem of unofficial strikes was more serious, it was decided that 
measures aimed at reducing their number simply by forcing unions to make them 
official would not lead to an improvement in industrial relations. The solution 
suggested in the Report was that the Secretary of State for Employment and 
Productivity should, in appropriate cases, place on an industrial relations officer the 
duty of obtaining the full facts about unofficial and unconstitutional stoppages where 
they were causing particular difficulties, usually after the event. In this way a much 
clearer picture of the circumstance of the stoppages would be gained than the 
Department could normally achieve.433 These investigations would not, however, 
remove the underlying causes of unofficial strikes, and recommendations for 
addressing specific causes such as unfair dismissals and disputed claims to 
recognition were addressed elsewhere in the Report. In this regard at least, 
legislation was deemed to be an appropriate tool for the governance of good working 
relationships. 
vii. Local Agreements, the IRC, Penalties for Unofficial Action and Limited 
Immunity in Tort. 
The Commission’s own inquiries into the causes of unofficial strikes found that 
disputes were over wages, working arrangements, discipline and redundancy – all 
workplace issues. The Commission did not, however, commission research into the 
results produced by legislation designed to control unofficial strikes in Sweden, West 
Germany and the USA. Instead, the proposed remedy was to have negotiated plant 
or company agreements covering all the issues which tended to be the cause of 
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unofficial strikes, and supervised by an Industrial Relations Commission (IRC). In 
fact: 
 ... all the legislative techniques suggested as means of preventing unofficial strikes 
were dismissed, with the exception of the majority proposal that unofficial strikers 
should lose immunity in tort and also the note of dissent from Lord Robens and Sir 
George Pollock arguing that unofficial strikers should lose all their accrued 
entitlements to benefits.434 
The Report was clear that, until recent times, the State had considered it better to 
abstain from interfering in the affairs of employers and their workers, Parliament 
taking the view that the best means of resolving such questions was by voluntary 
collective agreements and by equipping the government to deal with such bargaining 
procedures.435 It is this conviction that in the end produced a report that strongly 
favoured a voluntarist approach, but with an acknowledgement that collective 
bargaining could and should be supported by legislation.  Yet, despite these 
recommendations based on a thorough examination of the British industrial relations 
system, the approach that would be favoured by the Labour Government’s White 
Paper, In Place of Strife, and to an even greater extent by the Conservative’s 
Industrial Relations Act in 1971, would be to move firmly away from the voluntarist 
approach and to seek to take greater legislative control over the trade unions.436 
As the Donovan Report acknowledged, industrial relations were at a crossroads, and 
consideration would need to be given to whether the basic principles of industrial 
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relations should be ‘restored, revised or replaced’.437 Any replacement would have to 
consider the viability of legislation to formalize industrial relations. The existing 
system already acted on both formal and informal levels, and any new legislation 
would have to consider whether it was possible to formalize the absolutely informal. 
 
3.8 Further Legal Changes – an Industrial Relations Act and Commission 
Although the Report on the whole was against the implementation of far-reaching 
legislation in the field of industrial relations, it did include a proposal for a single Act 
of Parliament dealing with the principles relating to collective bargaining, to industrial 
relations, and to trade unions and employers’ associations, with an Industrial Law 
Committee attached to the Industrial Relations Commission to keep the legislation 
under review.438 If that was a step too far for the legislature, a less welcome 
alternative would be to consolidate all the existing statute law as an early 
measure.439  
It was proposed that unions would be granted corporate status, which would 
necessitate keeping a register of unions, although no problem was envisaged here 
as 351 unions were already registered with the Registrar of Friendly Societies, these 
accounting for over 85 per cent of union membership. The Commission clearly did 
not anticipate any major reluctance on the part of the unions to registering as 
corporations. The majority of the Commission had been in favour of the 
recommendation that the sanction for a refusal to register should be the risk of 
damages claims from employers in the event of strikes. However, a system of fines 
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for failing to carry out administrative duties as a registered trade union in the ensuing 
Industrial Relations Act 1971440 proved wholly unacceptable to the unions and the 
risk of sanctions did nothing to persuade them to register as they were required to 
do. These events demonstrated that trying to force the trade unions into acting 
against their will with threats of financial sanctions was neither appropriate nor 
workable as a strategy for controlling their activities. 
The Commission was not prepared to intervene with suggestions for legislation on 
the issue of trade union immunity. On being returned to power in 1964 the Labour 
Government had quickly passed the Trade Disputes Act 1965 in response to the 
decision in the case of Rookes v Barnard by the House of Lords.441 The Trade 
Disputes Act 1906, whilst granting immunity against the economic torts to 
participants in industrial disputes, precluded protection for ‘acts done in 
contemplation or furtherance of a dispute’ if unlawful means were used. The House 
of Lords held that a threat by persons that contracts of employment would be broken 
unless the employer agreed to their demands, was a threat to do something unlawful 
and therefore constituted the tort of intimidation; that is, unlawful means were used 
and the protection under the 1906 Act was thereby not available to them. The 
Commission accepted that the 1964 provision should not be repealed as it afforded 
trade union officials protection in the reasonable performance of their functions.442 
The unions must have heaved a collective sigh of relief on hearing this. 
The single major piece of legislation that the Commission proposed was an Industrial 
Relations Act, recognizing that the pace of change needed to be stepped up, and 
that voluntary action alone would be insufficient to bring about rapid transformation. 
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Eager to learn from the experience of alternative jurisdictions, the Commission 
turned to patterns of industrial relations observed in other industrially efficient 
countries, namely the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the USA there 
was an obligation on employers to bargain with trade unions where the majority of 
their employees wished it. In Germany, firms were obliged to set up Works Councils 
where elected employee representatives discussed and negotiated on a range of 
issues. However, both models were dismissed for present purposes, as collective 
bargaining was already strong in Great Britain. It was the nature of collective 
bargaining that required change, bringing greater order and control to bear on the 
way in which such bargaining was carried out. In this, the Commission was almost 
certainly mistaken in dismissing the lessons of other successful industrial nations so 
peremptorily, demonstrating an unwillingness to embrace radical change while 
continuing with the policy of making small, safe recommendations. 
The Commission proposed the imposition of a registration requirement on 
businesses. This would require businesses of a certain size (initially over 5,000 
workers, but with a gradual reduction in this requirement to encompass smaller 
companies) to register collective agreements with the DEP. The proposed Industrial 
Relations Act would also establish an Industrial Relations Commission.  One of its 
duties would be to report on problems arising out of registration of agreements or on 
a failure to reach agreements.  
At first glance, the solution as posited here was startlingly simple – persuade the 
unions and management to reach an agreement on fundamental issues and set up a 
commission to ‘deal’ with them if they fail to do so. The reality of such a mammoth 
undertaking does not seem to have troubled the Commission. Neither is there any 
suggestion as to the reasons why unions and management should be desirous of 
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making such agreements. The way to ensure compliance with registration, it was 
proposed, was to fine the company if it did not register the agreement, or failed to 
explain why there was no agreement. However, there would be no corresponding 
system of fines for companies which failed to recognize a trade union. What the 
Commission does not seem to consider here is the possibility that, to avoid a fine 
due to an inability to reach a settled agreement with the recognized union, the 
company could simply de-recognize it.  Andrew Shonfield, a member of the 
Commission, is frank in his criticism of this, and other proposals, which he makes 
clear in his Note of Reservation within the Report.443  
3.9 Summary of Main Conclusions of the Donovan Report 
The main finding of the Commission was that the two systems of industrial relations 
(informal and formal) were at odds with each other, with actual earnings having 
moved away from the rates laid down in industry-wide agreements, and many 
agreements taking place informally within the factory which were outside the control 
of the employers’ associations and trade unions. This, it argued, helped to explain 
why resort to unofficial and unconstitutional strikes and other industrial action had 
been increasing. Collective bargaining had become decentralized under pressure of 
full employment, and the authority of the employers’ associations had declined. 
The central problem was the disorder in pay structures and in factory and workshop 
relations as a result of the conflict between the formal and the informal systems. To 
remedy this, effective and orderly collective bargaining was required over such 
matters as the control of incentive schemes, the regulation of hours actually worked, 
the use of job evaluation, performance management and so on. In most industries 
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such matters could not be dealt with effectively by means of industry-wide 
agreements.444 
Nevertheless, the Commission believed that factory-wide agreements could provide 
the remedy, and recommended that boards of companies should review industrial 
relations within their undertakings, with six objectives in mind: 
1. To develop comprehensive and authoritative collective bargaining machinery; 
2. To develop joint procedures for the rapid and equitable settlement of 
grievances in a manner consistent with relevant collective agreements; 
3. To conclude agreements regulating the position of shop stewards; 
4. To conclude agreements covering the handling of redundancy; 
5. To adopt effective rules and procedures governing disciplinary matters; 
6. To ensure regular joint discussion of measures to promote safety at work.445 
A key recommendation was to require large companies to register their collective 
agreements with the DEP. This would serve two purposes: first, to emphasize the 
primary responsibility for the conduct of industrial relations within a concern; and, 
secondly, to draw attention to the aspects of industrial relations which the public 
interest requires should be covered by clear factory agreements.446 Together with 
the proposed Industrial Relations Commission (IRC), which would be charged with 
investigating and reporting on any problems arising out of the registration of 
agreements, it was envisaged that these proposals would assist an incomes policy to 
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work effectively, exposing the whole process of pay settlement to the influence of 
policy.447 
It suggested that there might be new measures to encourage the extension of 
collective bargaining. Stipulations in a contract of employment that an employee is 
not to belong to a trade union would be void, while the IRC would deal with problems 
of trade union recognition. 
Recognizing that there was considerable scope for improving the efficiency of the 
use of manpower, the Report concluded that the reform of collective bargaining 
would lead to factory agreements which, if properly used, would contribute to higher 
productivity. Training would be a key component of the changes that would bring 
about objective standards in skills; trade unions would then be required to change 
their rules to ensure that no qualified worker was arbitrarily denied admission to a 
trade, and who would have recourse to an independent review body if that were to 
occur.448 
A reform of the institutions of the collective bargaining system and a mechanism for 
dealing with recognition disputes and unfair dismissals (often the causes of strikes) 
were seen as fundamental to the solving of the strike problem. Since collective 
agreements were not legally binding contracts, and since making them so through 
statute would not in itself deliver better industrial relations, it was recommended that 
there should be no legalization of the agreements and no sanctions for individuals 
who acted in breach of agreements. 
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The dismissed employee would have a right of complaint to a labour tribunal to seek 
either compensation or reinstatement.449  It was considered desirable to improve the 
machinery for the judicial determination of disputes arising out of employment 
contracts and of statutory claims between employers and employees; existing 
tribunals that would deal with these matters were to be re-named ‘labour tribunals’ 
while actions for damages arising from accidents at work would still go to the 
ordinary courts. Their primary duty would be to promote the amicable settlement of 
disputes by way of conciliation. 450 
Having one union for all employees in the same industry regardless of occupation 
would have a number of advantages, but practical objections, too. However, merging 
unions that represented workers in the same industry was considered to be a 
positive step forward, providing this did not breach the Bridlington Agreement, an 
agreement made in 1939 that rival unions affliated to the TUC would not poach 
members from each other. The TUC’s involvement was envisaged to encourage 
unions to adopt closer working arrangements and adopt the principle of ‘one union 
for one grade of work within the factory’. More full-time officials would be required 
and there should be a proper training programme for officers and shop stewards. 
Unions should in future be granted corporate personality and should be registered, 
while the existing register kept by the Registrar of Friendly Societies could serve as 
the new Register. Legislation should remove the possibility of liability for civil 
conspiracy where persons have agreed together, in contemplation or furtherance of 
a dispute, to break their contracts of employment. 
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The Commission recommended that the Wages Councils Act 1959 should be 
revised, and that there should be a re-introduction of unilateral arbitration on a 
selective basis. There should be statutory protection of employees against unfair 
dismissal and for union members (or applicants for membership) in relation to trade 
unions. There should be revision of the law relating to trade disputes.451  
Overall, the recommendations amounted to little more than a proposal for a new 
Industrial Relations Act providing for registration of trade unions and a new Industrial 
Relations Commission, a nod towards unfair dismissal protection, greater protection 
from arbitrary expulsion from a union, and a reduction in the number of unions in 
each industry. The proposed legislation would not to any great extent interfere with 
trade unions’ self-regulation. After three years of deliberation on potential 
improvements to industrial relations, these proposals were so timid as to invoke 
widespread criticism for the caution showed by the Commission, particularly from 
those who had expected much more radical solutions to the problems that had taken 
hold of industrial relations in many industries. 
3.10 Dissension and criticism  
Although much criticism of the Report was to follow in the wake of its publication, 
there was also dissension within the Commission itself. This was almost an 
inevitability, given the diversity of backgrounds of the individual commissioners. As 
the lone voice of major dissent, Andrew Shonfield set out his reasons for disagreeing 
with major issues in the Report in his Note of Reservation - effectively his own 
minority report.452 As an economist, Shonfield was an advocate of long-term 
planning and a mixed economy. Whilst he agreed with the remedies proposed in the 
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Report, he noted that, ‘...it barely concerns itself with the long-term problem of 
accommodating bodies with the kind of concentrated power which is possessed by 
trade unions to the changing future needs of an advanced industrial society.’453 He 
was concerned that the control of vital services lay in the hands of a handful of 
powerful trade unions which could disrupt their supply and upset the lives of millions 
of ordinary people, and viewed the policies of the Donovan Report as short-term and 
reactive. He noted that industry and services were becoming more interdependent 
so that the disruption of the supply of one good or service could seriously affect the 
production of supply of another, additionally affecting the wage-earnings of the 
workers in interrelated industries. 
Shonfield suggested that unions were in fact bullies, and that they acted as if they 
were somehow above the law, which he regarded as unjustifiable. ‘If organisations 
are powerful enough to act the bully then very special grounds are necessary to 
justify the decision not to subject their behaviour to legal rules.’454 He considered the 
statement in paragraph 471 of the Report that collective bargaining should remain 
‘outside the law’ to be wrong, suggesting that the current system of laissez-faire was 
a throwback to the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. At that time, legislators 
regarded trade unionism as an unpleasant conspiracy which it would be wrong to 
support in any way, for example by treating any agreements between the 
‘conspirators’ as ordinary, legally enforceable contracts.455 
 This ‘licensed conspiracy’ had helped the unions to grow in strength, but Shonfield 
argued that: 
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... now that they have evolved to this dominant role, it would be highly anomalous if 
the legal prejudices of an earlier generation were to continue to be used to 
encourage them to avoid undertaking ordinary contractual obligations in the relations 
with employers or to permit their actions to escape the public regulation which has 
come to be accepted as the common lot of corporate bodies wielding economic 
power.456 
Shonfield suggested that, where union rules appeared to run counter to the welfare 
of the community, they should be subjected to public scrutiny, such as would be 
achieved by the registration of collective agreements with a central authority. These 
arguments may have seemed heretical at the time, suggesting that unions should be 
subject to greater accountability, but they do reflect the very real problems of the lack 
of central control over unions and the resultant economic chaos which could needed 
to be addressed. 
On the subject of disputes over recognition and jurisdiction in the workplace, he 
suggested that where there was such a dispute between rival unions, and attempts 
at conciliation had failed, there should be an automatic reference to a judicial body 
(he proposed a special section of the IRC). This body would decide which union was 
the most appropriate bargaining agent for specific groups of employees, and issue 
an order to this effect. He proposed greater powers for the IRC than envisaged in the 
Report and a more autonomous function. Its powers of investigation would be able to 
be exercised, he thought, without waiting for the orders of the Secretary of State 
where there was serious friction in industrial relations. The IRC should also have a 
section with independent judicial authority and with jurisdiction over specific matters: 
recognition disputes; the range of matters to be covered in collective agreements 
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which were liable to compulsory registration; and restrictive practices. The judicial 
task of the IRC would be to supplement, rather than replace, collective bargaining, 
and to ensure that the parties bargained in good faith.457 This independent body, 
working as a scrutineer of trade union activity, could have taken on the functions 
which would later be delegated to the National Industrial Relations Court, but its less 
formal nature may have found a more ready acceptance from the unions  
On the subject of collective agreements in the form of contracts, Shonfield suggested 
that the current form of agreement lacked the necessary precision to be treated as 
enforceable contracts, but that there would be a new kind of collective agreement 
emerging from the reforms proposed in the Report. He wrote that: 
... it has been made clear in the course of the investigation of the Royal Commission 
that the predominant view in Britain ... is that a collective agreement does not set up 
any obligation on the part of the trade union to do anything which in the event turns 
out to be less convenient than the framers of the agreement anticipated.458  
He considered that a commitment to honour the bargain would eventually obtain 
better bargains from employers for their members, and that the agreement should be 
legally enforceable in the Industrial Court. This particular proposal was impractical 
and demonstrated a view that anything was possible if it was legislated for. The fact 
that such legislation would overturn well-established norms in collective bargaining, 
where such agreements were binding in honour only, does not appear to trouble him  
Shortly after publication of the Report, he wrote in the Sunday Times on why he 
thought that it did not go far enough.459  
                                                
457 Ibid., 294‐295. 
458 Ibid., 300‐301. 
459 The Sunday Times, 16 June 1968. 
149 
 
The Vice of the present British system of industrial relations is its hypocrisy. People 
pretend to have power which they do not possess while the important industrial 
bargains are made elsewhere, often out of sight and messily. 
The remedy proposed in the Report of setting up an IRC, charged with the task of 
examining and approving the detailed and comprehensive agreements that would be 
produced by management and unions, makes the assumption that both sides would 
be willing to participate in the production of such agreements.  Shonfield warned of 
the danger of having an ‘unarmed institution’ that invites defiance, and that, in his 
Note of Reservation, he had suggested a penalty for employers or unions bent on 
sabotaging the process of bargaining. He argued that the point of a legal sanction is 
not necessarily to punish the wrong-doers, but to reinforce the position of those 
inclined to obey anyway. He also thought it wrong to rely on the employers as the 
instruments of change when the unions were equally to blame for the disorder in 
industrial relations. ‘The idea that the unions should continue to be treated as some 
species of private club grows increasingly absurd.’460 He therefore advocated that 
they, as much as the employers, should be made to justify their actions to the 
Industrial Relations Court whenever they were observed to be supporting restrictive 
practices which held back progress in living standards. 
There was also a great deal of external criticism of the Report. Michael Moran 
suggested that the whole Report had been unduly influenced by Allan Flanders in 
two ways.461 He considered that the Report’s identification of the central problem of 
the two systems relied heavily on his evidence, as did its recommendation to 
formalize the domestic, informal system. Perhaps unfairly, Moran also considers that 
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there was evidence of undue influence, relying on the fact that the Research 
Director, Bill McCarthy, was a former pupil of Flanders, while Clegg was both a 
colleague and a friend. Clearly, Moran considered that Flanders was possessed of a 
strong sympathy with the labour movement, who had been able to exert a great deal 
of influence on other members of the Commission. Indeed, Moran was also 
convinced that only ‘a minority of the Commissioners were from the beginning 
opposed to a legislative solution to the problems of industrial relations’ and that ‘this 
group managed after long debate to transform itself into a majority by gaining the 
support of a number of waverers’.462  
Robert Kilroy-Silk claimed that the whole Report failed to examine whether the 
remedies it proposed ‘were appropriate to our kind of society’.  
What type of society do we want and what place have trade unions and unofficial 
groups in that society? Is it to be a society which allows freedom for groups to strike 
at the expense ... of the general standard of living, or a society that places its 
emphasis on material rewards and hence outlaws strikes?463  
He claimed that it was hard to avoid the suspicions that the Commissioners were 
firmly against the idea of legal penalties to control unofficial action.464 This suspicion 
is compounded by the fact that ‘most of the research papers were written by people 
known to be against the introduction of the law into industrial relations ... by 
individuals sharing a similar frame of reference, what has been called the new 
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Oxford group’.465 He suggested that a wider catchment area with various 
perspectives might have been more valuable and produced a different report. 
Indeed, he was highly critical of the Oxford approach as one which led the 
Commission inexorably to eschew legislative remedies. Of the various theoretical 
models of industrial relations, the Oxford approach was the one used by the 
Donovan Commission to provide the theoretical basis of its policy 
recommendations.466  
H.A. Turner was also in no doubt that the Oxford approach was influential on the 
Commission, referring to the method disparagingly as: 
... combining an industrious extension of established avenues of inquiry ... a 
preference for the short-term rule of thumb over the broader generalization, a rather 
low awareness of ... sociology, statistics and economics ... and a variety of 
propagandist mini-reformism which insists partly in leading people boldly in the 
direction they appear to be going anyway.467 
The Oxford approach stressed the process of rule-making through collective 
bargaining and can be contrasted with the ‘systems model’, designed by John T. 
Dunlop468  which put greater emphasis on the role of wider influences of rule 
determination. The Oxford approach sees political variables as of paramount 
importance, while the systems approach considers economic, sociological and 
ideological variables as of particular significance. The Oxford approach can therefore 
be criticized for being too narrow to provide a comprehensive framework for the 
analysis of industrial relations. No prominence is given to such variables as 
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technology, the market and ideology, and it is suggested that the narrowness of this 
particular approach acted to severely limit the scope of the Commission’s study.469   
Kilroy-Silk argued that the Commission did not adequately perform its self-imposed 
task, failing to examine whether unofficial strikes had economic consequences, or to 
give adequate consideration to suggested legal remedies. He also suggested that it 
did not do the job set out in its broad terms of reference. 
What the Commission did was to confine itself to a discussion of the efficiency of 
certain remedies for certain industrial problems. What it should have done was to 
consider whether or not the remedies were appropriate to our kind of society.470 
 
Although the Commission’s conclusion that legislation was mainly inappropriate for 
regulating industrial relations, the Report’s legal aspects and light touch were 
considered with approval by Cyril Grunfeld. He considered it to be ‘an outstanding 
public document, an affirmation of rationality in the conduct of human affairs’. He 
called the Report ‘a profound diagnosis of the malaise of British industrial relations’ 
which had ‘propounded solutions at once apt, sophisticated and firmly founded on a 
painstaking investigation of facts.’471 He concluded:  
In the sphere of the power relationship between management and organised labour, 
[the law’s] touch should be light and sensitive’ and ‘haste is to be made only 
slowly.472  
                                                
469 Blain, A.N.J., Gennard, J., ‘Industrial Relations – A Critical Review’, 396‐7. 
470 Kilroy‐Silk, ‘Trade Unions and Society: The Donovan Report’, 100. 
471 C. Grunfeld,  ‘Donovan  ‐ The Legal Aspects’, British Journal of  Industrial Relations, November 1968, Vol. 6, 
Issue 3, 316‐329. 
472 Ibid., 329. 
153 
 
Grunfeld approved of the Commission’s view that legislation would only work in 
limited circumstances, if at all. Turner took a similar view, drawing on international 
strike figures to make one very important conclusion with regards to the impact of 
legislation on industrial action: 
Nearly every country in the table has a higher degree of legal intervention in 
industrial relations than does the United Kingdom, yet the strike incidences of the 
various countries involved range vary widely on either side of the U.K. figure. So that 
the presence of a comprehensive legal framework for industrial relations would 
certainly not seem to lead automatically to a low national incidence of stoppages 
from industrial disputes.473 
This may well have been one of the many aspects of the Commission’s findings that 
led ultimately to the conclusion that legislation was not a panacea for poor industrial 
relations and multiple strikes in the UK. However, there was little doubt that the 
Commission’s bias in terms of the Oxford approach, its failure to adequately consider 
economic factors sufficiently, and its reliance on historicism were all factors in the 
criticism which followed in the wake of publication of the Donovan Report. 
3.11 Political Responses to Donovan 
In the meantime, the Conservative Party had been engaged in preparing its own 
investigation and report, described by Kilroy-Silk as an ‘even stronger body of 
opinion to suggest that the law can play an important part in changing behaviour’.474  
This Report, entitled Fair Deal at Work, certainly went much further than Donovan, 
particularly in the area of legislative control which Donovan had largely rejected, and 
was published shortly before the Royal Commission Report in 1968, pre-empting 
                                                
473The Times, 15 May 1969. 
474 Kilroy‐Silk, ‘Trade Unions and Society: The Donovan Report’, 100. 
154 
 
and no doubt undermining its impact.475 The Commission had concluded that 
legislation had only a limited role to play in the governance of industrial relations, but 
the Conservatives were determined to use the law much more extensively to bring 
greater order into the workplace, into the economy and into the country as a 
whole.476 
Meanwhile, Harold Wilson barely seemed to give the ongoing inquiry any of his 
personal attention over the three years while the Commission took evidence and 
wrote their report, with almost no reference to it in his published memoirs.477 
Nonetheless, events continued to bring the matter of strikes and pay restraint to the 
political forefront. A seven-week strike in 1966 by the National Union of Seamen had 
led to a Government declaration of a State of Emergency. A six-month freeze on 
prices and incomes, followed by a further six months of pay restraint, led to a 
government decision in 1966 to impose fines on unions and their members if they 
refused to comply with the freeze. Addressing the TUC, the Prime Minister, clearly 
still hoping to avoid the imposition of legal restraints, expressed an optimism that the 
‘freeze’ measure would work by voluntary means. However, he threatened to use 
legislation if it became necessary, saying that ‘if there is a breakaway action, 
whether in wages or prices or by any other challenge by any section of the 
community seeking to secure a privileged position for itself, then ... the Government 
will reluctantly have to replace voluntary action by operating the statute.’478 
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There were further calls for legal measures to restrict ‘unconstitutional’ action, and in 
November 1967 George Brown urged the immediate introduction of trade union 
legislation.479 The CBI, in its evidence to the Royal Commission, had called for 
penalties for ‘unconstitutional’ action, the legal enforcement of procedure 
agreements and a registrar of trade unions who would have the power to take action 
against unofficial strikers.480 These proposals now appeared to be finding favour with 
a wider audience, and the economic problems were being blamed largely on the 
trade unions, driving the Government inexorably towards consideration of more 
stringent measures to control strikes than were emerging from the Donovan 
Commission. 
3.12 Conclusion  
The Donovan Commission concluded that collective bargaining, properly supported, 
was the best way forward in order to maintain harmonious industrial relations, but the 
problem with this straightforward solution was that it failed to address the multiple 
problems connected with shop-floor bargaining and the attendant uncontrolled rises 
in wages, nor was it able to demonstrate how better collective bargaining would 
reduce the number of unofficial strikes. 
There is little doubt that the Commission aimed to judge the reform of industrial 
relations by these criteria of greater order and the extended reach of collective 
agreements. The problem was nevertheless a joint one, and it may have been more 
effective to approach it from both the employers’ and the unions’ perspective. The 
unions were demanding more consultation and participation in decision-making, 
while British management was reluctant to allow them such a role.  
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Lewis Minkin concisely summarized the outcome of the Donovan Report when he 
wrote that the Commission ‘rejected the use of legislation as a means of enforcing 
adherence to the national pattern of bargaining’ and instead ‘recommended the 
voluntary encouragement of an orderly adaptation to this informal system’.481 In the 
face of a growing body of evidence that some legislative measures were necessary 
to control union activities and strikes, it was remarkable that the Commission 
effectively disregarded this advice, a fact that could be attributable to the Oxford 
influence on the Report.  It had achieved certain goals in that it provided a useful 
analysis of how the various institutions were involved in collective bargaining, and 
also an examination of very specific aspects of the law relating to unions. The result 
was a particular diagnosis (although not the only possible one) of the causes of 
industrial unrest in the UK. Nevertheless, there was still some doubt over its overall 
validity and there was a general paucity of definite proposals for remedial action.  
The ‘voluntary machinery’ endorsed by both Kahn-Freund in 1954482 and by the 
Ministry of Labour in its written evidence to the Donovan Commission483 had worked 
well where industry was organized, but that left many workers without the protection 
that unions could afford them. History had shown how legislation could be used to 
positive effect in the realm of employment and industrial relations, extending beyond 
protection for unions and their members to workers in non-unionized industries. 
When used to protect vulnerable workers, to ensure the safety of the nation, to 
bolster the economy, to defend the legitimate activities of a union from criminal 
prosecution or suit in tort and to permit unions to raise funds without interference, the 
legislature and the unions operated more or less harmoniously side by side. The 
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unions positively welcomed legislation that gave workers a measure of protection, 
and a more nuanced, negotiated approach to the deployment of legislation, where 
unions were given assurances of enhanced social and welfare rights in return for 
agreement to control wage rises could have been a more effective solution. Indeed, 
this notion was to be included in the Social Contract, an agreement between the 
TUC and the Government which dominated the direction of industrial relations in the 
mid-1970s.484 
Despite the length of the Report and the time taken over the inquiry, it failed to 
address adequately the problems associated with the trade union movement, and it 
was almost inevitable that politicians would move in with legislative proposals to fill 
the gaps left by the Commission. The Commission had been handed the opportunity 
to create a comprehensive body of rules which would govern the organization of 
trade unions, but failed to do so. The lack of firm proposals for dealing with strikes 
was to prove a major source of frustration to Barbara Castle when producing her 
White Paper, In Place of Strife. It is notable in view of the undue haste with which the 
White Paper and the ill-fated Conservative Industrial Relations Act 1971 were 
created, that the cautious approach advocated by the Commission had fallen on deaf 
ears. 
In trying to answer the question of why the Commission failed to create a 
comprehensive body of rules which would address the problems within trade 
unionism, it is necessary to go back to its inception. Its biggest weakness lay in its 
membership, and in its terms of reference. Its composition was questionable and, 
while this defect might have been remedied by clear, unequivocal terms of reference, 
this did not happen, a double failure which resulted in an unsatisfactory Report. The 
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Commission was a representative body, with the TUC represented by Woodcock 
and Collison, counterbalanced by a representative of the employers’ organizations. 
The Conservatives may have had the better idea when they deliberately omitted 
union representation on the secret committee set up to inquire into trade unions and 
industrial relations, being fully aware that trade unionists would raise objections to 
any attempt to interfere with their autonomy or impose legislative restrictions on their 
activities. This meant, of course, that they were able to get the answers that they had 
set out to achieve, but the policies had little success in terms of resolving the 
industrial relations problems. 
The terms of reference put the outcome largely in the hands of the Commission 
itself.  It became progressively narrowed by the experts, while the Oxford school, 
with its particular restricted focus and reluctance to legislate, was able to exert its 
considerable influence over the overall shape of the Report. In the end, all that was 
really achieved was a study of the institutions, the machinery of collective bargaining 
and the law surrounding them.485 Yet, despite their inadequacies and outright 
failures, the inquiry and subsequent Report still retain their watershed status in the 
history of industrial relations in the sense that it ensured that the State would impose 
controls because industrial relations did not seem to be working without them. It was 
probably the most thorough investigation into industrial relations ever undertaken. It 
undoubtedly served as a catalyst for the reforms that were to follow in its wake, 
beginning with the controversial White Paper, In Place of Strife, which, perhaps 
recognizing some of the shortcomings of the Donovan Report, demonstrated a 
determination not to be accused of similar failures. Its recommendations alone 
offered little prospect of change because it documented the problems while failing to 
                                                
485 J. D. Derbyshire, The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, 1965‐1968, 293. 
159 
 
offer a solution to the problem of the split between official and unofficial strikes. 
Strengthening the unions with some legislative support was not necessarily going to 
address the issue of large numbers of unofficial strikes and industrial relations 
chaos. It may therefore be viewed as a watershed due to its failures to address the 
issues which forced the Labour Government and the subsequent Conservative 
Government into turning to legislation to remedy the problems, despite the warnings 
in the Report that legislation had little to offer when it came to achieving harmonious 
industrial relations. 
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Chapter 4. “In Place of Strife: A policy for Industrial Relations” goes beyond 
Donovan. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The Donovan Report suggested a tightening up of the voluntary system of industrial 
relations in Britain but faced a mixed reception. Whilst trade unions found it 
acceptable, employers and the Labour Government and the Conservative Party felt 
that it had not fully addressed the problem of strikes and chaotic industrial relations 
in Britain. The Government therefore turned to a major extension of industrial 
relations legislation, designed to exercise greater control over trade unions. The 
evidence suggests that the major political parties had to deal with the problem of 
industrial relations in Britain or lose political support. There were pockets of serious 
industrial unrest in the country, and the Conservative Party had shown its hand in 
their publication of Fair Deal at Work which demonstrated that it would not hesitate to 
legislate if re-elected. The Government was under pressure to bring about radical 
change, and the White Paper was the beginning of what proved to be a decline in 
voluntarism and greater politicization of industrial relations. 
The Donovan Report’s ideological framework had identified a way forward for 
industrial relations, based on a tightening up the voluntary system and a rejection of 
State intervention. Despite its detractors, the Report was well-received in certain 
quarters, particularly by trade unions, the TUC and several Labour MPs: 
The Report largely vindicates the aspirations, ideals and aims of trade unions ... If we 
implement the recommendations in the Report we shall have a much improved 
industrial relations system - a system to be envied, and one which I hope the Labour 
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Government will be able to say they have created in their lifetime. It will be the envy 
of the world.486 
Following the criticism of the Donovan proposals, Barbara Castle and Harold Wilson 
may have felt that it would be a straightforward task to persuade Labour MPs and 
trade unions that the Report was in fact fundamentally flawed, too complacent, and 
little more than a tidying up of the existing, largely voluntary system. Indeed, as 
Robert Taylor and Andrew Crines put it, ‘It read too much like an academic 
publication and seemed to fall far short of what Wilson believed the dire 
circumstances of the times required.’487 Castle, recently appointed to the role of 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, was in no doubt that greater 
restrictions should be placed on trade unions in order to address the problem of 
strikes in Britain, and she attempted to do this through the legislative proposals in 
her White Paper. In doing so she was trying to find a middle way between excessive 
restrictive legislation to control trade union activity and the complete autonomy that 
most trade unionists would have preferred. 
She was appointed to her new role on 6 April 1968, moving from the Ministry of 
Transport. Wilson wished to transfer the responsibility for prices and incomes to the 
Ministry of Labour, renaming the department ‘Employment and Productivity’. He 
recalled that Castle was ‘not all that keen’, but he ‘wanted her, both in incomes 
questions and more widely, to take over a responsibility for increased productivity’ 
and ‘all aspects of manpower productivity would be hers.’488 Ray Gunter, who had 
set up the Donovan Commission and finalized his report, had been looking forward 
to ‘the post-Donovan phase of refashioning Britain’s system of industrial relations in 
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the light of that report’, but was thwarted in this particular ambition.489 He was moved 
to Power, but resigned in June 1968, angry that he had been replaced by Castle, a 
move which he viewed as a lack of trust in his ability to take industrial relations 
forward.490 
While there was disquiet within the Government, its management of the economy 
was also in disarray at this time, with successive incomes polices having run their 
course ‘with no tangible upturn in the county’s economic fortunes’.491 The 
Government was coming under severe pressure from the Opposition to secure 
greater and more effective control over both the economy and industrial action. The 
Conservative MP Robert Carr put the blame for the economic problems in Britain 
squarely on the state of industrial relations: ‘there are uncomfortable signs ... that 
over a considerable number of years we have been falling behind other countries in 
our ability [to provide resource to help people who need it]’.492 Wilson also 
considered that ‘action on industrial relations would reassure overseas holders of 
sterling’.493 
Castle’s task would not be an easy one, since not only were relations between the 
Labour Party and the unions under some strain, but ‘Castle wanted unions to move 
away from the defence of sectional interests and towards corporate responsibility for 
national economic and social developments.’494 Wilson was also in favour of more 
aggressive policies, warning that ‘any lack of resolve now on Labour’s part would 
inevitably let the Conservatives in at the next election.’495 That resolve would include 
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a tough stance on trade unions, since the alternative was to enable the 
Conservatives to ‘reap the benefits of the Government’s long-term economic 
policies.’496 These statements suggest that proposals for reform were politically 
motivated, at least in part, but also indicate that the Labour Government viewed 
legislation as a swift response, not only to the problems of a weakened economy, but 
also to the public perception that trade unions were largely to blame.  The 
Government response to the Donovan Report was therefore to go beyond its largely 
non-legislative proposals.  
The Government’s controversial proposals were published in January 1969 in a 
White Paper entitled In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations.497 The White 
Paper began by stressing the considerable defects in the current system, and 
concluded that, ‘Radical changes are needed in our system of industrial relations to 
meet the needs of a period of rapid and technical industrial change.’498 
This was the first step in what Patrick Maguire termed a considerable alteration in 
the politics of labour legislation.499 Chris Wrigley agreed, suggesting that, ‘In taking 
up this issue and proposing interventionist solutions, both parties were politicizing 
industrial relations to a greater extent than had been the case since the period of the 
General Strike in 1926.’500 It was quickly becoming apparent that the State was 
adopting an increasingly significant role in British industrial relations. As Gill Palmer 
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concluded, ‘the post-war consensus which supported collective bargaining and a 
passive, background role for the state, has crumbled.’501 
Castle ‘set herself the task of framing far-reaching legislation that would both provide 
the unions with legal recognition and protection, and also ensure that industrial 
discipline would be imposed on them to avoid unofficial strikes, irresponsible wage 
demands, disruptions caused by inter-union disputes, and the other plagues 
characteristic of British labour relations at the time.’502 Simpson found justification for 
the White Paper proposals in the many objections to the Donovan Report, which he 
described as ‘sadly lacking in the spectacular in its proposals to reform industrial 
relations.’503 Nevertheless, the move ‘threw the Labour Movement into turmoil’, and 
the Government would eventually be forced into an embarrassing climb down, 
although with the assurance from the TUC of a ‘solemn and binding undertaking ... to 
tackle the strike problems by changing its own rules to permit TUC intervention in 
unofficial and inter-union disputes’.504  
It is not easy to understand why Castle decided to depart so radically from the 
Donovan recommendations, but her proposals were not without their supporters. 
She certainly had the backing of many in the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, 
and she wrote that even George Woodcock ‘listened to my full resume in silence and 
then, to my surprise, said that he didn’t think there was anything there that need 
alarm the trade union movement.’505  
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What combination of factors therefore led to the ultimate failure to place the White 
Paper proposals on to the statute book? Crucially, it would appear, she failed to find 
sufficient numbers of allies to back her more radical proposals. ‘Key figures were 
determined to oppose her’,506 including Jim Callaghan, the Home Secretary, who 
proved to be a thorn in her side over her White Paper, ‘a central combatant’507 in the 
major war over the trade unions which was about to unfold. He was committed to the 
trade unions, and became ‘their principled defender over In Place of Strife and their 
ally in drawing up the social contract’,508 discussed in Chapter 6 below. Although 
Castle noted in her diaries that Callaghan told her, ‘Speaking for myself, I welcome 
90 per cent of this White Paper’, she was in no doubt that he would ‘emasculate the 
rest.’509 She was acutely aware of his loyalty to the unions. In the Cabinet meeting 
on 14 January to decide the fate of the White Paper, for which there was a majority 
in favour, she quipped: 
The old carthorse [the trade union movement] is stirring in its stable. If we show 
doubts it will turn over and go to sleep again”, and then wondered if I hadn’t given a 
hostage to Jim Callaghan, who will no doubt repeat this to every influential trade 
unionist. 
The draft white paper was drawn up by Castle, Tony Wedgewood Benn, Peter Shore 
and Castle’s Personal Private Secretary, Harold Walker, with only the latter having 
any first-hand knowledge of trade unions and the only one to have reservations over 
the proposals, according to Kenneth Morgan, Callaghan’s biographer.510 The 
removal of Gunter, who had been a TSSA-nominated Member of Parliament, serving 
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as its president from 1956 to 1964, was perhaps an error, as he had the trade union 
experience which Castle sadly lacked. This failure to consider the trade union 
perspective also meant that she would not win the support of major trade union 
leaders, who also opposed the proposals. Morgan noted that, while certain proposals 
were ‘congenial to the unions, including the compulsory registration of unions and a 
Commission on Industrial Relations to spread good practices in all aspects of 
collective bargaining’, uproar was caused by three other proposals – ‘a 28-day 
enforced “conciliation pause”; powers given to impose a settlement in inter-union 
disputes; and powers to impose a strike ballot.’511 Fundamentally, she was guilty of a 
misunderstanding of the strength of feeling, both among trade unionists and among 
her own Labour Party colleagues, many of whom had fostered a long-standing 
mistrust of the type of restrictive legislation that she was proposing to deploy. 
The White Paper, In Place of Strife, represented a final opportunity for a resolution of 
the ‘trade union problem’ and the instability within industrial relations. Nevertheless, 
following strenuous objections from the unions to several of its proposals, it failed to 
reach the statute book, the reasons for which are examined here. 
 
4.2 Reaction to Donovan - a case for new laws?  
Castle had serious doubts about the usefulness of the Donovan Report: ‘I was glad it 
had rejected the Tories’ legalistic approach, though I could not see it doing much to 
help with the problem of wild-cat strikes in the short term.’512 Two such disputes 
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appeared to reinforce her resolve to strengthen the Donovan Report:513 – one at the 
Girling Brakes factory514 and the other in the newly-nationalized steel industry.515  
The Report had concluded that the right way to avoid strikes was to improve the 
machinery of collective bargaining and ensure that there were effective conciliation 
procedures in every plant. This may have disappointed Castle, since she would have 
been anxious to prove herself as a political reformer. Peter Jenkins considered that: 
... she was not very impressed with it. It was an admirable enough exposition of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the British system of industrial relations but, to the taste 
of her orderly mind, lacked theory. Where was the philosophy behind it? What was 
the role of trade unions in a democratic society beyond the pursuit of their sectional 
interests?516 
Indeed, Castle was openly sceptical about how the Donovan Report would help with 
the problem of unofficial strikes. She believed in the right of workers to organize 
themselves in trade unions, and in the Donovan argument that it was better to 
strengthen rather than weaken the unions,517 but was nevertheless determined to 
exact the appropriate price for this from them.  Castle’s views of raising the status 
and rights of the unions, in return for their acceptance of greater responsibilities to 
avoid needless disputes, formed the basis of her proposals in her White Paper.518 To 
eliminate industrial anarchy, she considered that it would be necessary to: improve 
conciliatory machinery; improve the status and organization of unions by 
encouraging mergers into fewer and larger unions to minimize inter-union disputes 
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(thereby stopping the problems caused by the Bridlington Agreement, an agreement 
not to poach other unions’ members);519 fund the training of shop stewards; and 
strengthen the role of the TUC.520 
Castle said, ‘I wanted the trade unions not to abandon their sectional interest, but to 
fit them into a wider economic, national strategy pursued by a democratically-elected 
government, their Government, which they had financed and voted for.’521 Castle 
had nevertheless made the fundamental error of assuming that removal of long-
standing rights from trade unions could be somehow compensated for by gifting to 
them other ‘advantages’, even though these had not been sought by the unions. 
Such rights had been the exclusive preserve of trade unions for decades, and would 
not be easily relinquished. 
Castle may have been encouraged by Andrew Shonfield’s contribution to the 
Donovan Report; he had put forward sound arguments and support for a more 
radical approach than the main Report had advocated.522 Nevertheless, the 
proposals in his own Note of Reservation were considered unacceptable, according 
to Denis Barnes and Eileen Reid, involving as they did ‘a degree of legal 
intervention’ that ‘would have provoked determined opposition from the trade 
unions.’523 Moreover, Shonfield himself expressed some alarm at the direction taken 
by the White Paper: 
Hidden beneath the placatory style there are ... powerful devices which could bring 
the authority of the state powerfully *to bear on certain kinds of industrial dispute ... 
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The White Paper in fact goes further in these ... matters than the majority of the 
Donovan Commission was prepared to go.524 
Castle found herself in a very difficult position. Incomes policies, a central plank of 
governmental management of the economy in the 1960s, had been unsuccessful. 
The aim of a permanent incomes policy had been to enable government to maintain 
demand but prevent that demand from leading to high levels of wages. These 
policies had proved to be unpopular with the unions and had failed to work in key 
areas such as the docks. Meanwhile, unofficial strikes were continuing to have a 
devastating effect on important industries such as motor manufacture. She was 
therefore determined to put forward a more radical solution – even though it would 
later be described as a ‘bold and bonkers miscalculation from which at the time it 
seemed her reputation would never recover.’525 She had been duly warned, and 
recorded in her diary that Woodcock told her as early as 2 January 1969 that, ‘Frank 
Cousins was making trouble over her White Paper and wanted the TUC to throw out 
the whole document.’526 Indeed, Minkin was convinced that union opposition to her 
proposals had ‘led to the widespread belief that this was one area in which a Labour 
Government was powerless to act without trade union agreement.’527 Castle made 
an initial attempt to gain union approval through George Woodcock. After offering 
Woodcock the position of chairman of the CIR, she recorded his admission that he, 
too, was disappointed with the Donovan Report, and that he had ‘wanted the 
Commission to be more forthcoming, but I had to compromise.’ She wrote that ‘he 
clearly inferred that my penal powers would act as an incentive to the unions to do 
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the job themselves ... and I hinted hard that he could save an unnecessary cleavage 
with the unions if he would only say as much.’528 Two weeks later, she noted that, 
‘George’s attitude has not emerged as clearly as I hoped’,529  something that should 
have acted as a forewarning of his failure to follow her hint. The notion that 
Woodcock could do the job of persuading the unions on her behalf was just one of 
the many errors of judgement that Castle was to make over the next six months. 
4.3 The Economic Climate 
Jim Tomlinson contrasts the overall lack of governmental concern with industrial 
relations in 1964, when ‘productivity, prices and incomes policy had been integral to 
Labour’s 1964 vision of planned economic expansion’, with the high politics 
surrounding In Place of Strife just five years later. This was at a time when worries 
over the impact of industrial relations on economic performance occupied a far more 
central position in government planning.530 The Government was anxious to maintain 
stable industrial relations while bringing wage inflation under control. As part of this 
overall strategy, the Government brought industrial affairs and economic policy 
under one umbrella in 1968 by creating the DEP, thereby joining together two key 
aspects of governmental management of industrial society - incomes policy and 
industrial relations.531 Castle’s White Paper proposals were viewed by Wilson and 
Roy Jenkins as placing legislation in the context of short-term economic 
management, although ‘Castle was keen to put them in the context of a longer-term 
policy of reshaping industrial relations.’532 
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Castle proceeded on the basis that both industrial relations and the economy could 
be reformed by reconstructing labour legislation, despite there being no precedent 
for such a strategy, and therefore no firm basis on which to base this course of 
action. Nevertheless, the economic situation in 1968 was of deep concern to many, 
and a radical solution was deemed to be an imperative. Wilson had been forced to 
devalue the pound against the dollar in November 1967. The Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin of March 1968 indicated the seriousness of the situation on the 
world markets, with the US dollar under threat, while ‘the shock of devaluation was 
followed by a period of upheaval and rumour in foreign exchange and gold 
markets.’533 This economic climate served to hand Castle the ideal excuse for 
introducing the more interventionist legislative stance adopted by her White Paper. 
Nevertheless, the TUC continued to favour minimal intervention and interference 
with trade union affairs, while some members of the CBI argued for the right to 
exercise greater control over workers and their wages, and were in favour of strict 
legislation and legally enforceable collective agreements.534 
Incomes polices had been unpopular, not only with unions but with many members 
of the Labour Party which was attempting to impose them. Peter Dorey described 
how delegates at the 1968 Party Conference voted overwhelmingly to reject the 
incomes policy, in spite of Castle’s own robust defence of it.535 Incomes policy was 
also a problem for the TUC because of ‘the visceral union belief in free collective 
bargaining.’536 Dorey attributed the trade unions’ increased apathy towards incomes 
policy, combined with the increase in unofficial strikes, to Castle’s and Wilson’s 
perceived need for industrial relations legislation, as foreshadowed by In Place of 
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Strife.537 The policy went against all previous recommendations and against custom 
and practice, and was a complete step into the unknown in the realm of industrial 
relations. 
By 1969, a growing number of MPs were growing disillusioned by the incomes 
policy,538 since incomes were rising at a far higher rate than the Retail Price Index.539 
Dorey observed that this was ‘having a detrimental effect on the strength and unity of 
the Labour Party itself.’540 He cited a number of commentators who also agreed that 
the incomes policies had been unsuccessful. Robert Taylor, for example, wrote how, 
‘demands for wage restraint in the wider interest of resolving the underlying crisis of 
the British economy had come into conflict with the fragmented character of so much 
of the country’s wage bargaining system.’541 Brian Towers was also critical of the 
policies, but did at least concede that ‘in spite of everything, the policy may have 
contributed towards a dampening of the course of pay and price inflation.’542  
The disagreements among Labour backbenchers, within the Cabinet and among the 
trade unions over incomes policies were repeated in relation to the White Paper 
proposals, leading to their eventual abandonment. However, as Dorey pointed out, it 
was often the same MPs and trade unions who objected both to the White Paper and 
to incomes polices, thereby leaving the Government ‘bereft of both trade union 
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legislation and an effective incomes policy as the next general election began to 
loom.’543 
Indeed, Andrew Graham, an economic adviser, argued in January 1969, that the 
White Paper would make any deal with the unions on incomes policy impossible, 
writing that, ‘While a policy to improve industrial relations may be complementary to 
an incomes policy it cannot be a substitute for it ... and to push ahead with it at the 
expense of incomes policy would, in my view, spell disaster.’544 
4.4 The Draft White Paper – A Policy for Industrial Relations 
The first full draft of the White Paper545 was debated along with a paper written by 
Bill McCarthy, a member of the DEP’s research department and former Research 
Director for the Donovan Commission.546 This paper more closely reflected Castle’s 
own view - that sanctions should be linked to policy objectives - allowing her to ‘avoid 
the Conservatives’ blanket legalistic approach, whilst justifying the use of sanctions 
in relation to specific ends.’547  
The second, revised, draft White Paper, entitled A Policy for Industrial Relations,548 
began: 
The proposals ... comprise a radical programme for reform, designed both to 
strengthen trade unionism and make it more accountable, going well beyond the 
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Donovan recommendations in certain respects. In my judgment this is the right 
approach for the Government. 
Castle chose to share the contents of the Paper with both the TUC and the CBI on 
the day of its publication, but it soon became clear from the leaked reactions of both 
of them that, ‘in seeking to occupy the centre-ground, Castle was in danger of 
slipping down through the middle.’549 
Her proposals nevertheless found favour with the Prime Minster, who was becoming 
‘increasingly exasperated himself by certain kinds of unofficial strikes which 
threatened to sabotage the recovery of the British economy.’550 The draft paper did 
accept, in principle, Donovan’s analysis of collective bargaining arrangements, and 
its recommendations for the reform and extension of workplace bargaining. It also 
acknowledged that the Commission had been ‘more concerned with intervention by 
the authorities in workshop bargaining, in order to bring local wage negotiations 
under central control, than it was with legal restrictions on strikes.’551 It nevertheless 
contained proposals which went well beyond Donovan’s largely non-legislative 
reforms. Castle was attempting to bring the law into industrial relations where 
Conservative Labour Ministers between 1951 and 1964 had feared to tread, a move 
which seems not just radical, but distinctly foolhardy. 
One of the least controversial proposals, already suggested in the Donovan Report, 
was for a new Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR), Castle believing that ‘this is 
necessary to give impetus to the reform of collective bargaining’.552 The draft White 
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Paper also took a cautious line on the issue of making collective agreements 
between employers’ associations and trade unions legally enforceable, stating that a 
change in the law would be made which would enable them to make such 
agreements legally enforceable if both sides wished it. The Conservatives had 
previously adopted a stricter policy which stated that the agreement would be legally 
binding unless the parties opted out, giving an early indication of their preference for 
legal measures to control industrial relations.553  
A more controversial element was the proposal that the Secretary of State should 
have reserve powers to require secret ballots before official strikes were called,554 
and to require a cooling-off period, or ‘conciliation pause’ in the case of 
unconstitutional strikes, or any strikes where adequate joint discussions had not 
taken place and the effects of continued action were likely to be serious.555 Fines 
could be imposed by a new Industrial Board on unions failing to carry out a ballot 
and on individuals not carrying out the period of postponement. Unions would also 
be required to register, and those failing to do so would be subject to the imposition 
of a financial penalty by the Industrial Board.556  
These rather dramatic and controversial departures from the Donovan 
recommendations were, according to Owen Parsons, ‘based on the false assumption 
that collective bargaining and the right to strike are unrelated and independent’ since 
‘a crucial weapon in all collective bargaining is the knowledge that the workers have 
the ultimate sanction of the strike weapon.’ Without it ‘an inevitable tilt will occur in 
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the balance of negotiating power.’557 In going beyond the Donovan 
recommendations, the Government was effectively requiring the unions to surrender 
their most effective bargaining tool. These proposals on the freedom to strike were 
therefore of critical significance since, as Parsons wryly observed, ‘the assertion of 
an essential freedom does, indeed, tend to be a nuisance: it is also the thing that 
distinguishes a free man from a serf.’558 
Castle’s proposals proved unpopular on many fronts. The media was largely critical 
of the White Paper.559 The Guardian reported that the Cabinet discussion on the 
draft White Paper would most likely take place in ‘a mounting atmosphere of criticism 
and hostility ... ‘and it was made clear at once that the Government can expect a 
massive revolt at Westminster’.560 The following day the same newspaper reported 
on Castle’s plans, as initial reaction from other sources emerged.561  John Davies, 
Director General of the CBI had been scathing in his attack, saying that the 
proposals did not go far enough, and were like taking a nutcracker to crack a 
cannonball.562 
John Torode, the Labour Correspondent on The Guardian  agreed to some extent, 
writing that ‘laws that are unenforceable are provocative and dangerous’ and 
considered that the White Paper proposals were ‘even worse’.563 Torode agreed with 
John Davies that the penal provisions were ‘trivial’ and considered that a compulsory 
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strike ballot would do nothing to reduce unofficial strikes, while the idea of a ‘cooling 
off period’ was ‘so explosive that no Government would dare invoke it often’. He also 
warned that a pro-strike vote would make it less easy to force a reasonable 
compromise on the unions.564  
Despite these reservations, Torode also thought that it would be a ‘tragedy’ if the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee565 decided to recommend rejection of the 
whole package to the General Council of the TUC, since he considered it to be very 
good in parts, both for the unions and the nation. The CBI was less enthusiastic 
about these ‘good parts’. It rejected the projected regional industrial courts which 
were designed to handle disputes between workers and employers (even though the 
existing voluntary procedures often resulted in disputes). The CBI also disliked the 
concept of worker-directors on boards;566 the idea of a right of appeal against 
arbitrary dismissal; the proposal for union recognition being compulsory in certain 
cases; and even the new CIR. Nonetheless, Torode derided both the CBI and the 
TUC for throwing out the proverbial baby with the bathwater, since he considered 
that some of the Government proposals had much to commend them.567 
Some Labour MPs were also concerned about the potential impact of certain 
proposals.568 Union-sponsored MPs warned that the proposals would split the 
Labour Party, while The Times wrote that ‘it would be unwise to antagonize [the 
unions] by proposals which seemed designed to curry favour with a new sector of 
the electorate at the price of losing traditional support.’ 569 Eric Heffer MP warned that 
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the government would be in for a period of real trouble if it implemented the 
proposals.570 
Minkin attributed part of the problem of unions and Government failing to see eye-to-
eye over the proposals to the composition of the Cabinet at this period. These mainly 
university-educated ex-professionals reflected a shift away from Labour’s traditional 
trade-union base, a loss of empathy between the Labour Government and trade 
unions, and an emerging insistence on the need for legal regulation in industrial 
relations: 
The readiness of ‘the intellectuals’ to bring law permanently into the field of industrial 
relations was seen by union leaders as the action of those out of touch with shop-
floor complexities and with the traditions of British industrial labour.571 
 
4.5 The White Paper - The Cause of Strife?572 
Despite this initial hostile reaction to the draft paper, the White Paper In Place of 
Strife was published a little over a week later, giving little time for consideration and 
amendment, but arousing serious concerns, even within the Government. It 
contained 25 proposals for inclusion in an Industrial Relations Bill, three of which 
were effectively penal clauses and would prove highly contentious to many trade 
union leaders. The Paper set out the perceived deficiencies in the current system of 
industrial relations. To deal with these deficiencies, the policies were designed to 
secure four objectives: 
i. The reform of collective bargaining; 
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ii. The extension of the role and rights of trade unions; 
iii. New aids to those who were involved in collective bargaining; and 
iv. New safeguards for the community and individuals.573 
Proposals on reform and extension of collective bargaining were largely an 
affirmation of the Donovan proposals, accepting the ‘two-systems’ analysis of formal 
and informal bargaining, and calling for a reappraisal of collective bargaining, 
supported by the new CIR. Controversial new powers were proposed for this body, 
however. It would have the power to impose financial penalties on individual strikers, 
unions or employers.574 Owen Parsons was wary of a body which would have the 
powers of a court but none of the safeguards associated with the well-established 
courts, including their strict rules of evidence and procedure, likening it to a ‘Star 
Chamber’:575 
Who is going to control this Star Chamber body, what its procedure is to be, whether 
the rules of natural justice or of law or of evidence are to apply to its deliberations, 
what right of appeal (if any) there is to be, what right of representation is proposed, 
whether the hearings are to be public, none of these questions are raised, let alone 
answered, in the White Paper. The whole set-up sounds thoroughly sinister.576 
 
 (These concerns were more than borne out when the National Industrial Relations 
Court, (NIRC) was set up by the Industrial Relations Act 1971, suffering similarly 
from lack of consideration of such matters as rules of evidence and procedure. It 
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proved to be deeply unpopular with the unions, and failed utterly to gain their respect 
and acceptance. See Chapter 5 below.) 
The Bill would give the Secretary of State discretionary power to require the unions 
to hold a ballot on the desirability of strike action if persuasion did not work, and only 
where there was a threat to the economy or public interest and there was doubt as to 
the support for strike action.577 This made clear Castle’s view of the inadequacy of 
the Donovan proposals, and her determination to take a more interventionist stance. 
The American experience had led the Donovan Commission to reject strike ballots, 
saying that they could not be enforced in the case of small-scale unofficial 
stoppages, and that strike ballots in the USA were almost certain to go in favour of 
strike action.578 Nevertheless, the Government did not agree with this view, the 
White paper stating that it was ‘a matter for concern that at present it is possible for a 
major official strike to be called when the support of those involved may be in 
doubt.’579  
A measure of protection would be provided to those unions which registered within a 
prescribed period. They would be expected to have rules relating to admission, 
discipline, strike ballots, appointment and function of shop stewards. Those 
agreements would have to be registered and, controversially, refusal to do so would 
lay a trade union or employers’ association open to a fine by the Industrial Board.580 
This went against the Donovan proposal designed to secure registration which was 
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to extend the protection of section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 to registered 
unions only, arguably a much less threatening method of achieving registration.581  
 
Castle acknowledged that her proposals were controversial, admitting, ‘I’m under no 
illusions that Donovan may be the political end of me ... I am taking a terrific gamble 
and there is absolutely no certainty that it will pay off’.582 In supporting her White 
Paper, she compared it with the Conservative’s Fair Deal at Work, condemning their 
policy for being too legalistic.583 Yet as negotiations on the White Paper proceeded, it 
became clear that she, and more particularly Harold Wilson, became less inclined 
towards peaceful negotiation and more inclined towards imposing legislation, despite 
trade union hostility towards the White Paper. Indeed, the stance of both Wilson and 
Castle became increasingly Machiavellian, as they seemed to be preferring 
expediency to morality. Jenkins wrote of their irregular and unusual procedure in 
steering their proposals through the machinery of government, frequently by-passing 
the established procedures of Cabinet Government by confronting the Cabinet with a 
fait accompli.584 This inevitably angered some MPs who expected to be consulted 
over such controversial proposals. The Home Secretary, James Callaghan, the only 
major figure in the Cabinet with a significant trade union background, was opposed 
to the proposals in the Bill and ‘argued the straight Donovan line’, saying that this 
was in accord with moderate trade union opinion.585 Robert Taylor also noted a deep 
disquiet inside the Cabinet, especially from Callaghan who thought that ‘the unions 
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should be allowed to be put on their honour to change themselves.’586 Indeed, much 
of the blame for the industrial unrest in the 1970s was placed on this very battle: 
The clash of wills between Callaghan and Mrs Castle, the latter strongly backed by 
the Prime Minister, dictated high politics for much of 1969. The political and industrial 
fallout largely determined the gloomy course of British social and economic history 
throughout the 1970s.587  
Callaghan was certainly scathing of Castle’s drive towards legislative reform, and 
later recalled that ‘Barbara galloped ahead with all the reckless gallantry of the Light 
Brigade.’588 Richard Crossman was also concerned that Castle was ‘able and 
driving, but like all the rest of us an amateur, quite new to trade union law and 
legislation, a tremendously complex subject.’589 Tony Crosland considered that there 
was a viable alternative to the sanctions implied by the proposed legislative powers, 
and that was to follow Shonfield’s recommendation for strengthening the CIR.590 
Nevertheless, despite multiple reservations from several different  quarters, there 
were also pockets of strong support from other members of the Government. Writing 
to the Prime Minister, Fred Peart591 confirmed his belief in the need for more far-
reaching proposals than Donovan had recommended: 
I am convinced that, in the light of public opinion, it is essential that we bring more 
order into industrial relations, as well as helping the trade union system in areas 
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where it has weaknesses. I am sure that there is a widespread view that we must go 
beyond Donovan.592 
Peart supported the proposals for secret ballots and for a conciliation pause. He also 
recommended taking sufficient time over negotiations with the TUC which ‘could 
save much trouble later’, but also indicated that it would in any case be ‘impossible 
for an Industrial Relations Bill to be ready for Second Reading before the Summer 
Recess.’593 Despite this warning not to be too precipitate, the Government decided to 
aim to present an interim Short Bill to Parliament, with plans for a second Bill in the 
next Parliament.  
When In Place of Strife was officially published in January 1969, The Guardian 
reflected on the likely outcry against its proposals, warning that, ‘The White Paper 
may have been designed to lessen conflict in industry – it has certainly had the 
opposite effect within the Labour Party’.594  The writer, Labour MP Eric Heffer, who 
also wrote a full critique of the White Paper,595 considered that to most Labour MPs 
the White Paper’s proposals were 90 per cent acceptable, but that there were three 
proposals that were ‘thoroughly distasteful, totally unnecessary, and add nothing to 
better industrial relations.’ These were: compulsory ballots for certain national official 
strikes; the conciliation pause of 28 days for unofficial strikes: and attachment of 
payment for fines to the worker’s wage packet. These were all ideas based on the 
American experience, even though they had been less than successful there in 
curbing strikes. The real problem here, Heffer reasoned, was that the door to legal 
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sanctions would have been opened and ‘a Tory government could smash the door 
down altogether.’596  
Heffer agreed that Castle’s idea was to strengthen the unions, but that ‘her theory is 
an elitist one, believing that the Government knows what is best for the unions.’ In 
other words, the problem was that the two sides of industry could not be brought 
together and therefore the Government essentially felt that the control of the unions 
was the way to resolve the problem. Heffer’s argument was that it was never going 
to work. Although the trade unions had created the Labour Party and contributed 
most of its finance, he warned that since July 1966, ‘the strain on the loyalty of the 
trade union movement towards the Labour Government has been excessive’, citing 
various indicators of disillusionment with the Party, such as the drift away from 
payment of the political levy by trade union members. He suggested that the 
offending clauses should be removed, leaving a White Paper that did not go beyond 
Donovan, and which would allow the party to go forward united.597 
Outright opposition to certain proposals was maintained by some members of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), led by Callaghan. Stanley Orme MP598 objected 
to the White Paper on the basis that its philosophy was one of government 
intervention, and described the proposed grants to unions for amalgamations as 
‘insulting’, saying that, ‘A free trade union movement does not have to ask for such 
things from the employer or the Government as one may have to oppose them later 
on another issue.’599 He also condemned the proposal to hold a postal ballot as too 
expensive for the larger unions, and described the cooling-off period as an insult to 
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the unions. When the White Paper was first debated in Parliament on 28 January 
1969, he put down an amendment on behalf of the Tribune group which said simply, 
‘Rejects the White Paper “In Place of Strife” on the grounds that it contains certain 
proposals for legislation which would destroy certain fundamental rights of a free 
trade union movement’.600 Michael Foot MP601 observed that, in trying to find a 
middle way between highly restrictive laws and maintaining the status quo of 
voluntarism in industrial relations, the proposals in fact succeeded in satisfying no-
one. He was particularly scathing of Castle’s proposals, writing that ‘too little 
attention was paid to the likely reactions either of the union leaders or of backbench 
MPs.’602 
Nevertheless, despite considerable opposition, the White Paper was eventually 
approved as a basis for legislation with a majority of 162 votes, leaving the 
Government in no doubt that it had got it right.603 The battle had, however, exposed 
the splits within the Labour Government, revealing a vulnerability which it could ill 
afford if it was to succeed in pushing through its proposed legal measures. 
4.6 Anxiety over the proposals – the Employers, Unions and the TUC 
Castle was anxious to find a solution that satisfied all parties, while endeavouring to 
ensure the popularity of the Labour Government for the forthcoming General 
Election.  Following a meeting of the CBI with Mrs Castle on 21 April 1969,604 John 
Davies was dismissive of Castle’s motives behind the White Paper, which he 
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described as ‘political’, and repeated his earlier criticism605 that her package of 
measures on industrial relations was ‘inadequate’.606 Davies declared the time to 
take action was before the workers walked out, not afterwards. ‘Once work has 
stopped and men have left their posts, the damage is already done and is terribly 
hard to retrieve.’ Pointing out that 75 per cent of unofficial strikes were in respect of 
disputes which there had been no opportunity to resolve, he urged Mrs Castle to 
bring those disputes under the control of the law by insisting that they were subject 
to an agreed negotiating procedure.607 The employers’ organization was thus 
supporting the use of legislation as the best means for controlling unofficial strikes, in 
a direct contradiction to the recommendations of the Donovan Commission and 
despite similar measures in America having had no discernible positive effect on 
strike figures.  
A poll taken among rank-and-file trade union members, however, suggested that a 
majority of them, unlike the CBI, were in favour of both a secret ballot and a cooling 
off period to deal with unconstitutional strikes.608 This also reflected the views of the 
majority of trade-union sponsored MPs.609 Nevertheless, the TUC continued to 
maintain its opposition to the White Paper proposals while working on alternative 
proposals for dealing with unofficial and unconstitutional strikes. The contrasting 
views of different factions suggest that there were some acceptable suggestions in 
the White Paper, but that they did not fully take into account the various sectional 
interests and therefore stood little chance of being accepted.  
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Castle, meanwhile, continued to emphasize that the unions had to play their part: 
The aim of the [trade union] movement is to advance the standard of life of its 
members, but it does realise that it cannot do this in isolation from, or with 
indifference to, the national economy.610 
She maintained that some industries were approaching a state of anarchy, with poor 
management leading to workers striking as a last resort in their bid to force 
management to listen.611 
All of these discussions were predicated on the assumption that there was indeed a 
problem with excessive, highly damaging strikes in Britain. There was nevertheless 
an argument that Britain was not really strike prone after all.612 While discussions 
and negotiations over the White Paper proposals were still on-going, H. A. Turner’s 
influential paper on strike figures was seized upon by back-bench Labour MPs and 
members of the TUC General Council as evidence that there was in fact no real 
problem.613 In response, Castle commissioned an official rejoinder to Turner’s 
argument. It was perhaps inevitable that its author, Bill McCarthy, who had been the 
senior researcher for the Donovan Commission and was now a senior adviser on 
industrial relations in the DEP, would produce an analysis that would better suit the 
DEP’s position.614  
McCarthy pointed out that the strike statistics used by Turner did in fact indicate a 
growing trend over time for more unofficial or unconstitutional strikes, indicating a 
mounting disorder with ineffective means of dealing with this. That was the logic 
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behind the proposals for greater central control. The problems were ‘a steady 
upwards creep of small scale unconstitutionalism, and the occasional example of 
unconstitutionalism that results in serious injury to the economy or throws out of work 
large numbers of people not involved directly with the dispute.’615  The Government’s 
proposals to create a Commission for Industrial Relations and adopt a more active 
conciliation policy were designed to deal with the first; the conciliation was designed 
to deal with the second.  
4.7 TUC plans and a ‘solemn and binding agreement’.  
The TUC took a broader view of the problems. It accepted that something needed to 
be done about the high number of unofficial strikes, but was not prepared to accept 
that legislation was the only way forward, particularly when it involved penal 
sanctions for failure to comply with the strict letter of the law. Many of the White 
Paper proposals threatened the fiercely-guarded and long-held independence of the 
trade union movement. Jack Jones recorded that: 
The Government was determined to apply legal sanctions. It had tried it with the 
prices and incomes legislation and had failed, now it sought to control the trade 
unions by other means. This approach, the TUC declared, would ‘worsen rather than 
improve industrial relations’.616 
In a note to the Prime Minister, Gerald Kaufman617  gave an initial indication of TUC 
attitudes towards the proposals. He stated that Vic Feather had informed him that 23 
members of the General Council would vote against the White Paper, while only 16 
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would be for acceptance.618 Notably, it was the unions in the heavy, blue-collar 
industries (and those most susceptible to strike action) which were against the 
proposals.  
The DEP first met with the TUC on 2 January 1969, with a view to giving the TUC 
some of the assurances they were seeking.619 Castle confirmed that her ‘reserve 
powers’ would only be used in ‘an unusually serious situation’;620 that the 
discretionary power to demand a strike ballot would only be used ‘in special 
circumstances – not as a matter of course’621; and that an ‘unconstitutional stoppage’ 
would need further legal definition.622 It was quickly becoming apparent that many of 
the proposals were either ill-thought out in the haste to put the White Paper out for 
consultation, or that they had been left deliberately vague in order to gain initial 
acceptance. It could also be the fact that they had been intentionally excessive so 
that the Government could easily afford to give ‘concessions’ on the more 
controversial proposals and therefore be seen as reasonable and willing to 
negotiate. 
The General Council responded shortly afterwards.623 Its response clarified that 
there were several proposals which, the TUC was prepared to admit, ‘could in 
principle help to improve industrial relations and to promote trade union objectives’, 
but on other proposals it still held strong objections.624 In particular it was noted that, 
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in some significant respects, the Government proposals ‘discard advice given 
unanimously by the Royal Commission’.625 
The TUC’s main objections were to the imposition of financial penalties on a union 
for failure to register,626 to the trade union development fund627 and to any attempt to 
impose legal enforceability of collective agreements.628 It also opposed the proposed 
discretionary powers to require a union to conduct a ballot (contrary to advice of the 
Royal Commission), under threat of financial penalties. Furthermore, there were 
objections to the proposed reserve powers to decide on the question to be asked in 
the ballot paper and to determine the appropriate majority.629 The TUC opposed the 
conciliation pause (again contrary to the advice of the Royal Commission), and the 
notion that the Minister should have complete discretion to decide not only what 
constituted an ‘unconstitutional strike’, but the circumstances in which its 
consequences were ‘likely to be serious’, on the basis that this did not accord with 
democratic procedures.630 Furthermore, the TUC objected to the requirement for 
compulsory registration of their rules,631 since there was no evidence that the TUC 
was not capable of drawing up its own plans to ensure that all trade unions’ rules 
were satisfactory.632 
The TUC therefore pressed ahead with the preparation of its own alternative set of 
proposals, and had various meetings with Wilson to discuss these. They centred on 
an alternative to penal clauses and a programme of voluntary action based on the 
                                                
625 Ibid. 
626 Cmnd. 3888, para. 109. 
627 Ibid., para. 71‐75. 
628 Ibid., para. 42‐46. 
629 Ibid., para. 97‐98 
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632 Bodleian, MS 274‐5, TUC White Paper on Industrial Relations – comments by General Council, 103‐110. 
191 
 
Donovan Report and carried out on the basis of tripartite co-operation.633 The TUC 
had already endorsed the central conclusion of the Royal Commission that the best 
way of promoting good industrial relations was through voluntary collective 
bargaining, but had failed to persuade the Government that the introduction of 
punitive measures would be counter-productive. On 23 April the General Council 
agreed that a statement should be produced for the Special Congress on 5 June; 
this was later published as ‘Industrial Relations – A Programme for Action’.634  
The statement included comments on the Ministerial proposals, beginning with a 
general observation that: 
... any attempt by Government to impose unreasonable, and therefore unworkable, 
constraints on the freedom of working people to pursue their legitimate objectives 
could only harm the relationships between the trade union movement and the 
government and between working people and employers.’635  
The General Council maintained its objections in particular to the ‘penal clauses’. 
These included the ‘conciliation pause’ which could result in the imposition of fines 
on workers who failed to comply with an Order to return to work; the compulsory 
ballot; and the right of the Industrial Board to impose financial penalties on a union 
that refused to comply with a recommendation that it should, in the case of an inter-
union dispute over recognition, be excluded from recognition. There was also 
strenuous opposition to the compulsion to register their rules, once again under 
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threat of financial penalty, and to include in those rules provisions that would have to 
be approved by the Registrar.636  
Indeed, these ‘penal clauses’ would become a bone of contention in the negotiations 
between the TUC and the Government. A final meeting before the Special Congress 
took place at Chequers on 1 June between Vic Feather, Hugh Scanlon and Jack 
Jones, Wilson and Castle. Jones recorded how Castle had ‘poured scorn on any 
ideas that did not involve legal enforcement’ while he and Scanlon ‘tried to explain 
why the idea of applying attachment orders on the earnings of workers not observing 
a “conciliation pause” before some antiquated procedure was exhausted, seemed so 
ludicrous’.637 
Vic Feather said that the TUC had been ‘puzzled, but not angered’ by the 
Government’s intransigence and its apparent lack of confidence in unions to manage 
their own affairs without the imposition of penal clauses.638 Feather was also baffled 
as to why the Government chose to reject the recommendation of the Royal 
Commission that penal sanctions would be not only useless, but harmful, claiming 
that the TUC proposals would be more effective than the Government’s, arguing 
that: 
The pedantic precision of law cannot settle industrial issues ... To try to solve such 
issues by the threat of legal punishments will be to introduce an element of rigidity 
which will break under its own weight. 639  
The main thrust of the TUC’s Programme for Action, on the other hand, was to 
examine the three main areas in which there were problems and propose workable 
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solutions. These were relations between unions and employers, between unions 
themselves, and within unions.640 The General Council did make clear that it 
welcomed some of the proposals in the White Paper and in the joint TUC-CBI 
statement on the Donovan Report on strengthening the role of trade unions,641 and, 
perhaps in contrast to the Government, was trying to find a solution that was 
acceptable to all. The TUC was not simply refusing to accept the Government 
proposals, some of which it considered reasonable and constructive,642 but was 
trying to negotiate a more acceptable, non-legislative and practical solution by taking 
on greater responsibility for overseeing the conduct of affiliated organisations.  
The TUC’s own proposals involved taking a much more proactive role in the 
governance of its affiliated unions, and were produced in the form of a ‘solemn and 
binding undertaking’.643 They included an amendment to Congress Rules 11, 12 and 
13 - which governed the conduct of industrial disputes - to make more explicit the 
role of the TUC in disciplining unions. In future this would include an obligation on 
trade unions to keep the General Council informed of all matters arising between 
them and employers, or between organisations, ‘including unauthorised and 
unconstitutional stoppages at work’.644 The undertaking agreement from the TUC 
was denigrated in the Press as ‘no more than moral influence to wield over men who 
take part in unofficial strikes’.645  A more generous assessment would recognize that 
the TUC had achieved a great deal in a few months in the face of the threat of legal 
sanctions, gaining agreement with the unions and proposing to involve the CBI to 
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work together to prevent unofficial strikes in the future. In this way, legislation could 
be viewed as no more than a threat, a reminder of what a determined government 
could do, but which had effectively kick-started a valuable change in the attitude of 
the TUC, taking on a greater proactive role in controlling industrial action than ever 
before. 
The Management Committee reconvened on 9 June.646 In all there were 8 meetings 
between the Prime Minister and the TUC, either with the full General Council or the 
smaller negotiating sub-committee, to discuss the TUC proposals. This meeting was 
attended by high-level Cabinet members, including Wilson, Castle, the Chancellor, 
Lord President and the Secretary of State for Social Services, among others. The 
discussion revolved around what the Government was most likely to get agreement 
on from the TUC. The Government wanted to see a strengthening of Paragraph 42 
of the TUC proposals.647 In return, there was a suggestion of possible ‘cold storage’ 
of the Government’s penal clauses proposal in the first (interim) Bill, and inclusion of 
‘model rules’ in the second (full) Bill. 
The unions’ anti-legislation position was reiterated the next day at a meeting of 
Cabinet members and the Prime Minister with the full TUC General Council.648 
Feather reported that there had been virtually unanimous rejection of penal clauses 
at the special conference in Croydon, while the TUC’s own proposals in Programme 
for Action had been voted for by an overwhelming ten to one majority. Feather 
insisted that the proposals in paragraph 42 for dealing with unconstitutional strikes 
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were effective and had the necessary authority,649 but these would be backed by the 
necessary sanctions imposed by the individual unions. They agreed that they would 
continue to liaise with the DEP, but not while penal clauses were still part of the 
Government plan, since the TUC could not be seen to be cooperating with 
arrangements that might lead to penal sanctions. Sir Frederick Hayday650 was 
adamant on the futility of legal sanctions, illustrating this conclusion by pointing to 
past experience in relation to legislation: ‘the Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act 1875 provided statutory penalties against strikes, but no-one had seriously 
considered using these powers to deal with the present strike affecting the Southern 
Gas Board.’651 This remark serves the useful purpose of reminding legislators that 
legislation which is unworkable can simply fall into disrepute, and the legislator 
should be very slow to bring discredit on itself by legislating for threats that it has no 
intention or hope of carrying out. 
Wilson was a skilful negotiator, and he knew that selecting his negotiating committee 
carefully would give him a better chance of having the proposals accepted. No doubt 
he thought that if he included Feather, Jones and Hugh Scanlon in talks, all of them 
formidable opponents, he may have a chance of forcing the measures through 
without significant opposition. This committee met again the following day, 11 June, 
at Downing Street, with Castle, Wilson, Denis Barnes and other Cabinet members 
for the Government, Hayday and Feather of the TUC, and Jones and Scanlon for the 
unions.652 ‘Their unions covered the industries where unofficial disputes were most 
prevalent, and they made clear how far they were willing to go to prevent the 
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government legislating on “their” business.’653 The meetings were now taking place 
almost daily, indicating a note of urgency as the Government tried to achieve an 
agreement on the contents of an Industrial Relations Bill before the summer recess. 
However, the meeting closed without agreement being reached, resulting in an 
impasse, with an intransigent Government apparently unwilling to budge on the issue 
of penal clauses. 
The Management Committee met again on 12 June 1969. The Prime Minister 
concluded that, following the previous day’s meeting with the TUC, there were now 
three possible options. These were: to tighten up the TUC document to incorporate 
those points which the Government wished to see included, in which case the penal 
clauses would be dropped; to look at other possible legislation to give the TUC 
support in any action that they took under their own rules on unconstitutional strikes, 
but which would not involve fines; or to go ahead with the proposed legislation which 
did include penal clauses.654 Castle added that ‘the TUC were [sic] not being offered 
a final settlement but were [sic] being asked to agree to a revision of Rule 11, which 
was just enough to make it possible for the Government not to go ahead with the 
interim Bill.’655 The TUC wording of Rule 11 referred only to constitutional strikes, 
and the Government wanted unconstitutional strikes to be included. The TUC 
eventually agreed to an amended Rule 11 (c)656 which gave it a more proactive role 
in trying to ensure a resumption of work. This was a dramatic turn of events in the 
light of the initial draconian legislative proposals and represented a remarkable 
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climb-down from the early entrenched positions taken by both the Government and 
the TUC.  
In his autobiography, Harold Wilson recorded the final days of these intense 
discussions, when, in an atmosphere of crisis, he offered his resignation for the 
reason that he had failed to secure a modernized industrial relations structure which 
would help to ensure a diminution in strike action. He wrote that, following further 
discussions with the TUC General Council and some minor amendments, the latter 
accepted the proposal that ‘rule of Congress’ be amended to equate the status of the 
undertaking in Rule 11 with the same binding force as the Bridlington Regulations.657 
In fact, Jones and Scanlon had offered Wilson a way out, by offering a ‘solemn and 
binding’ agreement that the TUC would in future attempt to resolve unofficial 
disputes.658 This was unanimously agreed both by the General Council and the 
Cabinet. Jones noted that, ‘A victory had been scored in defence of the right to strike 
without fear of legal sanctions, but the TUC took aboard some big new 
responsibilities.’659 
Wilson recorded that ‘Surrender’ was the headline the next day in the Daily Express 
(although whose surrender exactly is not clear), and concluded:  
For good or ill, we had accepted the views of the TUC, but only because, under the 
catalytic action of our legislative proposals, they had ‘moved forward forty years in a 
month’.660 
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Although the number of inter-unions disputes was greatly reduced, and 
unconstitutional strikes were quickly settled by the new TUC fire-fighting 
machinery,661 strikes did not diminish in either number or duration following this 
agreement. This generally disappointing outcome could only have strengthened the 
resolve of the Conservatives to tackle strikes with the introduction of the kind of 
legislation envisaged by Fair Deal at Work.662 It could be said that the TUC and the 
Labour Government, having significantly damaged and weakened the relationship 
between them in their disputes over the details of In Place of Strife,  had thereby 
dramatically strengthened Edward Heath’s hand in the run-up to the next General 
Election. 
4.8 The CBI thoughts on TUC and Government proposals 
The CBI had earlier expressed reservations about this TUC approach and its 
proposals for joint action to deal with unconstitutional strikes.663 The CBI was 
convinced that such joint fire-fighting was bound to fail, since neither it nor the TUC 
had sufficient authority over their members. The CBI also wanted no part in an 
exercise which seemed designed to embarrass the Government by introducing an 
alternative to legislation.664 Indeed, the Financial Times declared that the CBI was 
likely to tell the TUC that it could not promise cooperation in the new plan by union 
leaders for voluntarily reforming industrial relations.665  
John Davies continued to argue that TUC proposals were ‘not good enough’ and that 
the Government would come under heavy fire from industrial leaders if it accepted 
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the TUC’s new policy on controlling strikes as an alternative to the Industrial 
Relations Bill, since ‘the damage is really being caused by individuals and groups – 
union members and non-union members alike – acting unofficially in defiance of both 
the unions and working agreements.’666 
The CBI was utterly opposed to the TUC’s plans for voluntary intervention in 
unconstitutional disputes, and felt that the Government should keep its projected 
penal clauses in its Bill. Davies considered that the TUC had no effective sanction to 
back up such intervention, telling Castle that ‘the CBI wanted union rules covering 
the right to call a strike, forbidding financial aid to unconstitutional strikes and 
providing penalties on unconstitutional strikers’. He added that ‘such rules would be 
quite useless unless the Government took power to register unions’, which Castle 
had by this stage already rejected.667 She recorded that the CBI ‘were appalled that 
we should have offered to give up the legislation under any circumstances’ and that 
they ‘were only interested in penal legislation at all costs.’668  
Although the TUC had envisaged a tri-partite arrangement between itself, 
government and employers, the CBI appeared bent on rejecting their proposals. 
However, it also rejected the White Paper proposals as not going far enough. A less 
intransigent approach from the employers’ organisation may have proved more 
constructive in the long term, but it was becoming apparent that employers viewed 
strict legislation with reserved powers and penal sanctions as a more favourable  - in 
fact, the only - option in the war against unofficial industrial action.  
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4.9 The Final Throes  
In April 1970 an Industrial Relations Bill - without the controversial penal clauses - 
was finally produced. Nevertheless, it was never implemented since the 
Conservatives secured victory in the General Election in June, enabling them to 
proceed with their own legislative proposals, previously outlined in Fair Deal at Work. 
The White Paper had ultimately failed in its objectives, and historians and industrial 
relations experts have suggested a number of reasons as to why this happened.669 
Peter Dorey considered that it was the opposition of Labour MPs that led to the 
abandonment of In Place of Strife.670 Others were of the opinion that the proposals 
were ill-thought through and impractical, representing a knee-jerk reaction to the 
Conservatives’ Fair Deal at Work which went far beyond the Donovan proposals in 
its suggestions for industrial relations legislation.  Anne Perkins suggested that the 
White Paper was little more than a ‘short-term political fix, a way of scoring off the 
Tories.’671 Some thought that neither Castle nor Wilson truly understood the trade 
union movement, and that they failed to appreciate the impact which any proposals 
to limit the right to strike would have. Jack Jones found them to be ‘basically 
academics’ and that it was hard to get them to see things from the perspective of the 
shop-floor.672  
A further theory is that Castle was in thrall to anti-trade union officials in the Ministry 
of Labour who had been sitting on draft legislative proposals for some time, waiting 
for a suitably compliant minister to pursue it.673 Jones was of a similar opinion, and 
queried why a Labour Government was peddling ‘the anti-trade union ideas of top 
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civil servants’.674 Robert Taylor confirmed that the early 1960s had indeed seen a 
tougher government attitude towards the unions, with several outsiders given senior 
appointments at the Ministry of Labour, even though this was ‘a department famed 
for most of its life for a stubborn and successful defence of voluntarism.675 The 
evidence suggests that Castle was propelled into taking a firmer stance with the 
unions due to a combination of all these factors, while the need to win the 
forthcoming General Election may have led her to place too much emphasis on 
convincing the electorate that the Government was determined to be tough on trade 
unions and to resolve the strike problem. 
The ‘solemn and binding’ undertaking between the Government and the TUC was a 
failure for both Castle and Wilson and showed the problems of trying to shake off 
Labour’s trade union roots. Jim Tomlinson called it a ‘political humiliation’, but agreed 
that the undertaking was ‘as much as the TUC could offer, given the claims for 
autonomy of the major constituent trade unions.’676 Despite Wilson’s bravado as he 
publicly hailed the legislation-free agreement to be a success,677 many politicians 
thought it an abject failure.678 Denis Healey MP wrote that, ‘The government wasted 
six months on a hopeless fight, which caused permanent damage to relations with 
the trade unions without making them any less necessary to our survival.’679 He 
suggested that permanent damage had been done to the relationship, and came to 
believe that legislation on union affairs was best avoided.680 Richard Crossman MP 
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was equally blunt in his opinions, commenting that ‘they had just chucked it all 
away’.681 
Nevertheless, it was the electorate who were the final arbiters on the question of 
whether legislation of an altogether tougher kind than Castle had proposed would 
resolve some of the economic problems faced by Britain in the early 1970s. In 
winning the General Election, the Conservatives took the view that this was, at least 
in part, ‘because the electorate thought that they could govern the trade unions who 
had seemed to prevail over the Labour Government’.682 The final agreement worked 
out between the TUC and the Government had evidently been viewed as a climb-
down by the voters, a surrender to the persuasive might of the trade unions.  
In writing In Place of Strife, the Government was arguably attempting to address 
some of the alleged shortcomings of the Donovan Report, and therefore felt 
compelled to go beyond Donovan. The proposals were aimed at achieving results in 
either the medium- or the long-term, and went no further than attempting ‘to impose 
an obligation on both sides of industry to cooperate in working towards a 
restructured system of collective bargaining.’683 The two legal ‘weapons’ of a 
conciliation pause and the strike ballot were, however, inconsistent with this policy, 
and were arguably purely political decisions. In the event, the proposed interim 
Industrial Relations Bill still contained the conciliation pause proposal, but had by this 
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time dropped the strike ballot proposal,684 since the former had ‘more political appeal 
as manifesting the attitude of “tackling strikes”’.685  
This struggle for supremacy in the war between organized labour and employers, in 
which the CBI was clearly the most determined to gain the upper hand, ignored the 
established wisdom of at least one of the members of the Donovan Commission –
Kahn-Freund. He identified this struggle as something ‘fired by the need for workers 
to combine to “match” the natural power of employers in the labour market.’686 Kahn-
Freund was convinced of the importance of voluntary regulation by the parties 
themselves and contrasted this approach with the much greater dependence on 
legal regulation in other countries. His views were based on his own experience, and 
he was persuaded of the validity of self-regulation, believing that the excessive 
reliance on the law in the Weimar Republic had contributed to the collapse of the 
German unions during the great depression in the 1930s, paving the way for Hitler 
and the National Socialist Party. The traditional independence and self-reliance of 
the British unions had, in his opinion, helped Britain to weather this particular 
economic storm.  
He wrote: 
In many social and human spheres the application of the law to intra-community 
affairs signifies the collapse of the community. This is true of labour relations no less 
than of international affairs, of commercial associations, and of the family ... A surfeit 
of labour legislation is not always a sign of well functioning intergroup relations. It is 
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the maturity of collective industrial relations in Britain which may explain the relative 
insignificance of legal sanctions.687 
This view of the futility of legal sanctions was endorsed by the entire Royal 
Commission (with minor dissension expressed by Lord Robens and Sir George 
Pollock)688 in the Donovan Report.689 Barbara Castle said herself that the last thing 
she and the Prime Minister believed in was ‘this legal framework’.690 Why then did 
the Government ignore the views of the Royal Commission, fly in the face of 
established wisdom based on historical facts, and even go against previously-held 
personal views? The objective of this government policy was evidently focused on 
the need to court the popularity of the electorate, as are many government policies, 
but at the expense of considering the most effective and probable solutions to the 
strike problem. Still, Wilson never wavered from his conviction, expressed so forcibly 
at the annual Labour Party Conference in 1968, that a responsible government had 
to take more radical steps than those advocated by Donovan. 
Much of the opposition by the TUC to the White Paper was directed against the 
principle of State intervention in collective bargaining, but as Peter Jenkins argued, 
‘A pluralistic political society and mixed economy cannot at the same time sustain full 
employment, an open-ended commitment to welfare and education and a system of 
unfettered collective bargaining.’691 He also rejected the idea that the use of law in 
industrial relations would not work:  
There is widespread misunderstanding about what the Donovan report actually said. 
It did not rule out the use of law in helping to regulate industrial relations. Indeed it 
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envisaged a role for the law in the future. Its chief point was that for the time being 
our system of industrial relations was so fragmented and chaotic that introduction of 
the law would be more harmful than helpful.692 
Castle had gambled on going beyond Donovan because she considered that the 
economic and industrial situation in 1969 called for more radical remedies than the 
Royal Commission had proposed. It was arguably a reaction to the Conservative 
proposals, but Castle recognized that the Donovan reforms could not be 
implemented quickly enough to resolve the problem of ongoing industrial action, and 
therefore she proposed measures which were designed to control those strikes 
which were to the detriment of the national interest. In doing so, she risked 
antagonizing the unions by introducing what the TUC considered to be ‘criminal 
sanctions’, which was not something it was prepared to accept on behalf of their 
members. Even the promise of enhanced trade union rights, coupled as it was with a 
wider set of responsibilities, failed to convince the TUC, suggesting that both Castle 
and Wilson failed to fully understand the trade union movement and its history. 
Castle’s gamble did not pay off, and her political eclipse would prove to be ‘rapid and 
complete’, as Peter Patterson asserted:  
Trade union memories are a great deal longer than anyone else’s in politics, and it is 
unlikely that Mrs Castle will ever be forgiven for her assault on their privileges and 
prerogatives in her ill-fated White Paper “In Place of Strife”.693 
The TUC’s alternative proposals for greater responsibility to avoid unnecessary 
strikes were eventually accepted by the Government and proved successful to some 
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extent. Some elements of the White Paper such as the establishment of the CIR694 
were also successful, but possibly the greatest achievement of the White Paper lay 
in the reaction to it from the TUC, since it was forced into facing up to its own 
responsibilities for governing the affiliated trade unions. Nevertheless, Taylor 
mourned the fact that ‘the long, sad decline of British trade unionism had begun ... It 
was a national tragedy and a lost opportunity.’695 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
In Place of Strife was very much the work of just one person – Barbara Castle – and 
it is to her that the failure of the White Paper to gain acceptance must be largely 
attributed. The Donovan proposals, when fully implemented, were meant to create 
an industrial relations system that would be ‘the envy of the world’, according to 
Michael Maguire MP.696 They were not given that chance, however, as Castle 
ploughed ahead with her own proposals which were rejected not only by the TUC 
and by many trade unions, but by several Labour MPs, resulting in the compromise 
which was embedded in the TUC’s solemn and binding agreement. Industrial 
relations could have taken a very different turn if Ray Gunter had remained Minister 
for Labour, since he would have had a very personal interest in seeing through what 
he had begun when he set up the Royal Commission. Castle, however, seemed 
determined to forge ahead with much more radical changes, apparently discounting 
the Donovan proposals as not fit for purpose. 
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Her proposals were viewed as a politicization of industrial relations and represented 
a new direction for labour legislation which met with little support, either from her 
own Party or from the trade unions. Industrial relations had a history of being 
controlled by politicians in the past, but successive governments had learned to treat 
the unions with at least respect, if not absolute trust. Castle was implying through her 
proposals that she did not trust the unions to govern themselves, and intended to 
reserve the right to intervene in industrial matters. As someone who had little 
personal knowledge of trade unions, hers was an ill-informed miscalculation that 
could have been at least partly responsible for Labour losing to the Conservatives in 
the next General Election. 
The prime concerns of both Wilson and Castle had been to address inflation and 
control industrial action. Dorey was probably right to attribute the push towards 
restrictive legislation both to the growing unpopularity within unions to accept 
incomes policies and the increase in unofficial strike action. MPs were also 
becoming increasingly disenchanted with incomes policies, and it was possibly this 
combination of union hostility and government disillusionment with incomes policies 
as a means of controlling inflation that led Castle in another direction altogether. 
Nevertheless, the proposals satisfied neither Labour MPs nor the unions, and there 
was evidence of internal strife within the Labour Party over the proposals. The 
Government had been unable to carry the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) with it, 
as the PLP had in turn been pressured by the trade unions.  
Nevertheless, there was some justification for the change in direction signalled by 
the White Paper. Highly damaging strikes were causing a loss of confidence in the 
British economy, a cause of major concern to the Government. A General Election 
was due at any time, and some more far-reaching policies were called for in order to 
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head off a possible defeat by the Conservative Party, which had also produced its 
own far more stringent policies. The final decision not to go ahead with the proposals 
was a prudent one, however. Implementation of the legislation could have 
exacerbated and exposed the domestic turmoil within the Labour Party at such a 
crucial period, and so it was politic to remove that particular bone of contention.697 
Nevertheless, the whole sorry saga was an indication of a reckless attitude towards 
industrial relations. It was indeed a ‘bold, but bonkers’ decision to take the 
Government into completely uncharted territory as far as industrial relations were 
concerned. If Donovan had unlocked the door to industrial relations legislation, In 
Place of Strife could be said to have opened it wide and issued an invitation to come 
in. The Tories responded enthusiastically to the enticement and rushed in to fill the 
void with their own carefully prepared legislative proposals in the form of the 
Industrial Relations Bill. This ‘Conservative panacea’ which followed in the wake of In 
Place of Strife proved to be even less appealing than anything that Castle’s White 
Paper had attempted, and the TUC’s successful campaign against its penal clauses 
was immediately followed by a battle against far more radical legislation.’698 
In Place of Strife represented probably the last opportunity to reform industrial 
relations with the agreement of the trade unions, but their rejection of any legislation 
which interfered with their right to self-regulation would lead to the next 
Government’s attempt to totally emasculate the unions. Few writers have 
concentrated on the role of legislation and the central part it could play in maintaining 
harmonious industrial relations. Castle therefore had little in the way of informed 
research into the advantages and disadvantages of a fully legislated, comprehensive 
approach to the reform of industrial relations, and the next Government would also 
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come to rely very much on the political solution of new laws to resolve the trade 
union ‘problem’. This would result in a greater body of academic opinion on the role 
of law in industrial relations, since it would be the first time in history that any 
government would attempt to fully reform the way in which trade unions operated, by 
legislating to bring unions under the centralised control of government through a 
comprehensive Industrial Relations Act. 
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Chapter 5. The Tory Threat turns to War over Industrial Relations  
5.1 Introduction 
The experience of Donovan and In Place of Strife suggests that legislation is a blunt 
tool for dealing with industrial relations, and that a more nuanced approach, directed 
at the needs and aspirations of workers should be a primary consideration. 
Legislation failed to gain acceptance from the unions at this particular period in 
history, and should have served as a warning that legislation has its drawbacks, 
although it is also true that circumstances change. The Conservatives, returned in 
the 1970 General Election, may have considered that the time was right to take a 
greater measure of central control, and therefore gambled on the introduction of far-
reaching legislation to curb trade union activity and freedoms, despite the failure of 
the legislative measures of In Place of Strife to gain union acceptance. The 
introduction of the Industrial Relations Bill marked an acceleration in the evolution of 
industrial relations legislation, which had begun with the Donovan Report and carried 
forward with In Place of Strife. Voluntarism would be seriously undermined for the 
first time in decades, overturning years of tradition in the trade union movement, with 
a view to reducing strikes and exercising greater control over the unions, but without 
any evidence that this would be successful. Indeed, the American experience 
provided clear evidence that legislative controls had little or no effect on the number 
of strikes. The Act was short-lived, and was repealed in its entirety after just three 
years. 
This chapter examines the reasons given by some historians and industrial relations 
academics for the abject failure of the Act in the light of the evidence. Paul Smith 
suggests that the failure was due to employers’ reticence and the strength of union 
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opposition,699 while Patrick Bell argues that the legislation was based on class, and 
therefore unlikely to encourage compliance among trade unionists.700 Both Robert 
Taylor701 and Roy Lewis702 suggest that the Conservatives were encouraged to 
attempt far-reaching controls over the unions by the prevailing economic 
circumstances, although Denis Barnes703 disagreed. However, the evidence 
gathered in this thesis suggests that, while it may be effective in certain 
circumstances, legislation was not an appropriate mechanism for regulating 
industrial relations in the 1960s and early 1970s. This was a point of view which was 
largely supported by the majority of the Donovan Commission members, and the 
attempt by the Conservatives to prove the alternative viewpoint was ill-considered, 
since the evidence which they relied on was both ideologically and politically driven. 
Furthermore, the evidence also suggests that the time was not right for such an 
experiment with industrial relations, since the unions were occupying a position of 
great strength from which to oppose the less acceptable legislative proposals, 
boasting around 12 million members in 1970.704 It was the unions’ intransigence and 
fierce opposition, first to the Bill and then to the Act, that contributed to and possibly 
caused its failure and eventual repeal. 
Labour’s surprise defeat in the General Election on 18 June 1970 left a clear field for 
the Conservatives under the new Prime Minister, Edward Heath, to bring in their own 
industrial relations policies. Indeed, the speed at which the Industrial Relations Bill 
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was pushed through Parliament was in stark contrast to the drawn-out consultation 
surrounding In Place of Strife. Many of its proposals went beyond Donovan, but the 
Conservatives persisted with the traditionalist view that legislation was the best 
method for regulating industrial relations, despite the rejection of this perspective by 
Donovan and several similar previous reports on industrial relations.705  
5.2 The Historical Debate 
The 1960s and early 1970s was a period of deep economic difficulties in Britain, and 
the frequent strikes and wage demands from the unions became inevitable foci for a 
new government intent on reforming industrial legislation. The rationale used by the 
Government for new legislation was that it was vital to cut the number and length of 
strikes in a period of economic difficulty. It pointed out that there were record 
numbers of strikes in 1970, and almost twice as many in the first three months of 
1971 than in the same period in 1970.706 The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was 
almost a knee-jerk response to that situation, with seemingly little consideration 
given to the possible consequences of a heavy-handed approach; legislation would 
be implemented swiftly and with little consultation with the trade unions. 
Such a major development in labour law tends to happen only at times of economic 
and social conflict.707  Many historians considered that the economic circumstances 
of the time gave the Government the justification it needed for overhauling industrial 
relations. Robert Taylor considered that the ailing economy worked to focus attention 
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on the unions which had become the ‘scapegoats of economic decline’.708 Roy Lewis 
also considered it likely that public concern over the role of trade unions in the 
economic woes of the country had led the Conservative party to use this fact to their 
own electoral advantage during the election campaign: 
The nature and extent of legal regulation has been determined not by some abstract 
rule-making force, but by the interplay of judicial innovations, public policy 
controversy, the relative power of management and labour interests, and party 
politics with a view to electoral advantage.709 
Barnes disagreed with this analysis, viewing the proposed legislation as not even 
immediately relevant to the problem of wage inflation.710  Such was the desperate 
economic situation at the time, however, that the Conservative Government was 
unlikely to follow Labour’s failed attempts to persuade the unions to take a more 
ordered approach to collective bargaining, but to impose restrictions on union 
regulation and activity whether they agreed or not. 
Whatever the motivation for the Bill, it was unusual in that governments up until this 
time had followed a largely abstentionist policy. As Barnes pointed out, ‘Abstentionist 
legal policy was a central plank of the prevailing voluntarist ethos in industry’;711 
while the trade union movement ‘regarded the voluntary principle as an article of 
faith, and management seemed inclined in the same direction.’712 However, those 
assumptions had been coming under some strain in the 1960s and 1970s. Donovan 
had persisted with a recommendation for voluntary reform of the collective 
bargaining system rather than restrictive legal regulation. Collective agreements 
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were often informal and vague and therefore did not lend themselves to legal 
enforceability. Nevertheless, this informality was one of the possible causes of 
disorderly industrial relations and the Conservative Government was determined to 
move forward with the new way of thinking which had its roots in the Donovan 
Report, even if the overall conclusion of the Report was to maintain the voluntarist 
principle while supporting collective bargaining. 
If behaviour was to be changed the law’s role was a question of degree and, perhaps 
unintentionally, the Donovan analysis represented the thin edge of the legal wedge 
which was to be driven home by Andrew Shonfield’s Note of Reservation to 
Donovan, by In Place of Strife, and ultimately by the Industrial Relations Act.713 
Nevertheless, there were some within the Government who were uneasy about the 
direction of legal regulation, and the speed at which it was introduced. In 1965, a 
document which had been drawn up by Viscount Amory’s working group on trade 
unions had warned that there was ‘a considerable political and psychological 
advantage in getting away from legislation dealing exclusively with trade unions’ and 
that it was ‘undesirable that the major piece of legislation we envisage should be 
capable of being presented as a Bill directed against the trade unions.’714 Both 
Joseph Godber and Viscount Blakenham715 had expressed doubts as to whether ‘a 
complex and comprehensive piece of legislation was the most sensible way of 
improving trade union behaviour.’716 Robert Taylor also referred to a number of 
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warnings which had come from the Conservative party itself.717 Keith Joseph, when 
Shadow Employment Secretary in 1966, had specifically warned against legislation 
which would ‘allow the unions to pose as political victims or martyrs in a class war’. 
He also suggested that the introduction of employee co-determination would be ‘at 
least a gesture.’718  This practice was enshrined in law in West Germany, where 
trade unions and works councils nominated up to one third of employee 
representatives on a company’s supervisory board.719 This and other alternatives to 
legislation are considered further in the next chapter to determine whether there 
were indeed other routes to industrial harmony and cooperation. 
In the face of such unequivocal opposition to restrictive legislation, the 
Conservatives’ motivation for pushing ahead with its proposals just a few years later 
is worth some scrutiny. Barnes suggested that there were three reasons why the 
Conservatives went ahead with this legislation.720 First, there were parliamentary 
considerations, and a new Government would want to present a major piece of 
legislation in its first session. Second was the fact that much of the preparatory work 
had already been done while the Conservatives were in Opposition. Third, legislation 
early in the Parliament would give time for the expected opposition and controversy 
to fade and the benefits to become apparent before the next General Election. 
Indeed, Heath and many of his ministerial colleagues considered the proposed 
legislation to be ‘rational, sensible and essentially modest’, according to Taylor.721 
The Secretary of State also recorded that the proposals would be ‘by and large 
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welcomed by the TUC as a sound basis for legislation’ although ‘the CBI are 
opposed to the Bill which they regard as one-sided and as mostly involving 
concessions to the trade unions’.722 The differences in language suggest that, while 
the CBI had already made their objections well known, the Government had yet to 
consult with the TUC to gauge likely reaction, and the notion that the union 
movement would welcome such legislation was wildly over-optimistic, as events 
would prove. Wary of such misplaced optimism, Peter Jenkins predicted that the new 
Government ‘would soon be in confrontation with the trade unions ... not only will it 
be a trial of strength, a test of governmental authority; the outcome will also help to 
determine the success or failure of the Heath Government in achieving an 
acceptable rate of increasing prosperity.’723  
Some members of the Donovan Commission had conceded that legislation could be 
a useful tool when used in the right context. Kahn-Freund, for instance, considered 
that the law could be used to support collective bargaining and set rules for 
‘industrial hostilities’ and for individual contracts of employment.724 He also thought 
that there should be legislation to protect against unfair dismissal, as the Industrial 
Relations Bill proposed, but that collective bargaining could not exist without the 
strike weapon and that law had no part to play there. Allan Flanders approved of a 
role for the law in specific areas, including the regulation of redundancy and 
industrial training,725 while Shonfield also favoured some form of legislation. 
                                                
722 NA CAB, C (70) 48, Industrial Relations Bill, Memorandum by the First Secretary of State for Employment and 
Productivity, 7 April 1970. 
723 Jenkins, The Battle of Downing Street, 170. 
724 O. Kahn‐Freund, ‘Industrial Relations and the Law – Retrospect and Prospect’, BJIR, Vol. 7, Issue 3, 
November 1969, 303. 
725 A. Flanders, Collective Bargaining: Prescription for Change, (London, 1967), p. 36. 
217 
 
Nevertheless, the contents of the Bill went far beyond any legislation envisaged by 
the Commission members, and its proposals were met with considerable and 
sustained opposition from the unions. Several reasons have been suggested for this. 
Bell, for instance, thought the Bill went too far, dismissing it as a ‘vicious and 
pernicious piece of class legislation’,726 and thus unlikely to be acceptable to the 
unions, while in Taylor’s view, Heath had ‘failed to recognize that unions were 
neither structurally nor ideologically capable at that time of delivering the kind of 
agreement he wanted’.727 The 1960s had been a period of ‘neo-corporatism’, with 
the emphasis on bargaining and negotiation with the unions, encouraging them to 
accept certain policies, including incomes policies.728 Under the new proposals 
unions would reluctantly lose their status as social partners, a situation which the 
next Labour government would attempt to restore. Indeed, Dorey described the 
Conservative departure from voluntarism towards one of strict legal regulation as 
‘The Experiment with legalism, 1970-1974,’729 but noted that this departure was not 
sustained, and was in fact followed by a re-invigorated return to a neo-corporatist 
strategy.730 
Keith Joseph may have had the better argument, but it was largely discounted at the 
time. His suggestion for employee co-determination could in time have provided a  
better solution for industrial peace. Yet while agreeing with many historians and legal 
commentators on this era that legislation per se may not be the most appropriate tool 
for regulating industrial relations, it can at least be the means of creating the 
mechanisms which can do that job far more effectively. These alternative means of 
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creating constructive and harmonious relationships within industry build on the neo-
corporatism of the 1960s, and the extent of their successes and failures are 
analyzed in the next chapter. 
5.3 The Conservative’s Initial Plans 
The new Conservative Government had spent many years involved in research and 
planning for industrial relations legislation. In the early 1960s, the Conservative 
Government had been increasingly concerned over Britain’s poor economic 
performance in comparison with that of the rest of Europe. Traditional voluntarism 
was under strain, and its proponents in the Conservative Government were finding it 
harder to justify this stance in the face of real economic difficulties,731 while 
becoming exasperated by the failure of the unions to put their house in order.732 It 
was nevertheless an over-simplification of the situation to blame the ‘British disease’ 
of low industrial productivity and frequent strikes wholly on the trade unions when 
there were many other factors to be considered. 
The Conservative Party embarked on a thorough investigation of its own,733 the 
outcome of which was a series of proposals on industrial reform, including trade 
union reform. However, the perceived need to take a stronger approach to 
controlling what it saw as the destructive ‘giant’s strength’ of the union movement 
was to lead to proposals for measures that went beyond Donovan in many key 
areas.  
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The Conservative Research Department’s (CRD) Policy Group reported in 1967.734 
This report was written with a view to modernizing industrial relations in Britain. Its 
key concerns were to promote cooperation between management, employees and 
trade unions, while removing barriers to efficiency and higher productivity. The report 
stressed that the success or failure of industrial relations depended on human 
behaviour and not on the law, and that communication between all the parties was 
essential. Nevertheless, despite this acknowledgement, and against the 
recommendations in the Donovan Report, it proposed to modernize the law by 
drawing together relevant existing legislation into one new, consolidating Industrial 
Relations Act.735 This attitude seems in retrospect to be going against not only 
established convention, but also ignoring extensive research and its related 
recommendations. 
The alleged aims of the CRD report were to ‘divorce trade-unionism from permanent 
alignment with any political party’, and to show that the Conservatives offered a 
viable alternative to the Labour Party.736 The policy was aimed at strengthening 
responsible leadership and providing incentives to unions to become more 
professional and efficient, while restricting the opportunities for abuse.  
The CRD report claimed that the British system was one of the least regulated in the 
world, and that existing ‘Trade Union Acts give positive encouragement to practices 
which society would never tolerate in any other sphere of human relationships’.737 In 
other countries collective agreements were enforceable in the courts, while trade 
unions and employers’ associations were corporate bodies, answerable in the courts 
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for their actions. These factors were presented as negative aspects of the current 
British system which, the report claimed, could only be addressed through new 
legislation. Attention was also drawn to certain long-standing statutory provisions738 
which the report’s authors believed were no longer justifiable, since they were written 
at a time when employers were ‘masters’ and unions were economically weak. The 
report suggested that the idea that unions should be unaccountable for activities 
which could be damaging to others, and treated in law as if they were private clubs, 
was no longer sustainable.739 What was proposed740 was to have properly 
constituted bodies with rules approved by a new Registrar, and for unions to have  
corporate legal status, subject only to immunities when acting in furtherance of a 
trade dispute, the definition of which would also be amended. There would be a new 
Industrial Court which could both adjudicate on breaches of collective agreements 
and issue injunctions.741 This last proposal proved to be the most controversial since 
injunctions, if ignored, result in the imprisonable offence of a contempt of court. 
Labour had stressed that its own Industrial Relations Bill did not intend to create 
criminal liability.742 To imprison trade unionists as a direct result of taking industrial 
action would take the whole trade union movement back to the dark days of the very 
early trade unionism and pull the criminal law in a new and wholly unwelcome 
direction. 
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5.4 Fair Deal at Work – the Conservative Solution to Industrial Relations 
The Conservative Party was able to present a fully prepared Industrial Relations Bill 
within a few months of winning the General Election. This was due to its earlier 
substantial preparation proposals, carried out in the years while the Donovan 
Commission had been preparing its own Report. Shortly before the Donovan Report 
was presented to Parliament, the Conservative Party published Fair Deal at Work - 
its own policy document on industrial relations, based on the recommendations in 
the 1967 Conservative Policy Group Report. The timing of its publication was 
blatantly designed to undermine the impact of the Donovan Report. It had also been 
developed from evidence presented to the Donovan Commission by the Society of 
Conservative Lawyers, which itself was based on the 1958 pamphlet, ‘A Giant’s 
Strength’.743 Its main proposals included an Industrial Relations Act with extended 
legislation; giving corporate status to trade unions and employers’ associations; and 
the withdrawal of legal protection from workers involved in either sympathetic, inter-
union, or closed-shop strikes. There were to be new Ministerial powers to order a 
secret ballot before strike action, while collective agreements would be given legally 
binding status. In addition to a new Industrial Relations Court there would also be a 
system of regional industrial courts. 
In comparing the Conservative proposals with those in the Royal Commission 
Report, there were some similarities, but also a large number of points on which they 
disagreed, particularly on the subject of immunity from legal action for taking 
industrial action.744 There were also points of difference on the issue of collective 
bargaining, the Conservatives demonstrating their strongly-held belief in the 
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necessity for legislative control. While Donovan rejected making agreements legally 
enforceable, the Conservatives recommended providing ‘legal support’ as a strong 
incentive to management and unions to reform the system. However, with regard to 
industrial disputes there were no points of agreement at all. While Donovan 
recommended no change to the legal definition of a dispute, the Conservatives 
thought that certain types of dispute should be excluded from the legal definition. 
The report disagreed with Donovan’s opinion that the Government had adequate 
powers, and recommended a ‘cooling off’ period’ to delay or stop a strike in times of 
national emergencies. There was also a recommendation for a return to the Taff 
Vale position, with the curtailing of immunities where either side acted in breach of 
agreements, or where third parties were suffering loss as a result of a dispute.745  
 In respect of changes to the law generally, the document pointed to a fundamental 
difference of opinion on the scale of legislation and the timescale for implementing it. 
While Donovan recommended codification of existing law and a standing committee 
to keep it under review, Fair Deal at Work adopted a more urgent timescale, with an 
‘early introduction of a comprehensive Industrial Relations Act which would draw all 
the strands together, repeal irrelevant or undesirable provisions, and include the 
proposed new measures.’746  In short, Fair Deal at Work went considerably beyond 
Donovan, with tighter controls over the activities of trade unions, machinery to 
enforce those controls and penalties for those unions which acted in opposition to 
those controls.  
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The Times editorial agreed in principle that there was a case for new laws, but 
cautioned that: 
The Conservatives have been insufficiently selective. A number of their legislative 
proposals are sensible, but it would not be useful to bind people, as they suggest, to 
observe a collective bargaining system which has ceased to function. The first need 
is to reform the system.747 
This opinion chimed with the conclusion of the Donovan Report, which deemed 
collective bargaining to be ‘the most effective means of giving workers the right to 
representation in decisions affecting their working lives.’748 The warning in The 
Times that the legislature should be more selective was a sensible approach to the 
implementation of new legislation, dealing with problems as they stood, rather than 
attempting to pre-empt issues which had not yet become problematic.  
 Nevertheless, pressure to reform trade unions was increasing within the 
Conservative party, and the ‘reformers were gaining ascendancy’.749 Fair Deal at 
Work can therefore be viewed as the culmination of a decade of clamour for 
increased state involvement in the relationship between unions and employers. 
 
5.5 The Traditionalist Critique v the Donovan Critique 
This Conservative attitude was arguably still a minority one, founded on the 
traditionalist critique that legislation held the answer to all problems. It was not, 
however, grounded either in lessons learned from historical events or from 
international experience. Kahn-Freund considered that: ‘There exists something like 
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an inverse correlation between the practical significance of legal sanctions and the 
degree to which industrial relations have reached a state of maturity.’750 
Nevertheless, his viewpoint had lost ground during the 1950s and early 1960s, as it 
became clear that the system of self-regulation and industrial autonomy was failing 
to function as well as it should. The strikes, both official and unofficial or 
unconstitutional, were growing in number and having a greater impact on industry 
generally. Incidents within unions also seemed to show that unions were abusing 
their power in relation to individual members or former members. Rookes v 
Barnard751, Bonsor v Musicians Union752 and Huntley v Thornton753 were all legal 
cases in which union members refused to work with non-members, each of whom 
was subsequently dismissed. There was also much publicity and criticism in the case 
of the ETU at its alleged ballot-rigging, and of inter-union conflicts in the docks.754  
The views being publicly expressed about irresponsible trade unionism echoed those 
made a century before in the Majority Report of the Erle Commission on Trade 
Unions of 1869.755 The critique of this Report was that, while combination for trade 
union purposes should be allowed by law, it should not be allowed to lead to union 
irresponsibility that could harm society. The Majority Report had recommended legal 
incentives, and penalties for promoting restrictive or harmful objectives such as 
picketing. This traditional critique was now enjoying a revival and would come to be 
reflected in the Industrial Relations Act 1971, although it first made a re-appearance 
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within the Conservative party in three influential documents. These were A Giant’s 
Strength in 1958, Trade Unions for Tomorrow in 1966756 and Fair Deal at Work757 in 
1968. Each was concerned with reducing strike action and restrictive labour 
practices, based on an assumption that, while existing rules were sound, it was 
necessary to ensure that they were observed by trade unions and their members. 
The answer, according to these publications, lay in legislation. Despite frequent 
reminders that the law is ill-suited to the regulation of industrial relations, the 
Conservative Party continued to express policy proposals almost entirely in terms of 
new laws and regulations, while the Donovan Report had cut across the traditionalist 
critique with non-legal proposals. 
This traditionalist critique in Conservative thinking considered that the central defect 
of British industrial relations was the way that trade unions had misused past legal 
immunities. Particular attention was therefore focused on the special legal protection 
provided by the Trade Disputes Act 1906.758 The traditionalist view was that these 
immunities, coupled with the fact that collective agreements were generally accepted 
to be non-legal documents, resulted in an excessive concentration of power within 
unions, without sufficient accountability. 
Fair Deal at Work focused on this view, claiming that: 
Britain’s industrial relations system is the least legally regulated in the world,759 yet no 
other country has granted so much legal protection to the participants. Indeed, our 
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Trade Union Acts give positive encouragement to practices which society would 
never tolerate in any other spheres of human relationships.760 
This view saw the answer in a comprehensive body of legislation that would contain 
union power and ensure that it was not exploited. The aims of the legislation would 
be threefold. The first would be to narrow the existing legislation to prevent strikes 
which were ‘neither necessary to support legitimate claims, nor desirable in the 
national interest’.761 Secondly, legal protection should be restricted to registered 
unions only. Finally, union leaders should be encouraged to control irresponsible or 
subversive groups within the organization, with union funds placed at risk where 
action was taken by the union which involved a breach of the immunities. 
When Fair Deal at Work was published, The Times warned: 
The temptation to turn to the law to repress the symptoms of a disease is difficult to 
resist. But ... hasty actions and hasty commitments may do more harm than good. It 
is not easy to see that such careful analysis and observation have been undertaken 
by either the [Labour] Government or the Opposition.762 
There was an alternative view which had found favour with the Donovan 
Commission and at least one of its forerunners, the 1917 Whitley Committee.763 On 
each of these bodies, the majority view was that the most effective solution was to 
be found outside legislation. They argued in favour of improved agreements and 
arrangements between employers and unions for tackling shop-floor grievances and 
claims - rule reform rather than rule enforcement. ‘It would not be useful to bind 
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people ... to observe a collective bargaining system which has ceased to function. 
The first need is to reform the system.’764 
This was a common theme in the Donovan Report.  McCarthy and Ellis considered 
that the Report: 
Established the most comprehensive case yet made for a practical approach to rule 
reform, which still represents the best short statement of the contemporary 
alternative to the traditionalist approach. For this reason we term this alternative view 
“the Donovan critique”.765  
The problems, as the Commission saw them, arose out of the interaction between 
rising shop-floor expectations and inadequate procedures and arrangements for 
dealing with it. The Commission would not accept that most strike action was a result 
of irresponsible and subversive elements within the trade union movement, which 
could be controlled if placed within the right legal framework. Therefore it rejected 
almost all of the common traditional proposals for a new legal framework.  ‘The 
desire on the part of a minority to make trouble and the irresponsibility and weakness 
of others are factors which contribute to the frequency of unofficial strikes. But this is 
not the root of the evil.’766  
5.6 The Meeting at Selsdon Park and the Consultative document on an Industrial 
Relations Bill 767  
In January 1970, Edward Heath held a secret brainstorming session of the Shadow 
Cabinet at The Selsdon Park Hotel near Croydon, Surrey. The aim of the meeting 
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was to formulate policies for the 1970 General Election manifesto. The result was a 
radical, free-market agenda which included a proposal to see the ‘monopoly power 
of the trade unions smashed’.768 Continuing large-scale industrial disputes and a rise 
in the number of working days lost though strikes would have undoubtedly hardened 
the Conservatives’ resolve to carry out this proposal. 
This view was not merely a Conservative one. Barbara Castle herself had admitted 
that there was a state of near-anarchy on the shop-floor, referring to the Standard-
Triumph strike in the Liverpool factory.769 Early in 1970, a small local issue at the St 
Helen’s Pilkington factory escalated into a national strike affecting more than 10,000 
workers.770 The number of working days lost through strikes was rising dramatically, 
with 6,846,000 days lost in 1969, compared with only 2,787,000 two years earlier.771 
It was becoming painfully obvious that the TUC undertaking, no matter how ‘solemn 
and binding’, was unable to achieve industrial peace when so much industrial unrest 
was down to individual workers. The argument for restrictive legislation was 
gathering pace, and the workers were inadvertently fuelling that debate. 
The economy was facing severe difficulties at this time. The welfare state and the 
loss-making nationalized industries were taking up large amounts of tax-payer’s 
money, while the cost of running the National Health Service was proving much 
higher than anticipated. Damaging labour relations were having a deleterious effect 
on the economy, the pound remained under pressure and tax rates were very 
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high.772 Edward Heath had promised to turn this state of affairs around, and one of 
his first targets was industrial relations. 
As early as 22 June 1970, Robert Carr, the new Minister for Employment and 
Productivity, signalled that he was hoping to enter into detailed consultations with the 
unions on an Industrial Relations Bill, to be presented in the autumn.773 A 
Consultative Document on the Industrial Relations Bill774 was published on 5 October 
1970, and was intended to form the basis of consultation between the Government, 
the TUC and the CBI.775 There was little difference between the aims of this 
document and those of the earlier CRD Policy Group report, although there was 
substantially more detail. In light of the fact that the Industrial Relations Bill had been 
published less than two months later, it is suggested that consultation was at best 
perfunctory and at worst meaningless. The unions were used to being consulted and 
this lack of consultation led to bitter resentment among union leaders. 
Controversially, the proposals contained an extensive list of ‘unfair’ actions deemed 
to be unlawful, but which nevertheless included a great deal of normal union 
behaviour.776 These restrictions still allowed for the possibility of certain strikes being 
regarded as ‘fair’, but only those that were officially called by registered unions, 
limited to the employers with whom the dispute existed, not in breach of a legally 
binding agreement and not within the other prohibited categories.  Even in this 
category, the right to strike would not be unfettered. There would have to be a secret 
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ballot if there was a threat to the community in order to ensure the agreement of all 
members of the union, and this was by no means inevitable.777  
 Such severe restrictions would inhibit the rights and the ability of unions to take 
strike action, and would do little to prevent unofficial strikes taking place should 
unionists prove to be too impatient to await the outcome of a ballot. These proposals 
were a serious threat to the fundamental right to strike, a move that would severely 
hinder future negotiations between unions and employers, since it would mean the 
loss of the unions’ most effective bargaining tool. 
5.6.1 Criticism of the Consultative Document 
Bill Wedderburn778 wrote an immediate scathing attack on the Consultative 
Document in The Times.779 He condemned it for ignoring the vital research work of 
recent years, and warned that ‘consultation must extend far beyond “details” if this 
Bill is itself not to be the cause of the very explosion of wrath by workpeople which its 
authors say they wish to avoid.’780 When the Document was debated in the House of 
Commons on 26 November 1970, it provoked fierce responses from the Labour 
benches. Castle accused Robert Carr, (somewhat hypocritically, as she had also 
failed to take proper notice of the Donovan Report), of ‘ignoring the Donovan Report, 
what industrialists say, what some of his own friends in industry say and, not least, 
what people on his own side used to say about industrial relations not being a proper 
field for law.’781  
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Owen Parsons also criticized the Document: 
At every point, provision is made for interference in the union’s unfettered democratic 
right to protect the interests of its members, and there is constant provision from the 
very drafting of the rules onwards, for outside intervention and meddling.782  
He was of the opinion that the lawyer’s approach was the worst possible one, since 
there is no flexibility in the legal approach to disagreements. He summarized the 
proposals as a wholesale attack on the trade union movement: 
The Movement is under attack not in the interests of industrial peace or increased 
production or the national economy, but purely and simply because it represents the 
workers of this country and the Tory Government is acting for the employers who 
want to cut down the power of their class enemies. It is as crude as that.783  
Further comment and criticism came in the form of a document prepared by teachers 
and research students of labour law at Cambridge University, whose views could be 
expected to be less partial than those involved directly in the debate, but who 
nevertheless also questioned the wisdom of the Government proposals.784 What 
they found to be of particular concern was that ‘...the present Government document 
departs so far from many of the proposals in the Donovan Report (and even to some 
extent from those in the Conservative Party’s Fair Deal at Work 1968) that it is 
essential that a much longer period should be allowed for public consultation and for 
intensive research.’785 They could see that the legislation was too far-reaching, too 
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radical, and had no basis in past experience, while the approach of the Conservative 
Government was both arrogant and patriarchal.  
There was deepening concern that the Consultative Document took no account of 
the international legal framework, including ILO conventions, the European Social 
Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights, all of which contained 
standards relevant to the proposed Bill. Some proposals were thought to be in actual 
violation of international labour standards which could in time give rise to complaints 
to the ILO or the European Court of Human Rights. The general principles in the 
Consultative Document also appeared to depart from ‘what has hitherto been 
regarded as the basis of legislation in the field of industrial relations.’786 These were 
that collective bargaining was the best method of regulating relations between 
workers and employers, and not just something that workers could opt into if they so 
wished (as the Consultative Document suggested); and that employers, not just 
workers, were equally desirous of encouraging industry-wide bargaining. 
Trade unions and professional associations also expressed concerns. In a letter from 
the President of UKAPE,787 the general philosophy of the Consultative Document 
was welcomed, since it represented ‘a long overdue attempt to introduce into the 
present chaos an element of reason, fair play and justice.’788 Nevertheless, there 
was concern over the lack of consideration given to professional employees, and 
although UKAPE welcomed the proposed right not to join a union, it objected to the 
proposal for individuals to justify their decision to an Industrial Tribunal and to 
contribute instead to a charity.  
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Many trade unions looked at the implication of the document in their own terms. The 
NUT,789 for example, was concerned that the proposals in the Consultative 
Document applied to teachers, ‘notwithstanding the fact that the terminology and 
thinking of the document is limited to the industrial and commercial fields’.790 On 
specific proposals, the NUT – as a public servant - was emphatic that the teachers’ 
legal right to strike should be maintained, and that the scope of the phrase ‘without 
damaging the public interest’ (paragraph 13c) was open to varied interpretation. On 
the issue of the proposed NIRC, the union made a very insightful comment on the 
extensive powers which it would have: 
The Executive cannot accept that any one body is the repository of truth and wisdom 
in the field of industrial relations. The issues involved are human ones and are rarely 
best dealt with by the precise judgment of the law.791 
The body of criticism and advice was quickly building against the proposals in the 
Consultative Document, many of which failed to take into account the breadth of 
types of organization, including professional associations and public sector bodies. 
By trying to use the law to regulate industrial relations in all types of employment, the 
many and often nuanced differences between the different forms of employment and 
association could not possibly be taken into account. The law was far too blunt an 
instrument for such a role, without the inherent flexibility of collective bargaining. 
Recognizing this fact, the Donovan Commission had reasoned that improved 
collective bargaining was the best means of achieving agreements between workers 
and employers. Nevertheless, the Government continued to press forward with its 
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draconian proposals which threatened to overturn the fundamental rights of trade 
unions and trade unionists.  
5.7 The Industrial Relations Bill - politically-motivated? 
Despite the extensive and wide-ranging opposition to the Government’s proposals, 
the Bill was published on 3 December 1970, replicating the Consultative Document 
almost in its entirety, demonstrating how little notice the Government had taken of 
the opposition to the proposals.792 
Owen Parsons’ detailed response to the Consultative document, The Tory Threat to 
the Unions,793 was quickly followed by a written response to the Bill, entitled The 
Tory War on the Unions.794 He quoted Vic Feather, the TUC General Secretary, who 
summed up the proposals as ‘unfair, unreasonable, impracticable and unworkable’ 
and as a ‘fundamental and retrogressive change in the whole basis of industrial 
relations in Britain’.795 Parsons was adamant that the proposals had nothing 
whatever to do with industrial peace or preventing strikes. 
The trade union immunity from prosecution or suit in tort provided by the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 was now under threat, despite the whole system of collective 
bargaining having grown up within this framework.796 The motives of the Industrial 
Relations Bill could only be properly understood in the context of the Government’s 
general social and economic policy, according to Parsons. Elected on a promise to 
reduce prices, they were nevertheless deliberately encouraging inflationary price 
rises through the imposition of taxes on imported food, cuts in farm subsidies and 
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their mini-budget. They were attacking the social services, imposing new charges on 
the sick, cutting free school milk and raising the cost of school dinners,797 cutting 
unemployment benefit and paving the way for large increases in council rents.798 
Only a strong trade union movement could effectively fight these social class policies 
and help to defend the interests of all sections of workers, and so, by cutting at the 
roots of the trade unions, the Government’s intention to curb their ability to fight back 
was alarmingly obvious.  
The Bill immediately provoked a renewed fierce and united reaction from the leaders 
of many trade unions, and from the Labour Party. Vic Feather called it a ‘straitjacket’ 
on the unions; Jack Jones said it was ‘a vicious class-war attack on the trade union 
movement’; Lawrence Daly (NUM) described it as ‘a Bill for scabs and non-
unionists’; and Hugh Scanlon described it as ‘the most iniquitous piece of legislation 
to be placed on the Statute Book’.799 The Labour Party considered that the proposals 
were politically motivated. It described the Bill as ‘a crude political weapon by which 
the Tories aim to strip the trade unions of rights won through years of struggle – and 
restore to the employers the privileges and prerogatives they have had to concede at 
the bargaining table over the past century.’800 
Opposition to such restrictive legislation from trade unions and the Labour party was 
to be expected, but the Tribune reported on a much more unusual story which 
revealed that the very architect of the Bill, Stephen Abbot, had himself previously 
admitted that union legislation was wrong, underlining the apparent about-turn being 
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executed by the Conservatives in their approach to industrial relations.801 
Furthermore, in 1962 John Hare had told the Tory Party conference: 
The legislative answers are not really as easy as they are made out to be. Ultimately 
they can well lead to the sanction of sending thousands of men to gaol if they refuse 
to obey the law.802 
The claim that legislation would reduce strikes was also based on dubious evidence. 
Strike figures suggested that countries with similar legislation to that set out in the 
Bill had been unsuccessful in reducing the number of working days lost.803 Despite 
the stark reality of these statistics, the Tories had relied on American legislation 
(Taft-Hartley, Wagner and Landrum-Griffin Acts) for many of the clauses in the Bill. 
Theodore Kheel, a leading US arbitrator, expressed puzzlement over the emphasis 
put upon emulating America in this regard, especially given the industrial problems 
that the USA was experiencing, with no sign that legislation had had any 
ameliorating effect.804  
The Labour pamphlet, Talking Points, considered that the Industrial Relations Bill 
‘treats the spirit and the substance of the recommendations made by the [Donovan 
Commission] with contempt’. Donovan had argued that what was essential to good 
industrial relations was to retain the freedom to negotiate voluntary agreements. This 
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is one thing the law cannot do; it cannot make people cooperate if they do not want 
to do so.’805  
Nevertheless, the Tory Government was attempting to destroy that very democratic 
bargaining process, and aiming to force binding agreements on both sides of 
industry through its proposed legislation. Although In Place of Strife did not accept all 
of the Donovan proposals unreservedly, this Bill went much further in rejecting 
outright much of the carefully considered advice of the Royal Commission. Donovan 
proposed that better bargaining at shop-floor level would channel militancy at this 
level into constructive bargaining, benefitting both workers and management, but the 
Industrial Relations Bill failed to acknowledge the solutions proposed by the 
Donovan Commission. 
Vic Feather also underlined the futility of the legislative proposals, predicting that 
legislation such as this could only exacerbate the situation.806 The TUC continued to 
make its objections to registration and other proposals in the Bill well known at 
rallies, at TUC Congress meetings, including a Special Congress, and in many other 
ways. It was objecting to the fundamental alteration of the basic pattern of trade 
union law, which was ‘the product of the struggles of the labour movement over the 
past one hundred years or more’.807 Although the law had intervened greatly in trade 
unions matters between 1901 and 1906, and again from 1927 to 1946 – periods in 
which Conservative governments had attempted to restrict trade union activity 
through legislation – twentieth century law had mainly kept a respectful distance from 
industrial relations. This was a position which had been largely satisfactory from the 
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trade union perspective, and trade unionists wanted to maintain the status quo. 
Nevertheless, the Government forged ahead with the legislation in a move that 
seemed to suggest that the Conservatives were finally reverting to form after the 
post-war consensus which had prevailed from 1945 to the 1960s. 
5.8 The TUC fights back - the campaign 
The TUC’s response to the lack of consultation and to the threat of the proposed 
legislation formed a major part of its work in 1970 and 1971. The 1971 Annual 
Congress Report detailed that campaign.808 It had taken precedence over all the 
other work of the TUC that year, so serious were the implications for trade union 
autonomy. The campaign was also used to gain public support for the TUC 
proposals, and a costly newspaper campaign was launched.809 All Trades Councils 
were advised of the purpose of the campaign and encouraged to organize events.810 
There were two national days of protests. The first was on 12 January 1971 when all 
unions were asked to organize local meetings. Wilson, as leader of the Opposition, 
attended a meeting in the Albert Hall that day, and millions of trade unionists took 
part in the day’s events. On 21 February there was a national demonstration in 
London attended by an estimated 140,000 people, said by Vic Feather to be the 
largest organized demonstration ever held in Britain.811 He claimed that the marchers 
had ‘given the answer to members of the Conservative Government who said that 
trade unionists supported the Bill.’ It had never been more resolute in its resistance 
to attack, he said, and the unions refused to be shackled.812 In a further show of the 
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strength and spread of opposition to the Bill, a petition was addressed to the House 
of Commons, asking for it to be withdrawn. The petition, with more than 549,000 
signatures was presented to the House on 24 March 1971, the day before the third 
reading of the Bill. 
 A Special TUC Congress was held on 18 March 1971 in response to the 
Government’s persistence in pressing ahead with the legislation. This was only the 
third time in the history of the TUC that such an event had been held, although it was 
less than two years since the Special Congress of June 1969 when the White Paper 
provisions had also come under scrutiny.813 The purpose of this Congress was to 
formulate a plan of action should the Bill become law, and the TUC now had every 
expectation that it would, despite its petition of over half a million signatures. 
Following the Special Congress, the TUC made recommendations to all affiliated 
unions which would effectively ensure that no unions would register, and that all 
unions currently registered should de-register before the date of the commencement 
of the new Register, or change their rules to ensure that they were not required to 
register. This policy proved very successful and, ‘as the numbers taking this action 
increased, so the pressure on the more reluctant unions grew.’814 
Unions were also advised to insert a clause into existing and new collective 
agreements to the effect that the agreement was not intended to be legally binding, 
and by June 1971 unions reported that over 100 employers had agreed to such a 
clause, known by the acronym TINA LEA (‘this is not a legally effective agreement’). 
Evidently, the employers themselves did not welcome, or could see no useful 
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purpose to having agreements made into legally binding contracts.815 They would 
also have been acutely aware of the outcome of the 1969 Ford litigation against the 
AEF.816 Ford had attempted to insert penalty clauses into the collective agreement; 
these were agreed by the smaller unions whose vote carried the same weight as the 
much larger unions - who did not agree. Ford attempted to enforce the agreement in 
court and lost.817 The judge, Justice Lane, confirmed that there was no intention to 
create legal relations in collective agreements, neither  were union-negotiators acting 
as agents with authority to bind their members.818 This was an aspect of the common 
law on contract that could not easily be overcome by legislation, providing an 
inconvenient truth for the Government, but the notion that union members could be 
agents of the union would arise again in one of the first cases to be decided in the 
newly-established statutory body, the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC).819 
The TUC was determined to put obstacles in the way of the successful 
implementation of the Bill. In a further move towards non-cooperation, affiliated 
unions were advised to inform their members to withdraw from the employed 
persons’ panel on Industrial Tribunals, and not to serve on either the Commission for 
Industrial Relations (CIR) or the NIRC. Trade Union members on the CIR, including 
George Woodcock, its first chairman, resigned because of their opposition to the Bill. 
The Government would later complain that the unions had refused to take up an 
opportunity to become involved in these ‘democratic’ organizations, and this was one 
of the reasons why the new agencies would be unbalanced, but it was never a likely 
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scenario that union members would wish to become involved with agencies that 
could penalize trade unions and their members. 
5.9 The Industrial Relations Bill – an analysis 
The Government’s fundamental error was its failure to consider how deeply the 
whole trade union movement was entrenched in tradition. The proposals represented 
a radical departure from the unique ways in which trade unions went about their 
business, traditions that were rooted in far-reaching immunities, largely untouched by 
the rules of commercial contract, criminal law or economic torts.  
Robert Carr had outlined the philosophy which underpinned the Bill: 
The Bill is essentially about regulating the eternal tension between, on the one hand, 
the desire of the individual person and individual group for complete freedom of 
action and, on the other, the need of the community for a proper degree of order and 
discipline. Unfettered freedom destroys itself. Liberty cannot exist without order, or 
rights be long sustained without corresponding duties.820 
Nevertheless, Carr seems to be overlooking the fact that unions already operated 
within a system of self-regulation and did not have ‘complete freedom of action’ – a 
phrase which suggests that unions were totally unregulated and anarchical.  
In the preface to Fair Deal at Work, there had been an earlier indication of 
Conservative philosophy.821  
This Report shows how ... within properly defined rules, individuals and organisations 
can be free to get on with the job without interference by the Government. It will form 
                                                
820 HC Deb. 14 December 1970, vol. 808 cc. 961‐1076, c. 962. 
821 Fair Deal at Work: The Conservative Approach to Modern Industrial Relations, Conservative Political Centre 
1968. 
242 
 
the basis of Conservative policies to provide Britain’s industrial life with a new 
framework of rights and obligations. 
This philosophy, which deemed a framework of rules for industrial relations to be a 
necessity, represented a radical departure from accepted traditions. Those traditions 
within the law were of non-intervention and certain well-defined immunities provided 
by law. The Government’s overriding objective was economic, while the specific 
objectives were to set national standards for good industrial relations; to safeguard 
those who conform to them; to protect individual rights in employment; and to 
provide new methods of resolving disputes over the conduct of industrial relations.822 
On the other hand, the unions claimed that the real motives were in fact to weaken 
the trade union movement as a whole and to undermine the collective bargaining 
system. Individual rights, such as the right not to join a union, were viewed as a 
means of undermining strong trade unionism, while the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed was considered to be underpinned by such weak remedies that the 
employer would be undeterred from dismissing an employee. 
Davies and Freedland noted that the Heath Government took a crucially different 
approach to that of the previous Labour Government, ‘with even more momentous 
consequences for the development of labour law’.823 The justification for this, in their 
view, was the economic crisis, forcing the government ‘to address questions which 
had been much less sharply posed in the easier conditions of ... the 1950s’, and that 
governments were now forced to take much harder decisions in finding a 
compromise while trying to maintain the post-war commitments to full employment, 
free collective bargaining and to the welfare state. Since not all priorities could be 
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fully maintained, the Government had to decide on its priorities, and consider where 
the greatest risks lay, necessitating a high risk strategy. While Wilson had planned 
for the retention of a voluntarist system, Heath’s intention was diametrically opposed 
to this, aiming to secure ‘legally regulated collective industrial relations in the 
framework of a self-regulating industrial economy and a free labour market’, as he 
worked towards taking the UK into the European Economic Community (EEC).824 
Nevertheless, this high risk strategy would lead to disastrous consequences for 
industrial relations and the economy.  
John Wood had a more optimistic view of the Bill. He considered that the law would 
in future play a more central part in British industrial relations, and that clearer 
statements of rules and objectives would be a great gain, although the gain would 
not be in the courts, but through greater self-discipline. He thought that any 
legislation should balance the desirable with the attainable, although he warned that 
any new legal code would come under attack, resulting from a desire to protect 
interests.825 The Times also cautioned that ‘good legislation in a disturbed and 
sensitive area is best based on what people in general accept as reasonable ... 
otherwise the propounders will risk defiance and bring the law into disrepute’.826 
These warnings went unheeded, however, as the Conservative Government pressed 
ahead with its comprehensive legislative reform proposals. 
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5.10 The Industrial Relations Act 1971 
The Industrial Relations Act came into force in August 1971. This event represented 
a watershed in the history of industrial relations when ‘the whole post-war voluntarist 
structure, indeed the whole post-1871 peacetime legal structure, was both formally 
and substantively replaced by the Industrial Relations Act, and was not subsequently 
reconstituted in its previous form.’827 It was a legislative revolution which failed to 
make a positive impact at the time, but which has nevertheless brought about 
permanent changes to the way in which industrial relations are perceived and 
regulated. 
Davies and Freedland argued that changes in the economy and in society in the 
post-war period meant that the union movement’s traditional goals necessitated 
legislative support.828 While Kahn-Freund’s analysis was highly relevant and 
insightful in 1953 when first expounded, political and economic changes, combined 
with increased union growth and strength, led inevitably to the governments of the 
1960s and 1970s to seek greater legislative intervention. Nevertheless, the 
provisions of the Industrial Relations Act opened up deep divisions both within the 
Conservative Party and the trade union movement.829 Some Conservatives 
maintained that what was needed was ‘a conciliatory approach, not recourse to 
authoritarian measures’.830 Nevertheless, Robert Taylor considered that the 
Conservative Government of 1970-1974 had more than enough justification for 
taking a firm line with ‘the seemingly intractable problem of trade union power.’831 
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Indeed, Heath was forced to declare a State of Emergency in response to highly 
damaging strikes on no less than five occasions, and the annual number of working 
days lost never fell below 10 million between 1970 and 1973.  
Although strikes were proliferating across the Western world by the end of the 
1960s, in Britain the chief problem at the heart of the industrial strife was 
undoubtedly the Industrial Relations Act. Ever since the Trade Disputes Act 1906, 
British trade unions had been largely free from excessive political intervention, so 
that they had been able to develop their own relations with employers, negotiating 
directly over terms and conditions and dispute resolution.832 Kahn-Freund argued 
that this method of ‘collective bargaining’ had led British unions to see it as 
preferable to all other forms of job regulation – legislation in particular.833 It had 
certain benefits such as flexibility, and led to mutually satisfactory agreements 
between the employer and the workforce. It was, moreover, less externally 
reversible: ‘What the State has not given the State cannot take away.’834  
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 effectively swept aside the method of collective 
bargaining that had worked more-or-less to the satisfaction of both sides of industry 
for decades. The long-running battle by the trade unions, first against the Bill and 
then against the Act, was not simply a bid to retain their own socialist ideals in direct 
opposition to the Conservatives’ central concerns of supporting business and 
maintaining capitalist principles. What the unions feared most was their loss of 
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autonomy and their liberty to organize and act within existing legal boundaries that 
gave them certain freedoms from suit in tort and allowed them to operate in a way 
that best protected the interests of their members without undue control from 
government. Put at its most extreme, the trade union movement was fighting for 
freedom and against totalitarianism, a fight which would over the next few years 
divide Parliament, drive a wedge between the TUC and the very trade unions it 
represented, and create a widening gulf between the unions and their members. 
5.11 Legislation - the way forward?  
To take such a contrary position raises the inevitable question of why the 
Conservatives deemed it necessary to involve such radical tactics to resolve the 
trade union ‘problem’. One suggestion is that both Donovan and In Place of Strife 
failed to offer a workable solution, leaving only one possible option to the 
Government. Hawkins advanced another theory for the change in direction.835 He 
argued that the Donovan analysis represented a far more realistic basis for change 
in industrial relations than the Conservative Government’s Consultative Document 
which preceded the Industrial Relations Act, but acknowledged that the 
contemporary debate confused two distinct problems. These were the need to 
devise an effective incentive to encourage employers and trade unions to accept 
reform in industrial relations, and the need to devise a system of sanctions to 
discourage the abuse of industrial bargaining power. While Donovan’s strategy was 
to increase the economic efficiency of collective bargaining through reform of its 
institutions, the ‘implied aim of the Conservative strategy is the achievement of a 
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greater degree of industrial discipline by the threat and use of legal sanctions,’836 
thus pushing the trade unions into a position where they would have to regulate their 
members’ behaviour. Keith Hawkins described this objective as ‘misconceived and 
unrealistic’, but recognized the reasons for the strategy, which he attributed to the 
preoccupation of all governments with inflation, strikes and economic growth.837 
Maguire likewise conceded that economic changes such as the ‘developing 
government incomes policy and the impact of the oil crisis after 1972’ heightened the 
already inevitable move towards major politicized disputes and direct government-
union confrontation.838 
Dorey, meanwhile, attributed this change of direction within the Party to the inclusion 
of newer, younger members, bent on ‘shaking up’ the Party leadership which was 
seen to be merely drifting with the tide.839 As evidence of this search for justification 
to move away from ‘paternal socialism’, Dorey cited an editorial in an in-house 
newsletter, Industrial Outlook, which declared: ‘the hard times endured by millions in 
the twenties and thirties is a poor and inadequate basis for a system of industrial 
relations relevant to the needs of today and tomorrow. But memories die hard.’840 
The view that collective laissez-faire was an outdated concept, also reflected in 
Shonfield’s Note of Reservation, began to take on a wider appeal within the 
Conservative Party, particularly following its 1964 General Election defeat, and more 
radical policies were called for. The shift to the right was beginning to gather 
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momentum, although to the evident dismay of many older, diehard Conservatives.841 
The Policy Group on Trade Union Law and Practice had among its members both 
Geoffrey Howe842 and Sir John Hobson, both barristers, so it was no coincidence 
that the proposals in their subsequent report had committed the Party to a policy of 
legalism.843 Nevertheless, ‘they had accepted that any legislative changes had to be 
enforceable in practice, otherwise both the law and a (future) Conservative 
government would be brought into disrepute.’844  
Fair Deal at Work had embodied the conviction that it was necessary to take control 
over industrial society in order to maintain political credibility, and that this was best 
achieved by a substantial increase in legal intervention. In it, the authors stated: ‘We 
have seen our main task as being to concentrate on those problems which we 
believe can be alleviated by direct government action through legislation and other 
means.’845 When Robert Carr introduced the Consultative Document on the 
Industrial Relations Act, he spoke of his conviction that comprehensive legislation 
was the only way forward, saying, ‘every other industrial country but Britain has 
already found, both in theory and in practice, that a comprehensive system of 
industrial law is useful and, indeed, necessary.’846 The Donovan Report had been 
criticized for failing to give serious consideration to economic policy, but this factor 
was now being used to justify the major attack on trade union freedom in the 
Industrial Relations Act, despite there being little credible evidence to support such 
measures. 
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5.12 Registration and Strikes 
The requirement for unions to register was one of the central planks of the Act, but 
the TUC advice was to refuse to register.847 Engleman and Thomson, both 
economists,  offered some reasons for the TUC’s choice of non-registration as a key 
strategy.848 One was the threat of a pyramidical structure with power at the top, 
rather than the developing theory of power vested in the rank-and-file members; 
another was a dislike of the concept of a ‘state licence’ as a basis for union rights. 
There was also a perception that registration would be tantamount to accepting the 
principles of the Act.  
Despite the very powerful reasons underpinning non-registration, the concomitant 
risks led to a situation where even the TUC leaders failed to unite over the issue of 
registration of the unions.849 Jack Cooper, the TUC President and leader of Britain’s 
third largest union, the GMW,850 said he would advise his union to register under the 
Act, in defiance of TUC policy.851 There was also a difference in attitude between 
large and small unions, with the smaller ones being reluctant to risk non-registration, 
even though the TUC had referred to this as ‘an easy but deceptive solution’.852 
Nevertheless, Congress decided to instruct unions not to register, on pain of 
suspension, indicating a hardening of attitudes since the earlier Special Congress 
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when the TUC had decided to simply recommend that affiliated unions should not 
register.853  
There were severe financial risks for those unions which did not register. The effects 
of registration were that the union would become a body corporate, capable of suing 
and being sued;854 its rules would be scrutinized by the Registrar to ensure 
compliance with s.65 of the Act on the principles as to conduct;855 and failure to 
perform duties imposed on it under Part IV would render the union guilty of an 
offence, punishable by a fine.856 Any non-registered unions would lose both 
protection against certain legal actions and the tax-exempt status which would have 
been a benefit of registration in the past. Both official and unofficial strikes by 
unregistered unions would be an unfair industrial practice. Yet, despite the potential 
benefits of registration, many unions followed TUC advice and refused to register. 
The President of the NIRC himself, with the benefit of hindsight, later criticized the 
assumptions on which the registration requirement was based, despite having been 
instrumental in the drafting of the Act: 
The basic assumption seems to have been that the advantages of registration were 
such that all major unions would register ... In fact the registration provisions have 
been largely counter-productive.857 
Although the overall intention of the Act was to ensure that strikes were reduced, 
1972 began with a seven-week miners’ strike, the first official one since 1926, 
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leading to the declaration of a State of Emergency.858 Car-workers, train drivers, 
steel workers and dockers all took part in strike action, and 1972 saw the highest 
number of strike days since 1926. A further State of Emergency was called in August 
1972 during the dockers’ strike. The strategy of the Act had been to make all 
unofficial strikes subject to legal action by the employer, but, ‘as of July 1972, the 
most generous assessment that can be made of this strategy for strike control is that 
its success is doubtful.’859 Although the strikes were not a reaction to the Act, neither 
had the Act worked effectively to prevent serious industrial action. 
Dorey noted that the response of the Government to these events was to instigate a 
major policy U-turn, even though this course of action caused a split within the 
Conservative Party, with the neo-liberals prompted to form the breakaway Selsdon 
Group.860 The actions of the Tory leadership caused consternation within the Party, 
and led to ‘rumblings of discontent in the Tory ranks, especially among the young.’861  
Nonetheless, in the face of a lengthy miners’ strike over pay in early 1972, Heath 
was already preparing to engage in talks with the trade union leaders and employers 
to find a better solution. Indeed, Peter Walker, a Cabinet Minister, ‘was talking of a 
partnership between the government, the trade unions, and the employers’ 
representatives, which would therefore establish a “trialogue”.’862 Nevertheless, 
Robert Taylor questioned how such a supposedly well-meaning and sympathetic 
conciliator as Edward Heath could preside over a government that had become a 
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byword for industrial confrontation.863 His answer was that union leaders had come 
to see Heath’s attitude, not as far-sighted and magnanimous, but as a sign of 
weakness. In addition, ‘once they had forged a “social contract” with the opposition 
Labour Party in 1972, an agreement to work in partnership and cooperation with a 
Labour government,  there was no obvious reason why the TUC should want to sign 
a comprehensive agreement with Heath, especially if such an achievement helped to 
secure him a second consecutive term in office.’864 It is further suggested that 
Heath’s comparative lack of knowledge of the law865 and relative inexperience as 
Party leader in 1965 when the proposals were first formulated by the Policy Group866 
may have contributed to the position in which he now found himself. He was being 
held responsible for legislation, the consequences of which he could not fully 
appreciate. Davies and Freedland further suggest that while Wilson’s government 
sought modernization through planning and intervention, Heath proposed 
‘progressive disengagement of the state from the management of the industrial 
economy’, of which legislative regulation of collective bargaining and of industrial 
relations was an essential part.867 Whatever the motivations and reasons for the 
intransigence of the Heath Government, however, it was quickly becoming clear that 
its legislative strategy was not working to reduce strikes. 
Whilst numerous strikes were happening in all areas of industry, and the number of 
strike days was rising exponentially, trade unions continued to boycott membership 
of the various agencies set up to administer the law, thereby showing their contempt 
for the new regime. This led to the unfortunate collapse of the traditional tripartite 
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nature of the new institutions, including the NIRC which should have included nine 
lay members.868 Such methods of working in partnership had been attempted before 
and would be again, and the arguments for and against such methods are discussed 
below in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, to be successful, the government would have to 
regain the trust of the unions. Meanwhile, employers were also reluctant to use the 
new provisions, afraid that to do so might lead to a deterioration of their relations with 
unions and workers. It seemed that no-one on either side of industry viewed this new 
legislation as the solution to industrial problems, while cooperative mechanisms 
which had the potential to regulate relations between the parties were being side-
lined. 
5.13 The National Industrial Relations Court, Case Law and Martyrdom  
The National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) was just one of several agencies 
which were set up for the first time or given new roles under the Act, since extensive 
new machinery was needed to administer the legislation. In this way the Act 
contributed towards a more comprehensive legal framework than had existed 
hitherto. However, the simultaneous introduction of so many new regulatory and 
judicial authorities was again a departure from previous established practice, and the 
failure to build on past experience appears to be an unwise and ill-informed 
manoeuvre.  
The Registrar of Trade Unions and Employer Associations was to grant registration 
once the rules of the collective bodies were approved. The former Industrial Court 
became the Industrial Arbitration Board with much the same jurisdiction as 
previously, having an arbitral function. The NIRC was to act as a branch of the High 
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Court, under the presidency of Sir John Donaldson. It was to act as a court of first 
instance for collective decisions, and as a court of appeal from industrial tribunals, 
and the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) was to act as an investigative 
agency for the NIRC. This court was to prove controversial and short-lived, presiding 
over some of the most memorable cases involving trade unionists ever heard, 
creating martyrs out of striking workers. 
Indeed, Keith Joseph had written a paper in 1966 for the Policy Group on Trade 
Union Law and Practice,869 responding to the ‘virtually exclusive focus by the group 
on the problem of trade union power’.870 In it, he showed considerable foresight 
when he warned of the danger of allowing the unions to pose as political victims or 
martyrs in a class war. In early 1972 a series of legal cases began, brought by 
employers and individuals against dock workers in Britain, when the President’s 
commitment to making his NIRC as effective as possible was demonstrated to 
devastating effect. The NIRC eventually ordered five dock workers to be imprisoned 
for contempt, thereby creating just the position of martyrdom among trade unions 
which Joseph had warned against.871 
The case began on 23 March 1972, when the haulage company, Heaton’s Transport 
Ltd, brought an action under section 96 of the Act in respect of the ‘blacking’ of its 
container lorries by TGWU shop stewards at Mersey Docks. Section 96 made it an 
‘unfair industrial practice’ for an unregistered union to induce a breach of contract in 
furtherance of an industrial dispute.  The NIRC granted an injunction against the 
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TGWU on the ground that shop stewards were in fact agents of the union, and 
therefore acting on the implicit authority of the union.872 
The NIRC ordered the union to refrain from blacking and, although for reasons of 
policy the union did not appear before the Court,873 it did order its local officers to 
advise the shop stewards to comply with the order. The advice was rejected, 
however, and just six days after the order had been issued by the NIRC, it found the 
union to be in wilful contempt of court. In the face of continued blacking, the NIRC 
imposed fines and a costs order on the TGWU for non-compliance with the orders. It 
also found the union liable to the firms for unfair industrial practices. 
There followed an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the findings of wilful 
contempt and of liability. This Court allowed the appeals, deciding that the requisite 
‘directing mind’ was absent. Lord Denning MR found that the shop stewards had 
been acting as representatives of their work group, and not as agents of the union as 
the NIRC had found. He was unhappy with the approach of the NIRC, which 
appeared to subordinate the common law to statutory policies about union 
registration.874 Registration was, after all, not compulsory, and Denning seems to 
have taken a common sense, purposive approach to the situation, while the NIRC’s 
view was based on a narrow, restrictive interpretation of the law. Had the NIRC 
taken a wider view of the law, and a narrower view of its own significance, a less 
inflammatory approach may have ensued. 
However, on 12 June, a further dispute arose between TGWU members and men 
who were employed at the Chobham Farm container depot in East London. Messrs. 
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Churchman and Cartwright of the London (East) ICD Ltd. Manual Staff Association 
applied for and obtained an injunction against three members of the TGWU, to 
prevent further picketing of the depot. The men did not comply with the injunction, 
thereby placing themselves in contempt of court, and the NIRC did not hesitate to 
sign warrants for their arrest and detention. An appeal was made to the Court of 
Appeal.875 Since the individuals, Bernard Steer, Vic Turner and Alan Williams would 
not appear before the court, their case was taken up by the Official Solicitor, 
represented by Peter Pain QC. His argument - that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove violation of the injunction by the three men - was accepted by the Court, and 
they were denied the opportunity to become martyrs in the cause of resistance to the 
Act and the NIRC.876 The order of the NIRC was reversed, the Court of Appeal 
having been called upon once again to ameliorate the harshness demonstrated by 
the Industrial Court. The Court of Appeal delivered a stern reminder to the NIRC that 
the grounds for depriving contemnors of their liberty must be as strictly proved there 
as in the High Court. Although Donaldson was an experienced judge, his 
determination to make the new court work, and to command respect from those it 
was dealing with, may have led him to be unduly harsh in applying the letter of the 
law with little regard for achieving industrial peace.  
A further complainant, the Midland Cold Storage Company, had also been ‘blacked’ 
by members of the TGWU. In the period between the Heaton’s case being heard in 
the Court of Appeal, but before a further appeal to the House of Lords, the Midland 
case was heard by the NIRC.877 Orders against five of the respondents, including the 
unrepentant Steer and Turner, were granted on the grounds that they had taken part 
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in the picket line. The picketing continued, however, and Midland sought an 
injunction from the High Court, which was refused.878 Midland then applied to the 
NIRC for enforcement of its order and the Official Solicitor attended on the 
respondents’ behalf as amicus curiae [friend of the court]. This time, five of the 
respondents were committed to Pentonville prison, including both Steer and Turner. 
The outcry from the TUC, trade unions and the public was deafening, with a huge 
proliferation of strikes and the striking workers marching on Pentonville prison. 
After six days the Official Solicitor applied for their release, which was granted 
because, that very morning, the House of Lords had held in the Heatons’ case that it 
was the union which was liable and accountable rather than individual members, and 
the primary method of enforcement should be against the funds of the union and not 
against individuals.879 Although this may have been good news for the men being 
held in prison, it was devastating news for the unions who, despite Denning’s 
pragmatic approach, decided that the unions should be liable for the acts of their 
members, thereby shifting liability to those who could be punished through financial 
means rather than imprisonment. 
The men, who had became known popularly as ‘The Pentonville Five’, were released 
on 26 July 1972, when the combined appeal was made to the House of Lords by the 
complainants, Heatons, together with Craddock Brothers and Panalpina Services; 
the decisions made by the Court of Appeal in favour of the union were reversed and 
this time went against the TGWU.880 The House of Lords held, in a rare unanimous 
and much expedited judgment, that the shop stewards had implied authority (from 
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the union) to take industrial action, thereby rendering the union directly liable. The 
imprisonment of the Pentonville Five effectively turned them into martyrs for the 
cause of fighting the Industrial Relations Act, a situation previously feared by Keith 
Joseph.881  
The affair of the Pentonville Five was a notable episode in the history of British 
industrial relations, epitomising the long-running tensions between trade union rights 
and the law and between union leaderships and their rank and file.882 
‘The Government’s determination to confront the labour movement with an unpopular 
Industrial Relations Act had been matched by a determination to resist the kind of law 
and order that the Act entailed.’883 
The resolution of the dispute in the House of Lords was described by Kahn-Freund 
as ‘the most important case decided under the Act’.884 Engleman and Thomson 
summed up the situation by observing that, ‘Whether or not the House of Lords had 
the better of the argument in law, the Court of Appeal surely had the better argument 
in fact.’885 ‘There can be little doubt that the Midland Cold Storage case was the 
Armageddon of the Act as far as the extensive use of penal sanctions against 
individuals was concerned.’886 
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Lord Devlin argued that such matters should not be for the courts at all, that it was 
an administrative, political issue.887 He had concerns about the use of contempt of 
court, saying that he wished that it had never been introduced at all, and went on to 
say that: 
 There is a distinction ... between making a law which judges have to interpret and 
apply, and between putting the court in the position as if it were identifying itself with 
the law ... it’s a political matter and it should be kept as a political matter.  
Devlin seemed to suggest that the Government was hiding behind the courts, leaving 
them to administer what it knew was going to be an unpopular law with trade unions 
by appearing to make it a judicial rather than a political matter. 
There was little doubt that the divisions within the court system may not have come 
about if the NIRC had not approached its role with such misguided enthusiasm. ‘The 
establishment of a new court, the delimiting of its jurisdiction and the definition of its 
structures constitute a difficult task,’ thought Peter Pain, the barrister who had 
represented Steer et al in the Chobham Farm case.888 He had concerns that the 
complexity of this particular task, which would have been best suited to careful 
consideration in the committee stage of the Bill, was, like the rest of the provisions, 
debated before the whole House. ‘Criticism by informed minds who are by no means 
all friendly to a Bill serves an excellent purpose in helping Parliament to avoid 
pitfalls.’889 
 The concept of an Industrial Relations Court was badly managed. The outcome of 
the Heaton’s and Craddock cases was not so much a failure to apply the law 
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correctly, but rather an over-enthusiasm by the NIRC for the letter of the law and an 
absence of good sense – pitfalls that may have been avoided if the potential 
difficulties involved in forming a new court had been more carefully considered. Such 
detailed analysis had failed to materialize, however, since the debate of the Bill in the 
House of Commons had been heated and angry, and in the end was cut short by the 
guillotine procedure,890 so that any careful consideration of the purpose, the role and 
the powers of the new NIRC, had simply not taken place. 
The Conservative Government should also have kept in mind that unions also had 
an innate distrust of courts, for they had been the unfortunate victims of a number of 
judicial decisions. Rookes v Barnard891 and the Taff Vale Railway892 cases are just 
two examples of such cases which suggested that the courts held a long-standing 
opinion of trade unions as bodies to be carefully controlled.  Nevertheless, a less 
gung-ho attitude on the part of the Government, with the gradual introduction of 
legislative measures and a court with fewer punitive measures at its disposal (or at 
least a greater reluctance to use them) could have led to a very different outcome. 
Peter Pain thought it a ‘great pity’ that the establishment of the court was linked with 
so many other measures that were the cause of bitter resentment by the trade union 
movement. ‘There is a serious risk that the National Industrial Relations Court will be 
destroyed not by any defects of its own, but by the unpopularity of the law which it 
has to apply.’893 Pain also pointed out that any new court should have the boundary 
lines of its jurisdiction firmly drawn, but this was not done. He concluded that, ‘so far 
                                                
890 This is a House of Commons procedure, also known as an Allocation of Time Motion, which restricts the 
amount of time set aside for a debate.  
891 [1964] UKHL 1. 
892 Taff Vale Railway Co. v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] UKHL 1. 
893 Pain, ‘The Industrial Court – a missed Opportunity’, 6. 
261 
 
as the Court is concerned, the Act is hasty, ill-considered legislation’ and ‘the 
transfer of jurisdiction to the new court has been ill-conceived.’894  
 Wedderburn also expressed concern over the extent of the NIRC’s jurisdiction. He 
noted that, by making the NIRC the keystone of its structure, the Industrial Relations 
Act put the courts and judges at the centre of industrial conflicts, which he 
considered to be a ‘reflection of the legislature responding to the middle-class 
demand for more “Law and Order” in industrial life’.895 Nevertheless, the move 
towards greater judicial interference in the affairs of trade unions had already taken a 
serious step forward in the House of Lords’ decision in Rookes v Barnard, and the 
creation of the NIRC both reflected and gave added impetus to that trend. Yet, the 
Government should have been aware of the outcry from the unions caused by the 
Rookes decision, and the subsequent legislation passed by the Labour Government 
to restore trade union immunity.896 This fact alone should have served as a warning 
that trade unions would not readily accept interference with their long-established 
rights. 
The role that the NIRC was forced to play, while coming into existence alongside a 
raft of unpopular legislative measures, denied the court the opportunity of becoming 
a genuine arbiter of collective disputes, and served only to drive a wedge between 
unions and their shop stewards and between the unions themselves. In the later 
case of Con Mech Engineers v AUEW 1973,897 a dispute arose between the 
company and the defendant union following a refusal by the company of a request 
by some of its employees to recognize the AUEW for bargaining purposes. The 
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NIRC decided that the unregistered union was in contempt for failing to cease strike 
action when ordered to, and directed sequestrators to seize the union’s funds, fining 
the union £75,000 out of those [political] funds. This action effectively treated the 
matter as one of ‘criminal contempt’, the NIRC becoming the prime mover in the 
matter, while that role would normally be taken by the complainant in a civil 
procedure.  
 The NIRC, with all its anomalies and difficulties associated with being a new court 
with poorly constructed procedures and principles, was finally disbanded through the 
Labour Government’s Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 as hastily as it 
had been established,. The adverse influence which the experience of the Industrial 
Relations Act and its principal organ of enforcement had each exerted on the opinion 
of the law in industrial relations required immediate and decisive action. 
Nevertheless, it would also act as a valuable lesson to a future government on how 
to bring about more effective control of the unions through legislation. 
5.14 The Beginning of the End 
On 28 June 1972 the TUC General Council decided to request a meeting with the 
Prime Minister to discuss either repeal or suspension of the Act. They met on 4 July 
at Downing Street, the same day that questions were being asked in the House of 
Commons about the operation of the Act. ‘The General Council stated that, in their 
view, the Government was not appreciating the gravity of the present situation. 
Industrial relations in the UK were at a very low ebb, and the Act had significantly 
contributed to the deterioration of the situation.’898 Heath said that the Act would 
work more effectively if the unions would play an effective role in its procedures, for 
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example by serving on the NIRC and the Industrial tribunals.899 He was, in effect, 
blaming the TUC’s policy of non-compliance for the problems. He also thought that 
the main problem behind the major strikes was the demand for higher wages rather 
than the Act, again putting the blame firmly on workers and the unions, and 
accepting no responsibility for the industrial turmoil in the country. Heath would not 
consider the TUC’s request to repeal or suspend the Act. 
No progress was made in the talks, and on 26 July the TUC called for a one-day 
stoppage to take place on 31 July, with a demonstration by all affiliated unions, 
action that was narrowly averted by the House of Lords judgment which resulted in 
the immediate release of the ‘Pentonville Five’. Although the judgment confirmed that 
individuals were not the main target of the Act, it was nevertheless a pyrrhic victory, 
since restraints on trade unions were tightened and the Act remained intact. 
In 1972 the TUC Annual Congress focused on the events that had followed on from 
the implementation of the Industrial Relations Act. Nevertheless, the tone of the 
Congress Report was far less militant than the previous year when there had been a 
massive campaign to ‘Kill the Bill’ and prevent it becoming law. The major concern 
now was that unions had been fined and, worse, their assets sequestrated which 
threatened their very existence.  
A Joint Statement was prepared by the liaison committee of the TUC, the National 
Executive Committee of the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party.900 It 
reiterated its continuing opposition to the Act and blamed the country’s many ills on it 
– the highest unemployment since the war, prices at an all-time high and still rising. 
The committee called for the immediate repeal of the Act, to be replaced with 
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voluntary reform; in the alternative, the next Labour government would repeal the Act 
in its first session. It also recommended the setting up of CAS – a Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service, recognizing the valuable contribution such a service could make 
to resolving disputes before they had a chance to escalate. The CBI was also agreed 
on this proposal for a non-governmental arbitration body.901 The levels of agreement 
between politicians, trade unions and even employers, although tentative, were the 
first green shoots of recovery in a country reeling from the scars brought on by the 
intransigence of these parties in the last two years. 
Richard Taylor argued that the dramatic events of July 1972 had in fact ‘fatally 
discredited the Industrial Relations Act’, becoming a ‘lingering embarrassment for the 
government which only a few months earlier had regarded the measure as vital to 
the modernization of the economy.’902 It is hard to disagree with this view in the light 
of the failure of the Act to bring about industrial peace and tackle union power, as 
Edward Heath had pledged to do. The debates, the strikes and the unrest in the 
country all rumbled on throughout 1973. The Times leader noted: 
It has been evident for some time that the Industrial Relations Act was not working in 
the way it was intended. This is not to accept the argument of the TUC that the Act 
should be repealed in its entirety, or “put on ice”: rather, it is to recognize the difficulty 
in legislating for relations between management and men.903 
The Labour Party won a narrow majority of seats in the 1974 General Election and 
stood by its pre-election promise to the unions, repealing the Industrial Relations Act 
and scrapping the NIRC. The Bill containing these proposals was introduced on 
Labour Day – 1 May 1974 – and only those aspects of the Act which protected 
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employees against unfair dismissal were to be carried forward to the new 
legislation.904 No doubt in a bid to address the previously ‘unfair industrial practice’ of 
pickets trying to stop vehicles and attempting to persuade the drivers not to enter 
strike-bound premises, such as was seen in the Heaton’s, Craddock’s and Panalpina 
cases, there was a provision in the new Bill to make this a legal right. The need for 
unions to register was also to be abolished and replaced with a system of 
certification with friendly societies. 
Michael Foot, the new Employment Secretary, was unapologetic about the speed at 
which the new legislation was to be introduced to Parliament, saying that it was 
designed to restore the pre-1971 position rather than make a new radical 
departure.905 Mr David Atkinson MP [Conservative] openly admitted that ‘virtually 
every trade unionist in the country will celebrate today as a great landmark in our 
history.’906 Mr Pardoe MP [Liberal] assured Mr Foot that he would have the support 
of the Liberal benches ‘in the repeal of this divisive Act’.907 After years of deep 
division within the country and within the trade union movement, the move to repeal 
the divisive Industrial Relations Act was to be the first step along the road to healing 
some of the rifts that had threatened the very unity of the country. 
Nevertheless, the TGWU, as a major player in the disputes surrounding the 
Industrial Relations Act, had benefited greatly from the controversy surrounding the 
Act, with many joining this and other unions. A quarter of a million new members 
joined the TGWU in 1972, taking its total membership to precisely 1,746,234.908 Jack 
Jones wrote of a ‘sense of crusade [which] prevailed throughout the union, and non-
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unionists were responding to our recruiting appeals in large numbers.’ Overall, 
membership of trade unions reached a record high in 1972 with 11.5 million, an 
increase of over one million members since 1968.909 Far from weakening the union 
movement as the legislators had hoped, the Act had served to unite the workers and 
strengthen the union movement. 
5.15 Why did the Industrial Relations Act fail, and did it provide lessons for future 
legislators? 
It was not legislation per se that was anathema to the unions, but rather the 
objectionable nature of the Industrial Relations Act in particular. There had been 
many instances of unions understandably being amenable to new laws (for example 
the Trade Disputes Act 1906 and the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974) which 
supported collective bargaining or ensured workers’ rights where the unions lacked 
the capacity to act alone. This particular Act, however, had proved unpopular with 
both employers and trade unions. In response to the operation of the Act, The Times 
noted: 
It is common sense that there ought to be a law which regulates industrial relations, 
but for such a law to be successful it has to acquire the confidence of the trade union 
movement. If the operations of such a law become in themselves a source of conflict, 
or at the worst produce a highly emotional national confrontation between the system 
of law and the whole trade union movement, then the damage must greatly outweigh 
the benefit to society.910 
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Some considered that the problems with the Act were that it was politically 
motivated, class-ridden or outdated. Eric Heffer had lambasted the Industrial 
Relations Bill for being ‘a lawyer’s paradise’,911 and that is was ‘based upon political 
dogma built up since 1958 [year A Giant’s Strength was published] and not upon a 
real understanding of industrial relations.’912 Patrick Bell also agreed that, for Heffer, 
the legislation was an ‘act of class war’.913 However, it could also be argued quite 
strongly that this was not an overt piece of class legislation, since its introduction 
affected, financially and otherwise, both employers and employees. Indeed, although 
the CBI initially supported the Act, the employers rarely used its provisions, taking a 
more pragmatic approach to industrial conflict and reverting to collective bargaining 
wherever possible in order to maintain continuance of their business and avoid the 
creation of union martyrs. As Michael Moran argued:  
Of those who had initially favoured a legislative solution to the problem of industrial 
relations, none were more disillusioned by the experience of the Act in its twilight 
years than the large employers who dominate the economy and their chief 
spokesman, the CBI.914  
Paul Smith neatly summarised the deficiencies of the Act which led to its downfall:  
‘Its very comprehensiveness, employers’ reticence, and effective trade union 
opposition combined to make the Act a failure.’915 The Act itself was an ambitious, 
monolithic piece of legislation which set out to bring within the law a whole raft of 
collective bargaining procedures, hitherto left to private agreements. Its aim was to 
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915 P. Smith, ‘Order in British Industrial Relations: From Donovan to Neoliberalism’, Historical Studies in 
Industrial Relations, April 2011, Issue 31‐32, 115‐154, at 133. 
268 
 
revolutionize the basis of industrial relations and to address some of the problems 
with tort law where they impinged on industrial relations. Moran concluded: ‘Many 
Acts do not have the precise effect intended by their authors; few can have gone so 
disastrously awry.’916 Jim Prior917 later admitted that his Government had ‘tried to do 
far too much at once, putting our faith in the idea that sweeping changes in the law 
would rapidly change behaviour on the shop-floor’.918 Lord Wedderburn also agreed 
that the Act failed because ‘[it] attempted to wrench the law at a stroke into a new 
pattern, to change its organic historical relationship with industrial relations.’919 
Nevertheless, views on the wisdom and utility of the Act encountered some changes 
in later years. It was evident that even Kahn-Freund’s views on the role of legislation 
in industrial relations had softened some years later when he offered some 
retrospective reflections on the Act in 1974.920 He admitted that it was too soon ‘to 
form a considered judgment on the place of the Industrial Relations Act in the history 
of law or of industrial relations’.921 Nevertheless, he made particular reference to the 
growing problem of picketing, and to what extent activities surrounding picketing 
should be legal. Despite his general antipathy towards the role of law in industrial 
relations, he admitted that changes in technology required some adjustments to the 
legal limits of picketing: 
Perhaps those who have with so much justification always argued against legal 
intervention beyond the point of absolute necessity should now consider the need for 
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emphasising the role which the law still has, and will always have to play in industrial 
relations.922 
Engleman and Thomson chronicled the failure of the Act and offered some 
explanations for its lack of success, but they nevertheless acknowledged that the Act 
was not without its achievements.923 They recorded that many cases did proceed 
smoothly, the rights of dismissed employees were strengthened, and the NIRC’s 
record of dealing with appeals in areas like redundancy was an improvement on that 
of the High Court. In addition, there was a change in trade union behaviour, as 
several unions, including the TGWU, did restructure their rules, and shop stewards 
were no longer rushing to the kind of martyrdom that the dockers’ cases had 
precipitated. 
Nonetheless, the Act had failed to meet many of its key objectives, with most of its 
legal issues remaining untested. Collective bargaining had not been restructured and 
few collective agreements became legally binding. ‘In short, the industrial relations 
patterns highlighted by the Donovan Commission, and which the Act was designed 
to remedy, still remain and the doubts expressed by the Commission about the 
effectiveness of law as a solution have been only too well borne out.’924 
5.16 Conclusion 
The Industrial Relations Act stands out as a prime example of the need to consider 
the potential impact of using legislation as a tool to regulate human relationships. As 
The Times article pointed out, it is important to recognize the difficulties of legislating 
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between management and men.925 In view of the findings in the Donovan Report 
which had, after careful analysis of the industrial relations landscape, concluded that 
legislation had only a minor part to play in its reform, it seems foolhardy and irrational 
for the Government to have ploughed ahead with such comprehensive legislation. 
The Government was instead relying on its own Policy Group’s evidence, published 
in Fair Deal at Work. Moreover, In Place of Strife had met with such fierce opposition 
to proposals for legislative changes to unions’ immunities and their rights to self-
regulation, that the Government had been forced into an embarrassing climb-down. 
Yet, despite these very recent events, the Heath Government had considered that a 
bolder attack on the unions was not only necessary, but workable. Nevertheless, the 
attempt to legislate for the pattern of industrial relations in Britain, imposing a 
straitjacket of legal obligations to be met, was fundamentally flawed. Importantly, it 
failed to draw on the understanding of industrial relations in Britain or, indeed, on the 
experiences of the USA and other countries. The Act was a major political 
miscalculation that failed to take into account the strength of the unions.  
The hopeful, but unsubstantiated, doctrine of the Act ‘proclaimed that if only the legal 
structuring of industrial society was sufficiently extensive and systematic, it would 
bring about orderly and responsible conduct’.926 There was little evidence for this, 
however, and the motivations behind the policies also demonstrated an inward-
looking Government, bent on economic improvements but with little consideration for 
pragmatism.  Davies and Freedland considered that those policy-makers responsible 
for the Act were motivated by ‘the legitimation of the government in times of 
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economic crisis,’ but less pragmatic about ‘the considerations which shaped 
employers’ ideas about labour law reform.’ 
While the failure of the Act could be blamed on a number of factors, vital lessons on 
the implementation of new industrial relations legislation could also be taken from the 
event. These lessons may have helped to prepare for the incremental legislative 
approach of the Thatcher and Major Governments of the 1980s and 1990s. First, 
when legislating it is important to take a two-pronged approach, providing incentives 
for the unions to reform alongside appropriate deterrents. Second, the role of the 
judiciary should be carefully considered and controlled to ensure that judges do not 
create problems where none existed before. Third, when a government decides to 
engage in a bold experiment designed to change the fundamental nature of an 
operation, it would be wiser to take a step-by-step approach to avoid grave and 
serious errors. Fourth, it is unwise to pre-empt potential problems instead of 
concentrating on the most important issues initially, and waiting for those changes to 
be accepted and fully integrated before making further alterations. Finally, the 
maxim, ‘Know thine enemy’, should serve as a reminder to the legislature not to set 
itself against a movement that is so strong and so determined to win. The time was 
simply not right for the introduction of legislative controls, when the subject was still 
very much a ‘might giant’. 
The Act had been introduced without meaningful consultation with those most 
closely affected by it, and was unpopular with both unions and employers. It was 
administered by a court that was not impartial, with a chairman who had close links 
to the Government, and who had also been instrumental in the drafting of the Act. 
The principle of separation of powers was seriously undermined and the failure of 
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the Act is testament to the wisdom of following accepted procedures when 
legislating. These include consulting with those likely to be affected, and keeping a 
firm dividing line between the role of legislature, executive and judiciary to ensure 
that the latter maintains its constitutional independence. The 1971 Act had led to a 
battle with the unions, but in terms of strategy and planning it was little better than 
the charge of the Light Brigade, and equally destructive in terms of the relationship 
between government and unions.  
The Conservative Government’s defeat in the February 1974 General Election 
brought an opportunity to begin fresh negotiations with the new Labour Government. 
Unions now had the opportunity to work together with the Government to try to repair 
the damage done by this most controversial and divisive of Acts. The Labour 
Government maintained a far more cautious approach to the use of legislation, and 
pursued alternative strategies to improve industrial relations which were more 
consensual, by appealing to the employers, workers and the public. A new 
experiment in the form of an agreement between unions and the Labour Party - a 
social contract - would also evolve in a bid to find a viable alternative both to 
restrictive legislation and the chaotic nature of industrial relations.  
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Chapter 6. The Rise of the Social Contract and other Alternatives to Legislation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The furore over In Place of Strife had proved very traumatic for the previous Labour 
Government and a new approach to industrial relations had to be sought if a 
workable agreement was to be reached between unions and government.  In 
February 1973, the Labour Party reached a joint statement with the TUC, called 
Economic Policy and the Cost of Living. This came to be known as the Social 
Contract. The introduction of this and other mechanisms, all designed to provide a 
viable alternative to legislation, appeared to recognize and respond to some of the 
problems associated with new laws. The two previous chapters reveal the dangers of 
using the law to regulate and control industrial relations without the express 
agreement of the trade union movement. The evidence lends considerable weight to 
the hypothesis that restrictive legislation was not the most appropriate means of 
regulating industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s. However, there was an 
emerging consensus that, in certain areas of employment and industrial relations, 
there were alternative mechanisms that could potentially offer greater benefits to 
both workers and employers than collective bargaining alone. 
The period from 1974 to 1979 became a time of experimentation with tripartism, 
examining alternative means of achieving agreements between government, trade 
unions and employers which could be supported by legislation. They were, 
principally: the Social Contract; employee participation or industrial democracy; and 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Service. Although these new forms of working 
towards improved working standards could only be achieved through new legislation, 
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this was a price that the unions were prepared to at least consider paying in 
exchange for improved social conditions, increased participation in management 
decisions and greater industrial peace. In view of the brief life of two of these 
experiments, compared with the longevity of ACAS, the evidence appears to suggest 
that legislation could act effectively to organize, provide resources for and generally 
support ACAS, which has been extremely successful. In contrast, the Social 
Contract and industrial democracy, which both depended to a large extent on a 
strong economy and on harnessing the goodwill of the trade unions and employers, 
were edifices built on shifting sands, and therefore failed to take root and thrive. 
They lasted only a short time, and it is suggested that a more formal, legislative 
approach could have led to a more successful outcome for these experiments.  
ACAS was set up and regulated to some extent by legislation, but otherwise 
operated more or less autonomously, thereby providing it with the freedom and 
flexibility to bend itself to the requirements of its users – employers and unions. This 
could suggest that legislation can be an extremely useful tool when it is used to 
provide the mechanisms, support and freedom to an organization to operate within a 
flexible framework, offering a more workable alternative to the straitjacket of 
restrictive legislation. 
6.2 A change in the role of legislation in industrial relations 
Harold Wilson led the Labour Party to his third General Election victory in 1974, on 
the basis of a manifesto commitment that had its roots firmly in the Social Contract, 
an agreement that came out of the meetings of the TUC/Labour Party Liaison 
Committee which had been set up on the initiative of Jack Jones. Robert Taylor put 
this down to Wilson’s motivation to rebuild the relationship between the TUC and the 
Labour Party after it had been badly damaged through the disagreements over In 
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Place of Strife, and Castle’s attempt to reform the structure of British industrial 
relations.927 This year also marked the beginning of a ‘profound change in the 
structure of our labour law’.928 This, as Bell argued, placed unions at the heart of 
future decisions on labour law: 
The circumstances of opposition in 1970-74 ... conspired to make the trade unions 
more central to Labour’s policy processes. This was partly because the Heath 
government’s failed efforts to reform industrial relations placed the unions at centre 
stage.’929 
Not only were unions now at the heart of the industrial relations reform agenda, but 
their attitude to legislation appeared also to have undergone something of a 
transformation since the early 1960s. The General Council of the TUC considered 
that, although ‘statute law can only play a subordinate part in the conduct of 
industrial relations’, nevertheless ‘legislation should ensure that all workers have 
certain minimum rights and should encourage the development of voluntary 
collective bargaining and supplement it where necessary.’930 The type of law for 
which the unions were now calling was of a fundamentally different kind to that which 
has been discussed above, since it did not involve placing restrictions on their 
activities. However, by agreeing to legislation which guaranteed employment rights 
for all workers, unions ran the risk of giving the impression - perhaps inadvertently - 
that legislative control over collective bargaining could also be acceptable to them. 
The evidence presented in the previous chapters appears to suggest that, despite 
the trade unions’ opposition to restrictive legislation, there was at least a degree of 
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consensus that industrial relations should be subject to some measure of legal 
regulation, and that it could be a benefit in reducing industrial anarchy, supporting 
collective bargaining and ensuring a minimum floor of rights. Unions had already 
demonstrated a willingness to accept legislative interferences with employment 
rights in certain areas such as notice of dismissal,931 redundancy,932 race and sex 
discrimination,933 and equal pay for women.934 This new type of industrial legislation, 
which was supportive of employment rights, was described by Richard Whiting as 
about human relations, rather than the regulation of union affairs, but regretted that it 
had been overshadowed by ‘the drama of bitter conflicts between government and 
trade unions over the organization of collective labour relations’.935 Kahn-Freund, 
although a firm advocate of  voluntarism, nevertheless also recognized the 
importance of this new wave of legislation, noting that, ‘What has happened since 
1963 by way of legislative regulation of labour conditions exceeds in volume and 
significance what in previous years happened in decades.’936 
Whiting described the significance of such legislation as two-fold. First, that it began 
the politicization of work, becoming the subject of intervention and political debate 
over what constituted fair treatment at work. Secondly, that the reforms ‘marked a 
shift from informal, collective bargaining over employment to a more legally 
regulated, individually orientated relationship.’937 The legislation often involved 
changes which took the primary responsibility away from the unions for upholding 
fairness at work. Unions could not effectively organize to ensure that all employees 
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were treated fairly in relation to redundancy, or to ensure that employers treated 
workers equally in terms of gender or race. Unions could only collectively bargain for 
their own workplaces, whereas governments could operate to bring about fairer work 
conditions for all employees. It was the trade unions’ inherent inability to bargain for 
such global protections that enabled governments to fill those gaps through a 
programme of legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately for the unions, this 
gradual expansion of ‘the thin edge of the legal wedge’ that Lewis claimed had 
begun with the Donovan Report arguably opened the door to more restrictive 
legislation such as the Industrial Relations Act.938  
This revised union approach to legislation began to take on a more defined shape at 
the 1973 TUC Congress. A three-stage approach to future legislation was outlined, 
beginning with a repeal bill (to repeal the Industrial Relations Act), then an 
Employment Protection Bill which would extend the rights of workers and unions, 
followed by industrial democracy legislation. Nevertheless, the Labour Government 
had to be very careful that the ensuing Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 
and the Employment Protection Act 1975 not only appeased the trade union 
movement, but ensured that the economy did not suffer as a result. The 1975 Act 
included individual protections such as maternity rights, guaranteed pay in the event 
of a fall-off in work, and redundancy rights. In addition, in order to support collective 
bargaining as Donovan had recommended, trade union members and 
representatives were given the right to time off for trade union activities and duties. 
Collective bargaining rights were also improved or introduced, employers would be 
obliged to consult with unions in certain circumstances, and there was to be a 
modified statutory recognition procedure. Importantly, the relevant provisions of the 
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Trade Union Acts 1871-6 and the Trade Disputes Acts 1906 and 1965 were updated, 
improved and restored by the 1974 Act and the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Amendment) Act 1976. 
These were all provisions that the trade union movement could not have hoped to 
gain for itself through collective bargaining, and many of the rights extended to non-
union members, giving greater equality to workers in industries where it was difficult 
to organize collectively. Nonetheless, it was a stark departure from the laissez-faire 
voluntarism which had characterized the nature of industrial relations in the 1960s, 
and indicated a growing acceptance by the trade union movement of laws which 
gave positive rights to unions and to workers. The TUC General Council, while 
reiterating that the main method of conducting industrial relations was collective 
bargaining, nevertheless recognized that ‘legislation should ensure that all workers 
have certain minimum rights and should encourage the development of voluntary 
bargaining and supplement it where necessary.’939 The change in the role of 
legislation in industrial relations was dramatic and profound, but the obvious danger 
inherent in the unions’ fervent of acceptance of such new laws was that it arguably 
paved the way for the more restrictive legislation that would be introduced by the 
Conservative governments from 1979 onwards. 
6.3. The Social Contract, tripartism and social policy legislation 
This move towards legislation which provided universal rights for workers and 
greater social benefits began strongly with the passing of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974. The Act ‘contained an essentially coherent overall plan, 
namely, the restoration of legal abstentionism in the field of industrial conflict and 
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trade union law.’940 This policy, that the law would not be used to interfere with free 
collective bargaining and traditional union rights, was underpinned by a Government 
pledge ‘to end the Conservatives’ pay restrictions and to enter a social contract with 
the trade unions.’941 This radical proposal involved a much closer partnership 
between unions and government than had been contemplated before, with a 
restriction on pay restraints, and an emphasis on cooperation and overarching 
legislation to provide economic benefits beyond any which could be achieved 
through collective bargaining alone. It was very much a political arrangement, 
designed to draw support for the Labour Party from the unions in the next General 
Election. 
The Labour Party Manifesto of February 1974 spelled out the new spirit of 
cooperation with the TUC: 
We believe that the action we propose on prices, together with an understanding with 
the TUC on the lines which we have already agreed, will create the right economic 
climate for money incomes to grow in line with production.942 
Britain was entering a new phase of legislating in a spirit of cooperation and 
agreement between workers and government. This new approach offered greater 
appeal to the unions than the tactics of coercion and regulation which had failed to 
achieve the required objectives when they formed the philosophy behind the 
Industrial Relations Act. While legislation was an important component of the Social 
Contract, the TUC had a great deal of influence over its overall content.  
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The TUC/ Labour Party Liaison Committee, established in 1972, gave birth to this 
Social Contract, as a more acceptable alternative to the Industrial Relations Act. It 
was a middle way between complete autonomy and legislation, but involved a 
greater degree of agreement with the unions than In Place of Strife had been 
designed for. The Committee ‘brought together senior figures on the TUC General 
Council, in the Shadow Cabinet and on the NEC in what was hoped to be a close 
and effective unity over future policy making.’943 Jack Jones ‘got some satisfaction 
from knowing that trade unionists with shop-floor experience would be engaged in 
regular discussion with the political leaders of the Labour Party.’944 Jones wanted ‘to 
secure a joint programme, to which the Labour Party would be tied when it was next 
elected and on which both Labour Party and TUC could campaign.’945 Wilson owed a 
significant debt to the trade unions for their continued support, but they would not be 
content with mere repeal of the 1971 Act. They had suffered financially at the hands 
of the NIRC and were now demanding positive rights rather than mere immunities. 
The Liaison Committee was also very involved in securing such rights in the 
Employment Protection Bill, and the Government continued to consult with the TUC 
as the Bill progressed through Parliament. Jones recalled that: 
The relationship with Harold Wilson and other Government leaders was very different 
to the days of In Place of Strife.  He was clearly looking upon the trade unions as 
partners and anxious to make progress together.946 
TUC involvement with the Department of Employment was possibly at its closest at 
this point, and the General Council was enjoying an unprecedented influence over 
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the course of British politics. James Callaghan, who would become the next Prime 
Minister following Wilson’s resignation in 1976, was initially enthusiastic about the 
Social Contract, suggesting that it was ‘a means of achieving nothing less than the 
social and economic reconstruction’947 of the country.  
Jim Tomlinson described the Social Contract as ‘the most systematic attempt ever in 
Britain to make an agreement between the governing parties and the trade 
unions’.948  Yet, despite the term ‘contract’ suggesting an equal bargain, it has been 
suggested that it was little more than a shopping list of TUC demands,949 to which 
the Labour Party had committed itself, while little was given in return for the 
considerable concessions made by the Government. Nevertheless, the return to 
unfettered, free collective bargaining when Labour abolished the Pay Board, 
resulting in excessive pay demands,  was met with stern warnings from the TUC in a 
statement to Congress for pay claims to be limited to annual rises of no more than 
£25. The advice, unsupported by sanctions, went unheeded by the unions, and 
inflation, fuelled by excessive pay awards, rose to a worryingly high rate of 25 per 
cent in 1975. ‘The Government claimed that it had carried out its side of the “Social 
Contract” on the assumption that wages would increase by only 2-3 per cent above 
the TUC’s own guidelines when the overshoot was more like 8-9 per cent.’950 Even 
Jack Jones was persuaded of the necessity of controlled pay awards, but failed to 
win the support of his own TGWU shop stewards at their 1977 conference for a 
further year of ordered pay bargaining.951 
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A further manifesto, prepared in late 1974 as Wilson called a snap election to try and 
increase the number of seats held by Labour in Parliament, reaffirmed the aims of 
the Social Contract: 
It is not simply, or narrowly, an understanding about wages. It is about justice, 
equality, about concern for and protection of the lower paid, the needy, the pensioner 
and the handicapped in our society. It is about fairness between one man and 
another, and between men and women. It is about economic justice between 
individuals and between regions. It is about co-operation and conciliation, not conflict 
and confrontation. 952 
Reforms to pensions, family allowance, and other areas of social security were 
thereafter updated to give more realistic financial support to those most in need. 
Food subsidies and rent freezes were promised along with an undertaking to repeal 
the Industrial Relations Act in order to persuade the TUC to accept voluntary wage 
restraint, even though there was no commitment to do so in the Liaison Committee’s 
programme of reform.953 Women were to pay the same contributions towards their 
state pensions as men, and would no longer be left to be financially dependent on 
their husbands in old age.954  
Castle confirmed that the Social Contract was concerned with maintaining living 
standards – ‘not merely for wage-earners, but for all those who we are were in 
politics to protect.’955 The Social Contract thereby operated outside the realm of work 
and collective bargaining, functioning as an agreement between the Government, 
the trade unions and the TUC. It nonetheless demonstrated that legislation was a 
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necessary adjunct to widespread social reform, ensuring that it was not only workers 
who benefited from protection from the State. This social policy legislation was 
essential to supplement, rather than replace, the agreements brought about through 
collective bargaining and aimed to bring about greater economic justice and equality 
which could not be achieved through collective bargaining alone.  By 1974, the 
promises for an increase in pensions and food subsidies, tax reform, and a rent 
freeze had all been put in place.956 The proposals were to be funded by increased 
national insurance contributions, and the adoption of this radical programme of social 
and economic policies by the Labour Party ensured the continued support of the 
trade union movement.  
Not only did the 1974 Act repeal the 1971 legislation, but the unfair dismissal 
provisions were retained and strengthened in the 1975 Employment Protection Act. 
In addition, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was passed, having been 
prepared by the Robens Committee. It was the first Act to provided greater security 
from risks at all workplaces. It was later amended to make the qualification for 
workplace safety representatives that they should be representatives of the 
recognized trade unions. Further legal rights for lay representatives and officials 
followed, including paid time off for training. Nevertheless, despite this raft of positive 
rights for trade unionists and workers, there was no corresponding agreement from 
the unions to maintain orderly collective bargaining and deal with demarcation 
disputes, the trade union leaders continuing to maintain that they could manage this 
through voluntary means. Strikes continued unabated in the 1970s, particularly in the 
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engineering sector, inflation was rampant, and unemployment rose as businesses 
began to fail, no longer able to compete in the global markets.957 
A government, regardless of its promises, is constrained by economic necessity, and 
although the Chancellor, Denis Healey, ‘repeated his belief in the Social Contract’ 
and said that it was ‘the reason for our success so far’, his economic report to the 
Liaison Committee in January 1975 confirmed that the world was in recession and 
that employment was the main consideration.958 Global oil prices put a stop to the 
programme of economic and social reforms as Britain was hit hard by the world 
recession, which pushed inflation up still further to 27 per cent by 1976 and led to 
increased unemployment. After a year of massive price rises, the Government was 
forced to broker an agreement with the unions to accept a limit on pay increases in 
order to reduce wage push inflation. In return there would be an adjustment on the 
level of taxes and some governmental influence on the level of prices.959 The Social 
Contract was clearly no longer sustainable under these conditions, and many parts 
of the agreement were not implemented. 
Economic circumstances had conspired to ensure that the Social Contract was 
short-lived. Nevertheless, Keith Laybourn attributed the demise of the Social 
Contract to ‘the failure of both the trade unions and the Labour government to realize 
the extent to which their fates were inextricably linked up with the need to achieve an 
understanding which would stimulate economic growth.’960 He considered that the 
breakdown was therefore avoidable rather than inevitable, and both sides could be 
accused of not keeping their side of the bargain. 
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This outcome underlines one essential drawback of legislation when compared with 
collective agreements. It is that legislation is no more than a temporary promise by 
the government of the day; it has no contractual basis and cannot be enforced, and 
therefore has to give way to the economic necessities which are the main concern of 
government. In other words, a government is free to renege on its promises. On the 
other hand, even though collective agreements are not enforceable in themselves as 
contracts, once the terms have been incorporated into individual contracts of 
employment, it is much harder for employers to go back on those promises. This 
demonstrates one of the greatest advantages of collective agreements over 
legislation. 
Nevertheless, permitting free collective bargaining, which had been proven to have 
such disastrous economic consequences, also demonstrates the value of legislation 
to a government as an instrument of control over wages. It is perhaps one of the 
most important and effective weapons in a government’s armoury for controlling 
inflation. Even the TUC, as influential as it was, proved to have little control over 
unions’ pay demands, so it is doubtful whether individual trade unions, and still less 
the employers, would have been able to limit wage claims from the workers. The 
Social Contract, a tripartite agreement that had been embraced with great 
enthusiasm in the early 1970s, promising greater social equality, now lay in tatters. 
Indeed, Roberts warned against an over-reliance on tripartite working. He wrote that, 
‘The problem of securing a rate of economic growth that will in the years ahead 
prevent the unemployment rate from soaring to dangerous heights is likely to provide 
a critical test for the philosophy of tripartism.’961 Tripartism had been an instrument of 
industrial planning for many years, with trade union and employers’-organization 
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representatives playing a prominent role in the NEDC and its many industry-level 
offshoots. Economic concerns and the need to keep full employment in mind were 
nevertheless proving to be a threat to this philosophy. The NEDC was designed to 
promote closer relations between government, industry and unions, but the TUC’s 
desire was for a more direct influence on the investment decisions of boards of 
directors through employee participation.962 That is why one important element of the 
Social Contract was a proposal for greater employee participation in workplace 
decisions. 
6.4 Employee Participation and Industrial Democracy  
Although the TUC had initially been firmly committed to collective bargaining as the 
principal function of trade unions, in evidence submitted to the Donovan Commission 
it showed a softening of this attitude towards worker participation as a means of 
influencing decisions taken in the workplace, admitting that ‘the conflict of interest 
which might face trade unionists on a board was more theoretical than a real 
concern.’963 
Industrial democracy traditionally operated through the collective bargaining process, 
but the idea that industrial relations might be further improved through a system of 
employee participation was given serious consideration in the 1970s. Trade union 
power traditionally consisted of an ability to veto management proposals, and was 
therefore negative in effect. On the other hand, ‘proposals for the extension of 
industrial democracy seek to make the role of employees more positive, and more 
akin to the role of participants in other forms of institutional government’.964 Such a 
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system would have to be implemented through legislation to ensure a level of 
uniformity and compliance.  
While the unions were in favour of some form of industrial democracy, Bill McCarthy, 
who had acted as researcher for the Donovan Commission, was opposed to the 
idea. He insisted that there were ‘very real differences on interest and function that 
exist between management and workers’, and that rival systems of representation 
‘would cut across or undermine the development of strong and representative trade 
unionism.’965 He did admit, however, that in several countries, including Germany, 
the Netherlands and Norway, there were worker representatives on management 
boards and that this had resulted in benefits to both sides of industry. The advantage 
of worker representation on boards is that it brings the workers’ experience and 
commitment to the company into the decision-making process. 
The requirement for such a system to be formally considered became an imperative 
when the EEC, which Britain had joined in 1973, proposed extending such 
arrangements throughout the Community.  However, it was not something that could 
be achieved without a major extension to company law, to which many unions were 
reluctant to agree, despite the enthusiasm of the TUC for the notion. The unions had 
an historical mistrust of the law and its judges, something which has been examined 
above and extensively documented by Wedderburn.966 Indeed, Neal sums up the 
traditional approach of British trade unions as being one of ‘self-help, in the sense of 
strength won through the efforts of the unions themselves, rather than rights, 
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privileges and institutions established by the State through, for example, the 
legislator.’967 
In 1973 the TUC produced a report on industrial democracy which did, however, 
favour some kind of participation in management, and proposed its introduction at 
three levels:968 at plant level (for example a shop steward); at intermediate level, (for 
example at regional level); and at the level of the boards of directors. The TUC went 
so far as to propose legislation to allow companies to make provision for trade union 
representation, and suggested that the CBI should encourage their members to 
implement these measures.969 
Although the TUC was demonstrating a willingness to accept legislation if it resulted 
in closer consultation with management on essential matters, some individual unions 
were less enthusiastic about this move, no doubt sensing a potential loss of the 
autonomy which they had fiercely guarded for so long. ‘These proposals for the 
widespread extension of industrial democracy brought a sudden awareness to the 
trade unions, which had largely failed to grasp the significance of the change ... in 
TUC policy.’970 Andrew Thomson noted a distinct lack of unanimity within the trade 
union movement to the TUC proposals for legislation and government 
interference.971  The Engineering Workers’ Union argued that supervisory boards 
could act in opposition to the development of collective bargaining, which should 
instead be extended into new areas such as pricing, location, planning and sales.972  
The Electricians’ Union also argued that unions should maintain their 
                                                
967 A. Neal, ‘Co‐Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: An External Perspective from the United 
Kingdom’, BJIR, 25:2 July 1987, 228. 
968 TUC, Industrial Democracy, (London, 1973). 
969 Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 3623, para. 998. 
970 Roberts (ed.), Towards Industrial Democracy, Europe, Japan and the United States, p. 182. 
971 A. Thomson, ‘New Focus on Industrial Democracy in Britain’, The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 431, May 1977, 32‐43. 
972 Ibid., 37 
289 
 
independence.973 The TUC admitted that the unions had traditionally opposed such 
schemes in private industry, but it was now beginning to see the need for something 
more than traditional workplace bargaining. It recognized that there existed ‘a wide 
range of fundamental managerial decisions affecting workpeople that are beyond the 
control ... of workpeople and their trade unions’ and that ‘major decisions ... are 
taken at levels where collective bargaining does not take place.’974 At the 1974 TUC 
Congress a resolution was moved, and supported by the most powerful unions, that 
‘any extension of trade union participation in industrial management shall be ... an 
extension of collective bargaining and shall in no sense compromise the unions’ 
role.’975 In its policy statement, endorsed by the 1974 Congress, the TUC made clear 
its position: ‘It is essential that all ways of extending industrial democracy are based 
on trade union machinery, and that this should be parallel to a growing degree of 
participation in trade union democracy.’976 The resolution did, however, reject any 
legal imposition of supervisory boards, and called for alternative legislation. 
The Donovan Commission had also expressed reservations about industrial 
democracy, and agreed that reform of collective bargaining was a preferable method 
of allowing workers to exercise a positive influence on the running of businesses. 
The Commission considered that representation on management bodies might even 
be harmful, putting the worker-representative in a difficult position. Members of the 
Commission were also unable to agree on the changes that would have to be made 
to bring about the desired effect.977 Roberts considered that, ‘In the minds of the 
Commission, participation was largely a red herring which distracted attention from 
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the main issue, which they saw as the need to strengthen the process of collective 
bargaining.’978 
Some members of the Commission had observed such arrangements in German 
companies,979 but most supervisory boards in German industries comprised of two 
thirds of shareholder-representatives, and one third worker-representatives, thus 
making it difficult to make any meaningful comparisons between the British and 
German situations. Indeed, Neal argued that the British system of what Kahn-Freund 
described as ‘dynamic’ collective bargaining and Germany’s co-determination model 
were so far apart as to represent ‘opposite ends of a spectrum’.980 The majority of 
Commission members were unable to recommend the appointment of “workers’ 
directors”, although Wigham and Shonfield did consider that change was necessary 
and proposed having directors who would act as guardians of the workers’ interest at 
the stage when company policy was formulated.981 
The CBI, whose members were innately hesitant to consider employee participation 
in a positive light, entered the discussion in 1974, producing its own paper, entitled, 
‘Employee Participation: CBI’s contribution to the debate’.982 This was in response to 
the European Commission proposals for a Fifth Company Law Directive in October 
1972 for the harmonization of company law, but had also been advocated by some 
employers and trade unions, and also by many politicians. The foreword stated: 
All [members of the CBI] are convinced that different plants require different 
solutions. It therefore follows that a statutory solution imposing a rigid pattern would 
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be inappropriate ... The CBI Council ... urges managements to take the desire for 
more employee participation seriously and to consider how best they might take 
action to suit their own circumstances. 
This short statement encapsulates one of the most detrimental aspects of legislation 
in industrial relations terms – that of its rigidity and inability to deal adequately with 
the multifarious types of business organization and trade union or employee group. 
Any legislation in this area would, therefore, have to be more akin to European Union 
laws, that is, setting out a framework only which could operate flexibly according to 
individual needs. Nevertheless, this would not accord with the usual pattern in 
English legislation which depends on detailing every possible eventuality. 
The term ‘employee participation’ itself lacked clear definition, and meant different 
things to different people, with a wide variety of schemes already in existence, 
including democratic leadership, autonomous work groups, worker cooperatives, 
worker directors and suggestion schemes, as well as collective bargaining.983 Most 
of these had evolved through the will of the workers and directors, and it is arguable 
that these were more successful simply because they were voluntary schemes which 
could be adapted to suit the participants, rather than a statutory scheme which could 
not have offered the same inherent flexibility. It was the ‘one important issue on the 
agenda of the Social Contract which divided the trade unions, and there was no 
consensus among them over the meaning of industrial democracy.’984 
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6.4.1 The Bullock Report 
The Labour Government set up an inquiry in 1975 under the chairmanship of Alan 
Bullock985 to examine the issue of employee participation, and to consider whether 
law could be introduced to make this a mandatory requirement. Members included 
Lord Wedderburn, Jack Jones, Clive Jenkins of the ASTMS, David Lea, the head of 
the TUC Economic Department, and three employers’ representatives. The 1977 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Bullock Report)986 was 
seen as a means of solving the ongoing problem of industrial disputes and as a way 
of giving employees a greater say in workplace management. The Report gave 
careful consideration to the system of co-determination in Germany, although Neal 
argued that ‘the difference in the respective attitudes towards the role of law as a 
regulatory instrument in industrial relations’ makes it difficult to make meaningful 
comparisons of the two systems due to this basic incompatibility.987 Although the 
committee was divided, ‘the majority report clearly favoured an equal number of 
trade union and shareholders’ representatives on the boards of private companies 
with over 2,000 employees, with a few independents to hold the balance.’988  This 
would be structured through legislation. 
While the Bullock committee was itself divided on the viability of employee 
participation, Taylor noted that the unions also remained divided on the issue, and 
many of the larger unions were opposed to the majority proposals in the Report.989 
Nevertheless, Eccles found it ironic that some of the larger unions were opposed to 
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the proposals, even though this was something they had asked for when pressing 
the Government for industrial democracy.990 The unions’ inherent fear of finding 
themselves restrained within a tight legislative straitjacket made them reluctant to 
trust the Government on this issue, and Eccles conceded that ‘the introduction of 
worker directors poses more problems for unions than for management’.991 
6.4.2 The White Paper on Industrial Democracy 
The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, ‘had gone along strongly with Jack Jones’s 
view of workers’ participation on the management board’.992 He had also been 
strongly influenced by Helmut Schmidt, the German Chancellor, and his ‘passionate 
endorsement of German co-determination, deeply rooted in German industrial 
history over many decades’.993 Schmidt had argued that the British confrontational 
system was harmful to industrial performance in the UK, and was scornful of the 
suggestion that ‘worker directors would harm the flow of private investment’.994 The 
TUC General Secretary, Len Murray, was also a supporter of German co-
determination.995 Nevertheless, there are inherent problems involved in comparing 
one system of industrial relations with another, and there was widespread agreement 
that the system was so different in Germany as to be impossible to transplant into 
another jurisdiction.  
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The Government published a White Paper on Industrial Democracy in 1978, which 
was largely a diluted form of the Bullock Report.996 Callaghan introduced the Paper 
in the House of Commons, setting out its key objectives:997 
The basis of the White Paper is that employees at every level in companies and 
nationalised industries ... should have a real share in the decisions within their 
enterprise which affect their working lives. The objective is positive partnership rather 
than defensive coexistence ... The Government's intention is that this objective 
should be secured, wherever possible, by voluntary agreement between employers 
and representatives of employees. It is not the purpose to impose a standard pattern 
of participation on industry by law. 
Clearly, a rigid legislative framework was not part of the plan, with the Government 
wary of using legislation other than to support voluntary agreements. This reflected 
the Donovan ethos of using the law to support voluntary collective bargaining rather 
than imposing legal strictures on the process. Nevertheless, opposition to the 
proposals continued, with ‘divisions within the Cabinet’, ‘virtually unanimous 
opposition of employers and managers’ and ‘the announcement by a number of 
unions that under no circumstances would they would agree to participate in making 
the Committee’s proposals effective’.998 In light of this widespread opposition, the 
Government reluctantly decided not to proceed with its legislative proposals, only 
allowing schemes to be introduced where these were desired, as in the Post Office.  
This particular scheme was the subject of an examination by Batsone, who 
highlighted the antagonism which existed on both sides of the industrial divide in his 
analysis of the industrial democracy experiment that took place in the Post Office 
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between early 1978 and late 1979. He concluded that ‘both the strong advocates 
and the equally diehard opponents of such schemes may have overestimated their 
practical impact’.999 This was all the more remarkable as the experiment 
‘represented arguably the “strongest” form of industrial democracy short of full 
workers’ control.’1000 The overall finding was that the experiment had a barely 
noticeable impact. The management nominees on the Board were reluctant to 
discuss strategic matters in front of the union members, but the latter did little to 
prevent these tactics and ‘were not geared to make more positive use of the 
experiment.’1001 Batstone nevertheless conceded that it is difficult to draw general 
conclusions from this isolated experiment and suggested that if a ‘critical mass of 
schemes was in operation, industrial democracy would acquire a dynamic of its own 
... leading to a significant increase in the power and influence of unions and 
workers.’1002  
The Bullock Report and subsequent White Paper made far-reaching proposals for 
"workers' control", with seats on company boards for workers, equal to those of the 
shareholders' representatives. Furthermore, these worker-directors were to be 
chosen through recognized trades unions. Nevertheless, although this move was in 
accord with the zeitgeist of the latter half of the 1970s, attitudes towards cooperation 
between trade unions, politicians and industrial leaders were already showing signs 
of change. For example, The Telegraph called the Bullock Report ‘a period piece 
almost before it appeared’, suggesting that it ‘had come at the end of a period in 
British history; the age of corporatism and collectivism, of the "national co-operation" 
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supposedly personified by Ernie Bevin as the wartime Minister of Labour.’1003 
Indeed, when, the Conservative Prime Minister called for workers’ representation on 
company boards in 2016, it is doubtful whether she would have done so if she had 
obtained a clearer picture of previous attempts to legislate for such a move. It is 
certainly doubtful whether such an idea has any chance of taking root in the twenty-
first century. 
 
6.5 The Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
The Conciliation and Arbitration Service enjoyed a far greater degree of acceptance, 
and therefore success, than industrial democracy did. Conciliation is a process 
whereby a third party assists the parties in dispute to find a mutually acceptable 
agreement, thereby avoiding the need for the adversarial procedures of the court 
room. Conciliation and arbitration have a long history and had been used by 
governments, employers and employees since the late nineteenth century. Indeed, 
there was a Conciliation Act in 1896 which was aimed at encouraging conciliation 
through local conciliation committees. The Whitley Councils (also known as Joint 
Industrial Councils) had also undertaken a conciliation role during the First World 
War. These had been made up of representatives of labour and management for the 
promotion of improved industrial relations and remedying industrial unrest, although 
they later developed into wage negotiating organizations.1004 Therefore, it was not a 
new concept in the 1970s, but rather the revival of a well-established idea in a semi-
autonomous form.  
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In 1972 a joint, non-statutory TUC-CBI conciliation service had initially been 
established, with the full support of, and representatives from both the TUC and the 
CBI. It dealt with its first case on 31 January 1973 following a joint request from the 
two unions concerned – the TGWU and UCATT.1005 Traditionally, the Department of 
Employment had played the major conciliation role in industrial disputes,1006 but 
complaints had been voiced over its lack of independence from government policies. 
In 1970-72, for instance, the Government refused to conciliate in disputes involving 
claims over a certain financial amount, since there was little room for manoeuvre 
during periods of incomes policies.1007 This highlights the inevitable rigidity of using 
statutory procedures in industrial relations, and the TUC and CBI had demonstrated 
their impatience with the futility of a conciliation service whose hands were tied by 
government policy, by forming their own organization.1008 
Nevertheless, in 1974 the new Labour Government announced that it was to 
establish a statutory Conciliation and Arbitration Service - CAS -  which was 
independent of Ministerial control, removing the role altogether from the Department 
of Employment. Based on the non-statutory TUC-CBI model, it was now to be 
publicly financed and run by an independent ten-member council appointed by the 
Secretary of State, some of whom would be suggested by the TUC and the CBI. This 
tripartite body was formally established on an administrative basis in 1974, but put 
on a statutory footing by the Employment Protection Act 1975, when it was re-named 
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, or ACAS.1009 
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It was set up at a time when there was ‘disenchantment with the role of government 
in overseeing wage disputes, and recognition of the need for an impartial body to 
oversee disputes’.1010 In its first year of operation, it successfully arbitrated in over 
2,500 industrial disputes, which strongly suggested that this was the best way 
forward for dealing with them.1011 As an impartial and independent agency, ACAS 
retains an important role in supporting the parties in an employment relationship, but 
has no enforcement powers even today. Dickens has questioned whether the 
organization should have wider powers, such as the right to offer advice to 
employers in individual claims to avoid future problems, and a greater role in 
compliance.1012 Nowadays it does provide a Model Workplace, offering a blueprint 
template for employers to measure and self-assess their performance in specific 
areas such as pay and grievance procedures, although take-up for this has been 
slow so far. Nonetheless, the success of ACAS, which no government has yet dared 
to challenge, is testimony to the ability of an organization which has no influence 
from government, unions or employers,  to offer an unbiased service which is to the 
benefit of all three. 
Conciliation can be on a purely informal basis, but to have an enduring, reliable and 
independent service, legislation was found to be necessary to establish such a 
facility. This is an outstanding example of legislation working at arms’ length, rather 
than acting either restrictively or prescriptively, for the good of healthy industrial 
relations. The system retains the flexibility of independent arbitrators to deal with 
difficult industrial disagreements, whilst ensuring financial support and the 
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involvement of both sides of industry. While the previous TUC-CBI model 
undoubtedly provided the blueprint for the CAS, statutory backing has ensured the 
longevity and success of this important body which continues to deal with individual 
worker complaints and seeks to encourage good labour practices. 
6.6 Legislation undergoes a change of emphasis and the Social Contract ends. 
The period of 1974 to 1979 witnessed a clear drive towards voluntarism, with plans 
for a return to free collective bargaining, although underpinned by alternative 
supportive structures. The Government was unable to dispense entirely with 
legislation, but was now inviting the unions to participate in its policy making and 
legislative proposals. Nevertheless, there was a noticeable shift in emphasis away 
from supporting the unions and towards supporting the individual. Wedderburn had 
earlier analyzed labour legislation as being binary in nature, with individual legislation 
providing a floor of rights, and collective labour law governing trade union affairs. 
Davies and Freedland noted that this binary system creates something of a paradox, 
however, since it is unclear which type should take precedence.1013 The authors 
highlighted that the former type of legislation had continued apace since 1974, with 
developments such as improvements to unfair dismissal law, the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 and the associated provisions of the Employment Protection Act 1975, and 
the Race Relations Act 1976. In addition, the first comprehensive reform to health 
and safety law was passed, protecting all workers regardless of workplace.1014 
These all added to the body of rules which was aimed at promoting industrial justice 
in the individual employment relationship.1015 Indeed, there was a noticeable shift of 
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emphasis towards protecting the individual, even at the expense of traditional union 
rights, indicating a new direction for labour law.  
For trade unions, however, there were more modest gains, despite the reduction in 
legislative regulation of the structures of industrial relations which was brought about 
through the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act. Even though there was a 
restoration of the tort immunities in the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act 1974, 
Davies and Freedland argued that this ‘appears to be not so much a reaffirmation of 
the liberal model of collective laissez-faire, in which the conduct of industrial relations 
is delegated by government to the parties, as an attempt to construct a corporatist 
relationship.’1016 Unions were understandably wary of such a move, and gave the 
new legislation only a cautious welcome. Indeed, Taylor denounced the legislative 
gains for unions as ‘limited and flimsy’, arguing that ‘the rhetoric belied the modest 
realities.’1017  
Unions had been encouraged not to exercise their industrial powers to the full in 
return for access to the government’s legislative and executive policy-making 
through the Social Contract. This was not an entirely new direction for the 
relationship between unions and government, and since the end of the war Labour 
governments had tried to incorporate trade unions and employers more closely into 
the enterprise of government through political rather than legal means, thereby 
leaving the formal legal structure of collective autonomy intact.  The NEDC was one 
such example. ‘What was erected in the second half of the 1970s was, however, 
clearly the most elaborate and explicit of these corporatist arrangements, and yet it 
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proved no more capable of even medium-term success than its predecessors.’1018 
Despite TUC acceptance of greater legislative involvement in what had been 
traditionally the preserve of collective bargaining, events such as a weakened 
economy and rising inflation, continued industrial action and a failure of individual 
unions to agree with some of the TUC strategy, contributed to the failure of much of 
the Social Contract. 
 In July 1978 the Government issued a White Paper which set a limit of five per cent 
on pay rises for the next twelve months. This was an unofficial phase IV of the Social 
Contract. It was described by Denis Healey as ‘provocative as well as 
unatainable’.1019 Barbara Castle noted that, ‘The breach with the unions was 
widening. They had kept their side of the social contract by acquiescing, however 
reluctantly, in the Government’s pay and anti-inflation policies, but their patience was 
wearing thin.’1020 The unions, thinking that there would be an election soon, did not 
react too badly to the news, but following an announcement by Callaghan in 
September that there would be no election, the TUC refused to agree to the five per 
cent limit at a meeting in November. This therefore ruled out TUC support for Phase 
IV. The first of four major strikes began with a strike in the private sector, namely the 
Ford car works, where the employers were forced into giving a 17 per cent pay rise. 
This marked the beginning of the so-called Winter of Discontent. The Government 
was forced to retreat from its planned sanctions on employers which exceeded the 
five per cent limit.  
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The pay strategy was therefore dealt a severe, and possibly fatal, blow by the events 
of the winter of 1978-79,1021 when industrial relations between the Government and 
the unions broke down altogether.  The Government had tried to enforce a pay 
increase limit of 5 per cent when inflation was still in double figures. By February 
1979, over one and a half million workers were on strike, including road hauliers, 
grave-diggers, refuse collectors and health workers. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The Social Contract, particularly the notion of free collective bargaining, had proved 
to be politically unfeasible and impossible to uphold in the face of economic factors. 
This left the way clear for the very different, legislative-heavy and restrictive 
approach of the Thatcher Government from 1979. One way of reducing inflation 
would be first to weaken the unions, and that is precisely what the Conservative 
Government set out to do. The Social Contract had been a bold and novel 
experiment in bringing the trade unions into closer cooperation with government, but 
proved to be short-lived, and no similar experiment has been attempted since. 
Nevertheless, in trying to avoid the imposition of legislation, the TUC had perhaps 
found itself unwittingly agreeing to something even less palatable, which was severe 
self-restraint over pay claims. Spiros Simitis argues that legislation is just one form of 
state intervention, and the ‘indirect steering based on a carefully delegated decision-
making power’1022 seems to be an apt description of the TUC’s production of its own 
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incomes policies in the mid-1970s.,1023 although even that particular form of state 
intervention became unsustainable in the face of rising inflation and unemployment. 
Employee participation was an interesting idea which was thoroughly examined by 
the Bullock Committee. It was an idea which worked well in German systems of 
organization, but met with opposition from all sides in the UK as it did not accord with 
the British system of unitary boards or with the essentially conflictual context of 
British industrial relations. There was no single defect in the Bullock proposals which 
caused the experiment to fail, but rather it owed its lack of success to the recession 
and rising unemployment, ‘a context in which neither trade unions nor management 
saw much point in it as an immediate issue.’1024  
Neither the Social Contract, nor the concept of worker participation were therefore 
able to offer either a viable alternative to restrictive legislation, an improvement in 
industrial relations, or lasting benefits. Both were victims of the financial climate at 
that particular time and therefore no firm conclusion can be drawn as to whether they 
would prove unworkable at any other period. Of the three forms of alternatives to 
restrictive legislation put forward in the 1970s as a means of regulating trade unions, 
ACAS has been the most enduring and the most successful. Even though ACAS 
was established by legislation, and funded by government, its activities have 
remained largely untouched by any further legislation in the last forty years. ACAS 
remains as the great success story in the drive to control and regulate industrial 
relations, while supporting a non-confrontational approach to breakdowns in 
industrial harmony. 
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Nevertheless, by the end of the 1970s the floodgates had been opened wide to the 
imposition of legislation to improve the working rights of individuals, beginning with 
the Donovan Report. This process had begun to proliferate and take root in this 
decade, taking over much of the role of the trade unions in protecting workers. Had 
the unions followed the wishes of the TUC to introduce worker participation, a more 
democratic form of company decision-making may have ensued. Workers may then 
have gained a greater say in identifying the rights that were most important to them, 
instead of having them imposed by the government through legislation. It seemed 
that, despite strong arguments for alternative mechanisms for industrial peace, the 
failure of the employers and trade unions to positively engage with worker 
participation, and the financial constraints on a fully-functioning Social Contract, 
contributed to their ultimate failure, leaving the door wide open for the restrictive 
legislation to be introduced by the Thatcher Government after 1979. 
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Chapter 7.  Conclusion  
 
This research has focused on industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s as they 
related to the Royal Commission Report, In Place of Strife and the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971. These documents and the events surrounding them have been 
examined by many other writers, although the focus of this study has been on the 
value of legislation in the context of industrial relations at this particular period, 
thereby lending a hitherto largely unexplored perspective on these important 
documents. 
Four major findings have emerged from a study of these documents. First, although 
the Donovan Commission saw the answer to much industrial unrest in greater 
support for collective bargaining rather than new laws, legislation was viewed 
increasingly by politicians as a more viable alternative to the voluntarism that had 
characterized industrial relations for decades, and which could bring about quicker 
results. Secondly, there were many disparate views on the value of legislation and 
even the unions were willing to accept such legislation that brought benefits to the 
workers and to the unions themselves; in particular it was the only remedy for 
overturning unwelcome judicial decisions which undermined the autonomy and 
power of the unions. Thirdly, In Place of Strife was the first major attempt since the 
Second World War to use legislation to strike at union power. Although unpalatable 
both to unions and employers, its legislative proposals could have represented a 
preferable alternative to the Industrial Relations Act which presented a vivid 
demonstration of the folly of trying to make too many fundamental changes, too 
quickly, to a well-established system of industrial relations. Finally, the Social 
Contract and other experimentation with alternatives to legislative control came 
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about as a result of the adverse reaction to strict regulatory legislation, although it 
too proved to be largely unsuccessful, mainly due to the economic circumstances of 
the time. However, it was perhaps the unions’ gradual acceptance of legislation as 
an alternative means of securing workers’ rights that left the door open to more 
restrictive legislation in the 1980s. This would rob the unions of much of their ability 
to regulate themselves, but the subsequent reduction in strikes demonstrated that it 
could act as a very effective means of controlling industrial action. 
This gradual process of politicization of industrial relations began with the Donovan 
Report. This report was pivotal in the gradual shift in focus on unions from essentially 
autonomous organizations to bodies which needed to be managed and controlled 
through centralized mechanisms. Lewis was right to claim that the Report 
represented the thin edge of the legal wedge, as more legislation would eventually 
follow than had been envisaged by the Commission, although some members, 
including Kahn-Freund, Flanders and Shonfield, were all in favour of legislation in 
certain areas. However, criticism of the Donovan Report revealed a general 
disappointment that it failed to offer more legislative solutions, that it was overly 
complacent, and that it relied too much on an historical perspective.  
This in turn led to a robust response from the Labour Government in the form of the 
White Paper, In Place of Strife. An analysis of some of its key provisions relating to 
reform of, and support for, collective bargaining suggested a practical way forward 
which could advance the ideological stance of the Donovan Report. An examination 
of the contents of the White Paper, the diaries of key protagonists, the minutes of 
their meetings, government records, newspaper reports, parliamentary debates, 
biographies and historical analysis has revealed a deepening politicization of 
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industrial relations. Indeed, both Wrigley and Maguire noted this trend towards 
politicization in the White Paper.  
However, this research throws doubt on Simpson’s view that legislative action was 
justified due to the weakness of the Donovan proposals, although opinions on why 
successive governments were able to justify increased juridification of industrial 
relations vary. Dorey, for instance, blamed the push for legislation on the unions’ 
reactions of increased apathy towards incomes policies and a greater tendency to 
engage in unofficial strikes. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence that workers were 
reluctant to accept polices which imposed restraint on wage rises, while many of 
them saw little harm in taking unofficial strike action.  
An examination of the individual elements of the White Paper revealed that some 
MPs, including Callaghan, Orme and Foot were totally opposed to the legislative 
proposals in the White Paper, as was the TUC, while the CBI opposed them for not 
going far enough. Other MPs, including Heffer and Peart considered that some parts 
of the White Paper were acceptable, while journalist John Torode also saw merit in 
certain elements. However, in trying to find a middle way between full legislative 
control and the labour movement’s preference for a voluntarist system, Castle failed 
to satisfy anyone entirely and it was perhaps no surprise that the White Paper 
proposals failed to find their way into legislation. The final outcome was nothing more 
than an agreement from the TUC to adopt a more robust approach to tackling 
industrial action. 
The failure of both the Donovan Report and the White Paper to translate into 
practical, binding solutions enshrined in legislation revealed a weakness in an 
industrial relations system which relied on policies, recommendations, non-binding 
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agreements and undertakings, and highlights the potential value of legislation as a 
mechanism for ensuring consistency, certainty and control over the people who 
make up and govern the trade unions. Nevertheless, subsequent events showed that 
the impact of industrial relations legislation also needed to be carefully considered 
before implementation. 
The Conservative Party began taking a more robust, legalistic approach to the trade 
union problems in the 1960s, particularly towards unofficial strikes and the difficulty 
of imposing pay restraint through incomes policies. It finally abandoned any previous 
reluctance to reform industrial relations through a legislative framework, giving a high 
priority to a revised strategy to deal with the trade union ‘problem’.1025  The Trade 
Union Law and Practice Group recommended a decisive break with the voluntarist 
approach, as set out in the 1965 policy document Putting Britain Right Ahead,1026 
while proposals for legislation appeared in the 1966 manifesto, Action Not Words,1027 
and in Fair Deal at Work in 1968. These documents revealed an inclination for more 
stringent legislative measures to control industrial action at a time of economic and 
social conflict, many of which were eventually enacted in the Industrial Relations Act 
1971. 
Further examination of Conservative Party documents, as well as historical analysis 
and contemporaneous debate surrounding the Industrial Relations Act itself, 
revealed many reasons for the hostile reaction to its provisions from both the union 
movement and from employers. In a way, the use of legislation to this extent was 
probably ahead of its time. Legislation would come to play a greater role in industrial 
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relations within the next decade, but the early 1970s, rife with militant and powerful 
unions, still flushed with success over their resistance to In Place of Strife, was 
evidently not the optimum moment for bringing in far-reaching legislative reform.  
Not only was the legislation far-reaching, but some writers, including Heffer, Bell and 
Joseph, identified class bias in the legislation, and there is little doubt that it would 
have had a greater impact on the working classes than the middle classes and the 
reaction to it was most extreme among the unions in the heavy industries such as 
docking.  However, economic factors were claimed to provide sufficient justification 
for this legislation, according to Taylor and Lewis, although Barnes disagreed with 
this analysis.  Economic considerations are, however, the main concern of 
government, and therefore it was unsurprising that the unions became a target for 
major reform at a time of rising wages and inflation. 
The 1971 Act was short-lived, and alternatives to such restrictive legislation were 
hurriedly discussed between the Labour Party and the unions in a bid to find a third 
way between complete autonomy and legislative control. An examination of the 
alternatives to legislation which were mooted or attempted in the 1970s 
demonstrated that, although legislation was not without its drawbacks, the long-term 
will to experiment with new methods of maintaining industrial peace must be present 
on all sides of the industrial spectrum. The Social Contract, industrial democracy and 
ACAS were contrasted with law as a means of maintaining harmony within the 
workplace. Robert Taylor, Bell and Tomlinson viewed the Social Contract as putting 
unions at the heart of future labour law, although Laybourn attributed its eventual 
failure to unions’ and governments’ lack of joint commitment to an understanding on 
how to achieve economic growth. Indeed, the lack of commitment by government, 
unions and employers, as well as high unemployment and soaring inflation, were 
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significant contributors to the lack of success and durability of the measures, with 
ACAS remaining as the one outstanding exception. Nevertheless, this particular 
period is notable for its multiple lost opportunities to implement measures which 
could support and complement industrial relations in ways that legislation could not 
possibly do. 
The historiography revealed that much had been written about industrial relations 
and about the three documents examined in this thesis. Much has also been written 
about the role of the law in industrial relations. Nevertheless, despite an extensive 
literature in industrial relations related to the three main documents that have been 
examined here, there has been no previous in-depth consideration of the specific 
role and suitability of legislation which might be determined from a focus on these 
important papers. Indeed, those who have written on them have been historians, 
politicians, industrial relations experts, journalists, business analysts, trade unionists 
and employers’ organizations, but very few lawyers. This exposes something of a 
lacuna in the examination of the role of legislation in the field of industrial relations, 
particularly in this period, a gap which this research has attempted to address. The 
reasons for the failure of the three documents have been explained in terms of 
multiple factors, but with scant reference to the purpose and value of legislation as a 
tool for managing industrial relations. It is interesting to note that, despite the number 
of lawyers on the Donovan Commission who argued against the use of legislation to 
regulate industrial relations, these were largely ignored by politicians.  
Of those experts who have offered opinions on the role of law in industrial relations 
in the 1960s and 1970s, Wedderburn was one who was very clear that law can play 
a useful role in providing a floor of rights, focusing on individual employment and 
safety laws. He nevertheless maintained that there were problems with laws which 
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provided for compulsory conciliation of disputes, as the Industrial Relations Act and 
In Place of Strife had both advocated. Undy, Fosh and others were wary of 
legislation that stunted the development of unions and was likely to generate hostility 
among members. Flanders and Shonfield, on the other hand, thought that there was 
an important role for legislation and that pure voluntarism was an outdated concept.  
Wrigley also approved of Flanders’s view of the role of law, finding that it had a role 
to play in industrial relations. Dunn even considered that the Industrial Relations Act 
could have been of benefit to the unions in time, putting them on a more solid legal 
footing. Nevertheless, writers such as Andrew Thorpe and Andrew Taylor were both 
sceptical about the idea of top-down solutions, with no consideration of the political 
objectives of reform. These and other writers whose work is examined here have 
contributed to a substantial corpus of divergent opinion as to the suitability of 
legislation in the regulation of industrial relations, although it could be argued that the 
emphasis on the impact of legislation in this area and how it would affect the people 
it attempted to control was sadly neglected. 
The findings that have emerged from this research have nevertheless revealed that 
an examination of such suitability can only be done within the context of the 
prevailing political and economic climate. This has been the focus of this pilot study, 
using only the key documents produced in the decade from 1965. Donovan focused 
on the historical nature of industrial relations, using past experience to inform future 
policy. In Place of Strife attempted to legislate to control inflation through incomes 
policies at a time of full employment and trade union strength. The Industrial 
Relations Act also legislated at a time of union strength; the Government failed to 
consult those unions, legislating for potential future problems that had not yet arisen. 
All were guilty of the error of overlooking the key prevailing conditions, demonstrating 
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that relying on settled opinion which is based on historical analysis, or making 
predictions of future problems, were not the most effective approaches towards 
current requirements. 
The Donovan prescription of formalizing establishment-level collective bargaining 
machinery was never viewed as sufficient by governments whose key concern was 
to control inflation - which necessitated immediate solutions; this could only be 
brought about through legislation. Successive governments have found sufficient 
justification in the failure of the Donovan prescription for industrial relations reform to 
turn to the law to exercise greater control over the collective bargaining process 
because of its potential for inflationary consequences. This has taken the law in a 
new, revolutionary direction and away from its previously social functions such as 
redressing inequality of bargaining power and the resolution of conflicts of interest 
between employer and trade union.1028 
Politicians saw a greater role for the law than Donovan was prepared to admit, 
although the failure of the White Paper and the Industrial Relations Act seems to 
have retrospectively given ample justification for the Commission’s tentative 
recommendations for legislation. Castle’s proposals indicated a determination to 
move away from the largely passive, laissez-faire role that the State had adopted in 
the post-war period of consensus. In proposing legislative solutions to the problems 
of unofficial strikes, she was placing an over-reliance on the ability of new laws to 
fundamentally change the nature of organizations which were made up of people. 
People who had become accustomed to having a voice in the workplace; the 
opportunity to negotiate wage rises and working conditions; the freedom to take 
industrial action to hold employers to ransom over their wage demands. It was 
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people who won the battle as the unions won the right to maintain their autonomy 
and control over their own activities, from which we can infer that the unions were in 
many ways stronger than the government. To dictate how unions should be run, 
therefore, they would first have to be weakened. While Heath’s legislation failed to 
do this, Thatcher’s Government from 1979 appeared to learn from this mistake and 
embarked on a programme of incremental steps which would result in a severe 
reduction in union strength. 
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was reviled by the unions during its brief life, and 
defied by many in the trade union movement precisely because it tried to introduce 
too many controls, too quickly, over union activity and procedures. Had Heath’s 
administration taken a stepped approach to industrial relations problems, the 
legislation may have met with less resistance and greater success, since the 
incremental approach of the legislature in the 1980s suggests that it was not 
legislation per se that was the wrong strategy for controlling industrial relations, but 
rather the way in which it was implemented. This may imply that there is a middle 
way, and that there are sound reasons for introducing legislation slowly and to have 
long-term goals. The measures taken by Wilson and Heath had short-term economic 
aims, and appeasing the unions was not a top priority for either of them. 
Both the Wilson and Heath governments were shown to cling to a patriarchal 
ideology which was underpinned by the idea that those who lead the country know 
best. The failure of a decade of discussion and experimentation in industrial relations 
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s was the harbinger of the incremental 
legislative approach which Thatcher’s administration adopted in reducing trade union 
powers. Nevertheless, the trade union movement was at least partly to blame for the 
failure of the Donovan Report, In Place of Strife and the Industrial Relations Act to 
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result in workable solutions, and it is undeniable that they each contained certain 
aspects which could have proved beneficial to all stakeholders. 
The Social Contract, with its agreement to accept pay restraint in return for an 
increase in social welfare provisions, was welcomed to some extent by the unions, 
but soaring inflation demonstrated the unsuitability of the experiment as a form of 
economic policy. Industrial democracy was also found to be unsuitable for the way in 
which British companies and trade unions are organized, and could not be 
successfully imposed without a complete reorganization of both, which was 
impractical. As alternatives to legislation, they undoubtedly had their merits, but were 
unsuitable because of the nature of trade unionism and company organization in this 
country, and because of the economic climate of the 1970s. 
In addition to a consideration of the reasons for the failure of each of the three 
documents to individually provide lasting solutions, this research has also given 
some insight into the reasons why they failed collectively to provide workable 
solutions to the chaotic nature of collective bargaining and union organization. First, 
their commissioners underestimated the strength of the trade unions and their 
traditions. Secondly, they failed to consider the economic situation sufficiently. 
Finally, while Donovan placed very little reliance on legislation as an appropriate 
means of controlling industrial relations, In Place of Strife and the 1971 Act went too 
far in the opposite direction, thereby failing to convince the unions of the correctness 
of their approach. In addition, this trio of failed attempts to control and regulate 
industrial relations has been blamed on ‘the attitude of the British trade union 
movement to government interference in its affairs [which] has been influenced by its 
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structure, by its affiliation to the Labour Party and by tradition.’1029 Within that 
structure lay a firm belief in free trade unionism, unfettered by statutory control. 
However, given the chaotic nature of industrial relations in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, calls for some central control were almost inevitable.  
Whilst very few of the recommendations or legislative provisions survived beyond the 
1970s, the three documents represent a significant attempt to regulate trade union 
activity, which has left an important legacy for legislators and unions alike. The 
transition from treating unions as private clubs which were outside the law was an 
inevitable response by the country’s leaders, who viewed them as a threat to law and 
order. Although unions were averse to restrictive legislation, by agreeing to 
legislation which did provide tangible benefits, they inadvertently left the door open to 
the introduction of less welcome legislation. They wanted it all, but in the end lost a 
great deal. 
The examination of this period revealed, in summary, that the 1960s ‘limited 
legislation’ Donovan solution was not fit for purpose; that the 1970s solution of 
comprehensive legislation was also ineffectual, but which paved the way for 
consideration of alternatives to legislation; and  that such alternatives require 
commitment from all sides to be effective. The ideological stance of a government 
which holds fast to the notion that legislation is indeed the most effective means of 
reducing strikes and managing the economy can take lessons from history. First, that 
legislation needs to be introduced incrementally if it is to be effective; secondly, that 
if unions are not consulted over the content of legislation, they may rebel and strikes 
may in fact increase; thirdly, that legislation can be useful to workers in providing a 
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floor of rights; and finally that collective bargaining and alternatives to legislation 
should be seen as part of a package of measures to ensure industrial harmony. If the 
purpose of legislation was the improvement of industrial relations, a responsible 
government would consider the need to balance any further restrictions on trade 
union freedom with improved working conditions and greater strengthening of trade 
unions. Governments also have to balance the interests of the State against those of 
trade unions. Striking the right balance between various sectional interests is 
essential in maintaining the correct division of bargaining power. That failure to find 
the correct balance was fatal to the success of the Donovan Report, In Place of 
Strife and the Industrial Relations Act, but provided the perfect springboard for the 
tranche of legislation that was to come. This unwelcome outcome, as far as the 
unions were concerned, provided perhaps the perfect reminder of the importance of 
compromise in achieving harmonious industrial relations, something which had been 
in short supply from unions, politicians and employers’ organizations during this most 
eventful watershed decade in industrial relations history. The evidence of this 
research around the Donovan Report, In Place of Strife and the Industrial Relations 
Act strongly suggests that legislation which aims to control the rights and the 
behaviour of trade unions is unlikely to achieve true industrial harmony, and should 
be used with the utmost caution.  
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Chapter 8: A Final Word: Implications and suggestions for further research 
 
The implications drawn from this pilot study give rise to a number of issues 
surrounding the appropriateness and efficacy of legislation in industrial relations, and 
also to certain recommendations and suggestions for further research. This research 
suggests that, for legislation to be effective it must be acceptable to those affected 
by it, and it must command their respect. Consideration of the Government’s 
motivation alongside an examination of how it strayed from tried and trusted 
methods of introducing new laws lead to a valuable insight and understanding of 
important principles which need to be followed when legislating for people. 
Further valuable lessons can be learned from this study which can be taken forward 
by future legislators. Legislation can be an effective tool in helping to set up 
organizations such as the CIR and ACAS, which offer an alternative to industrial 
action, and are still more effective when legal sanctions exist to put pressure on 
employers to comply with their recommendations. As Wedderburn suggested, law 
can also be effective in providing a floor of rights for all employees as opposed to 
just those in unionized industries. Although those rights are often inferior to the gains 
made through collective bargaining, it is suggested that this could and should be 
addressed, since it is within the gift of politicians to protect the working population 
from exploitation.  
Indeed, there is much scope for research into the extension of individual rights, and 
a consideration of whether this could lead to a reduction in strikes. For example, if 
health and safety rights were to be given a higher priority instead of being treated as 
so much ‘red tape’, this could cut down on strikes, as workers would be less likely to 
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have to resort to industrial action in order to improve working conditions. Likewise, 
there could be further research into the effects of the imposition of non-negotiated 
contracts on public sector staff, and the likelihood of this resulting in strike action as 
the only means of legitimate protest; this could lead to fully negotiated agreements in 
the future. This would be more likely to be more acceptable to workers and would be 
in accordance with the Donovan proposal to support collective bargaining.  
There is also scope for further research into the value of the unfair dismissal 
provisions, first proposed by the Donovan Commission and enacted by the Industrial 
Relations Act. A number of inferences can be drawn from their enduring nature. 
While legislation can act as a deterrent, reinforcing the position of those inclined to 
obey anyway, the complexity of the legislation and the fact that it has been barely 
revised since 1971, means that unfair dismissals are still a common occurrence, 
even though numbers are declining. Research into alternative means of preventing 
unlawful dismissals, as opposed to legislation which merely labels certain dismissals 
as unfair in retrospect, could have a positive effect on the employment relationship. 
Such research into proactive means of preventing unlawful dismissals could cut 
down on both costly litigation and industrial action in support of sacked workers.  
The inferences that can be drawn from this study could inform further research into 
the overall value and purpose of industrial relations legislation. It is reasonable to 
conclude that the Donovan Commission erred in seeking historical justification for 
not committing procedures to legislative control, since subsequent legislation has 
demonstrated how unions can continue to use the strike as the ultimate weapon, but 
only after following democratic procedures and giving sufficient notice, which is of 
benefit to both workers and employers. There is a strong argument for research into 
the viability and suitability of legislation in the realm of industrial relations. 
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Nevertheless, any legislation to curb the power of the unions without accompanying 
social legislation to improve the lives of working people is unlikely to result in an 
immediate reduction in the number of strike days, since unions would resort to the 
ultimate strike weapon to fight to keep their rights. Such use of industrial relations 
legislation, for no discernible purpose other than to emasculate the unions, is unlikely 
to be embraced or welcomed by those most affected by it.  
 
Epilogue 
It is clear from the evidence presented in this thesis that legislation to regulate 
relationships in the workplace can be an appropriate response in many 
circumstances, but without the agreement of the trade unions it is likely to encounter 
opposition if its aims are purely political and it provides little or no benefit to workers 
and unions. Restrictive laws, aimed at regulating the economy with little regard for 
the rights and needs of workers, are bound to raise objections from trade unions. 
Nevertheless, trade unions have gradually been displaced as powerful associations 
in public life by agency employment and other precarious work forms. Times have 
changed and trade unions are no longer as central to the procurement of minimum 
standards of pay and protection as they once were. The European Union has taken 
much of that role now for all workers within the Union, and Brexit, when it comes, 
may herald a new and more central role for British trade unions if, as seems likely, 
workers are stripped of the rights and protections that have been gained as a direct 
result of EU membership. Nevertheless, today’s unions no longer possess a ‘giant’s 
strength’, since the big industrial unions which were at the centre of large scale 
unofficial strikes have all but disappeared. Fifty five per cent of trade unionists are 
now women and often part-time. Jobs are generally much less secure, with many 
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workers now unwilling to risk their livelihoods by taking industrial action. If any UK 
government decided to legislate to destroy workers’ and trade unions’ remaining 
rights in the future, unions would be all but powerless to object. The Trade Union Act 
2016 represents just such a move, and the failure of the TUC and the trade unions to 
prevent its implementation is a clear demonstration of just how far the union 
movement has been weakened, while governments now have no hesitation in 
legislating both to remove much of the floor of workers’ rights and to disempower the 
trade unions. The lengthy period of transition all began with the Donovan 
Commission, but it is unlikely that the Commission could have predicted that its own 
general rejection of legislation could have been the catalyst which has led to an 
almost complete dismantling of  trade union rights and the central role played by 
collective bargaining. Nevertheless, legislators and policy makers should in future 
pay careful attention to the mistakes made by past governments if further legislation 
is to be not only acceptable to trade unions and workers, but both effective and 
workable. 
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